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INTRODUCTION
Between 1957 and 1961, the Supreme Court issued four attorney licensure deci-
sions involving three separate petitioners and three state bar admissions processes.
The decisions, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California (Konigsberg I),1 Schware v.
* Joshua E. Kastenberg, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, is a military judge assigned to Joint
Base Andrews. He thanks his wife, Elizabeth A. Kastenberg, and dedicates this Article to her.
1 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Konigsberg I was argued on January 14, 1957 and decided on
May 6, 1957. Id.
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Board of Bar Examiners,2 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California (Konigsberg II ),3
and role of attorneys in a democratic society. Decided at the height of the Cold War—
when In re Anastaplo,4 evidenced how the Justices on the Warren Court viewed the
fears of Communist espionage, subversion, and the potential for atomic warfare were
keenly felt in the three branches of government and society as a whole—the Justices
sought to influence the ability of the legal profession to determine who was eligible
for bar admission, and, therefore, what might be the role of the zealous advocate. In
particular, state bar associations had begun to restrict admission of people who had been
affiliated with the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA),5 but the CPUSA
was not the only political entity targeted for bar exclusion.6
Within the Court, two opposing camps led by Justice Hugo Black and Justice John
Harlan sparred over the ability of state judicial branches to determine bar admission
based on political affiliation and loyalty oaths.7 One recent study characterized In
re Anastaplo as “exemplif [ying] the conflict between those who, like Justice Black,
placed absolute faith in the First Amendment, and others who, like Justice John Harlan,
felt that its freedoms had to be balanced against societal needs.”8 The same could be
said for all four decisions. Harlan’s belief in the necessity of balance was not wholly
original. He was guided and coached by Justice Felix Frankfurter,9 and his approach
was a continuation of Justice Robert Jackson’s jurisprudence.10 In the first two cases de-
cided in 1957, Black appeared to prevail.11 But Harlan’s ideology formed the majority,
and, therefore, the law in the second two cases, which were also decided together.12
Although Black was an absolutist in First Amendment jurisprudence, he believed
2 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Schware was argued on January 14 and 15, 1957 and decided on
May 6, 1957, the same date as Konigsberg I. Id.
3 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Konigsberg II was argued on December 14, 1960 and decided on
April 24, 1961. Id.
4 366 U.S. 82 (1961). In re Anastaplo was argued on December 14, 1960 and decided
on April 24, 1961, the same dates as Konigsberg II. Id.
5 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 83–84; Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 270; Schware, 353
U.S. at 234 (“connection with subversive organizations”).
6 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1971) (“or any organization ‘that advocates
over-throw of the United States Government by force or violence’”).
7 See RONALD K.L. COLLINS AND SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE:
STORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 5 (2011).
8 Id.
9 See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Justice Harlan and the First Amendment, 2
CONST. COMMENT. 425, 429–30 (1985) (stating that Harlan appeared to have been strongly
influenced by Justice Frankfurter).
10 See Patrick Schmidt, “The Dilemma to a Free People”: Justice Robert Jackson, Walter
Bagehot, and the Creation of a Conservative Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 517,
523–24 (2002) (describing Justice Jackson’s jurisprudence).
11 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
12 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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the four attorneys’ admission decisions represented more than the Amendment.13 He
argued that the independent bar was the guardian of the Bill of Rights, and judicially
imposed restraints on bar admission based on political belief was a tenuous path to the
erosion of those rights.14
Centered on Justice Black, this Article is a legal history of the decisional processes,
political influences, and jurisprudential ideologies involved in these four cases. It also
provides a window into what the Justices saw as the role of the legal profession in the
criminal justice system, as well as in national security. That said, although Black
failed to build a sustained majority, his ideology ultimately prevailed over time through
other decisions and independent acts of state bars, which, in turn, significantly modi-
fied Harlan’s jurisprudential ideology. There were two changes on the Court between
the first two decisions and the second two. In 1957, the Court consisted of Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Lafayette Black, Stanley Forman Reed, Felix
Frankfurter, William Orville Douglas, Harold Hitz Burton, Tom Campbell Clark, John
Marshall Harlan, and William J. Brennan, Jr.15 By 1960, Reed and Burton had left the
Court and were replaced by Justices Charles Evans Whittaker and Potter Stewart.16
However, neither Whittaker nor Stewart played a dispositive role in the decisions;
though, in a contempt decision, Stewart’s concurrence effectively deflated Frankfurter’s
and Harlan’s dissents.17
A brief note on this Article’s legal history methodology is important. Lawrence
M. Friedman, one of the late twentieth-century’s prominent legal historians, aptly ob-
served that legal history is far more than the passage and enforcement of laws; it is also
about the people on both ends of the process.18 This Article is written with Friedman’s
view of legal history. Likewise, Bernard Schwartz, another of the twentieth century’s
leading legal historians, noted in his study on the Burger Court that because much of
the important work of the Court is done in private, studying the correspondences from
the conference sessions after the cases have been argued are critical to assessing how
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions were formulated and what the Justices
intended, in addition to the consensus opinions.19 The same could be said for the pre-
ceding Warren Court, and where possible, this Article relies on original documents
such as conference memorandum and personal correspondences, rather than secondary
13 For more on Black’s jurisprudence see HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL
WARRIOR 28 (1996).
14 Id. at 115; see also ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 412–13 (1994).
15 MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt
.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
16 Id.
17 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring and Frankfurter,
Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
18 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 4 (2002).
19 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION
11 (1990).
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sources.20 This Article does not conclude, as some recent scholarship has done, with
the claim that since September 11, 2001, Konigsberg II and Anastaplo have been
given new life, or that the government is pursuing an agenda similar to the Cold War
attempts to limit the bar.21 On the contrary, the bar is far freer today than in most of its
history to defend notorious cases despite the wishes of some government officials.22
To the extent this Article advocates any cause, it is that of historical accuracy. On
that point, it is essential from the beginning of this Article to acknowledge that the
CPUSA’s leadership did attempt to undermine the government, enable the spread of
Communism, and encourage espionage of the nation’s classified defense program,
thus endangering national security.23 But the CPUSA’s leadership and the attorneys
who represented them were not necessarily the same people.
From 1868 to World War II, with the exceptions of one decision on the exclusion
of former Confederate officers24 and one decision involving the exclusion of women
from the bar,25 the Court had not spoken on an issue challenging attorney licensing.
Dating to Jacksonian America, if not before, the bar was considered open to all white
males.26 The regulation of attorneys typically occurred within the ambit of individual
20 The primary source documents, with the exception of the Felix Frankfurter Papers, which
reside at Harvard University, are located at the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division. The
primary sources used are the papers of: Hugo Lafayette Black; Harry A. Blackmun; Harlan
Fiske Stone; William J. Brennan, Jr.; William O. Douglas; Robert Houghwit Jackson; Earl
Warren; Felix Frankfurter; John Paul Frank; and Elliot Richardson.
21 See, e.g., Mary Elizabeth Basile, Loyalty Testing for Attorneys: When is it Necessary
and Who Should Decide?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1843, 1881 (2009); Peter Margulies, The
Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of
Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003); James E. Moliterno, Politically Motivated Bar
Discipline 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 725, 752–71 (2005) (placing the discipline of Jesselyn Radack
on a continuum with the Cold War jurisprudence embodied in the four licensure cases); Alissa
Clare, Note, We Should Have Gone to Med School: In the Wake of Lynne Stewart, Lawyers
Face Hard Time for Defending Terrorists, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 651, 661–62 (2005);
Theresa Keeley, Comment, Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitutionally Vague
Concept and Now Putting Bar Applicants in a Post-9/11 World on an Elevated Threat Level,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 844, 847 (2004). Note: This Author does not disagree, as explained in
the Conclusion, that vigilance against diminishing the independence of the bar is essential.
However, historic accuracy is a fundamental aspect of constructing arguments to maintain the
bar’s independence. This Article provides an explanation of why Justice Black zealously advo-
cated for an open bar, and why his advocacy succeeded.
22 See generally, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (requiring government to provide
evidence supporting disbarment).
23 See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 537–39 (7 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2006).
24 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
25 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
26 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 237 (3d. ed. 2005).
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criminal contempt and disbarment cases.27 Then, as now, criminal contempt and disbar-
ment hearings were judicial proceedings, unique and apart from criminal convictions.28
Trial and appellate judges, more than prosecutors and legislators, are entrusted with the
governance and discipline of attorneys through the contempt power.29 Yet a finding of
contempt may carry with it penalties similar to a criminal conviction, including incar-
ceration and fines, in addition to a temporary or even a lifetime disbarment.30 Contempt
and disbarment are at one end of a spectrum of attorney regulation. At the other end of
this spectrum is the admission of persons to practice law in the first place. All state legal
systems have an interest in admitting individuals with worthy reputations, generally
captioned as “good moral character.”31 Both ends of the attorney governance spectrum
are related in the sense that the prevention of admitting undesirable persons—people
without “good moral character”—to the bar, in theory, reduces the number of con-
tempt and disbarment hearings, thereby protecting the integrity of the judicial system.
The use of contempt and disbarment decisions has relevance to bar admission
decisions in the sense that the contempt and disbarment decisions articulate why the
courts require supervisory authority over attorneys. For instance, in Nye v. United
States, the Court examined the judicial contempt authority in the context of an attorney
taking advantage of an illiterate and feeble bodied man.32 A federal judge issued a
27 See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10–15 (2007).
28 Id. at 10–15, 17–20.
29 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
30 See, e.g., Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S.
33, 42 (1941) (“[P]articular acts do not always readily lend themselves to classification as
civil or criminal contempts . . .”). In Cammer, a contempt case authored by Black, the Court
reversed a contempt conviction of an attorney who had sent a questionnaire to grand jurors
employed by the federal government to ensure that they would be fair and impartial. 350 U.S.
at 400–01. However, the attorney did so without the express permission of the judge for the
particular case, even though the judge had permitted similar questions earlier. Id. The level
of due process afforded in these proceedings was unsettled. For instance, in 1959, in In re
Crow, Black and Douglas believed that a full hearing with the right to confront witnesses was
required. 359 U.S. 1007, 1007–08 (1959). The disbarment arose from a divorce proceeding,
a non-political issue. Id. But neither Justice could persuade Brennan and Warren to vote to
grant certiorari. Brennan believed that Crow had failed to state a claim and therefore the Court
had to disbar John Crow as a matter of comity to the state decision. Letter from Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice William O. Douglas (May 25, 1959) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 1212). “My difficulty with Crow
is that his return, as I read it, makes no such charge of unfairness in the Ohio proceedings, but
only that the witnesses against him were biased or perjured themselves or that the evidence
was insufficient to prove guilt.” Id.
31 See, e.g., Basile, supra note 21; Carol M. Langford, Barbarians at the Bar: Regulation
of the Legal Profession Through the Admissions Process, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193, 1205–07
(2008).
32 313 U.S. at 39–40.
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contempt and disbarment order against the attorney.33 Authored by Justice Douglas,
the decision attempted to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt.34 The Court
did not address the constitutionality of the contempt power, however, instead basing
the decision on statutory interpretation.35 The decision, however, did provide a useful
historical background for why the courts have limited contempt power and it delin-
eated the basic concept that for behavior to be punished through the summary con-
tempt authority—rather than through a criminal trial in which a defendant would be
afforded full due process—the behavior had to occur “in the ‘presence’ of the court
or ‘near thereto’.”36 In other words, the attorney’s misconduct would have to affect
the integrity of the proceedings, or at least have the intent to accomplish this end.
Contempt proceedings and challenges to disbarment were, and are, based on the
conduct of individual attorneys, and not attorneys who happen to be part of a class
of citizens generally protected by the First Amendment, such as religion or political
affiliation. From the nation’s founding, there was no national theory that a class of
citizens would inherently degrade the integrity of the judiciary.37 The only exception
to this rule was, in 1872, the Court’s upholding of Illinois’s exclusion of women, or
at least married women, from bar admission.38 However, at that time women were not
thought to be a class for the purpose of First Amendment class protection.39
This model of judicial governance, based on individual conduct, has deep roots in
American legal history. It was crafted by John Marshall, Roger Taney, William Taft,
and, most notably, Stephen J. Field, among others.40 During the Cold War, as a result
of state and federal government activities, and the departure from over one hundred
33 Id.
34 Id. at 42–43.
35 Id. at 50. Initially Douglas’s draft leaned toward a constitutional analysis, but Frankfurter
dissuaded him by pointing Douglas to his article, Power of Congress Over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1010, which was later incorporated into the decision. See Memorandum from
Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference (Mar. 27, 1941) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 60). Frankfurter urged “[i]t is, of
course, one thing to argue, . . . that the power of the courts to punish for contempt may be cur-
tailed by legislation, and quite another to suggest that the historic power which existed at the
time of the Constitution and has persisted since offends the Constitution.” Id.
36 Nye, 313 U.S. at 52. In 1831, Congress curtailed the contempt power in response to a
Federal Judge in Missouri, James Hawkins Peck, who ordered an attorney to prison after the
attorney criticized one of his decisions in a newspaper. See Eleanore Bushnell, The Impeachment
and Trial of James H. Peck, 74 MO. HIS. REV. 137, 137–65 (1988). Peck then faced impeach-
ment in the Senate and was barely able to retain his position. Id.
37 See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873).
38 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
39 HOWARD BALL, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS: BIRTH,
SEX, MARRIAGE, CHILDREARING, AND DEATH 44 (2002).
40 See infra Part I.
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and fifty years of Supreme Court precedent, the judicial model of adjudging attorney
fitness on individual conduct was upended.41 Conservative Justices in the aftermath
of World War II relied on the contempt and disbarment cases in upholding extraordi-
nary departures from the historic model.42 Although other Justices, such as William
O. Douglas, Earl Warren, and William J. Brennan, Jr. sought to maintain the historic
model of attorney governance, it was Black who consistently spearheaded, and ulti-
mately succeeded, in its return.43
This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I provides a precedential background
for judicial authority over attorney governance. Part II briefly provides the social
and political conditions of the Cold War, including the significant anticommunist
legislation, and judicial conduct in disciplining attorneys. This Part also analyzes
two Court decisions, American Communications Ass’n, v. Douds,44 and Dennis
v. United States.45 While neither decision is directly related to attorney governance,
the decisions were influential in the attorney licensure cases. Two other decisions,
Sacher v. United States,46 and In re Isserman47 originated in Dennis and directly in-
fluenced both the state bars and the Court in attorney licensure cases. In each of these
decisions, Justice Black’s conception of the unhindered attorney becomes apparent,
even though his conception does not prevail.48 Part II also contains an analysis of
relevant public employment law decisions from 1944 to 1957. These decisions were
incorporated into the licensure decisions at both the state and federal appellate levels.
Part III analyzes the four decisions noted at the beginning of this Article, as well as
a 1959 contempt decision involving a CPUSA affiliated attorney, which arose from
a Hawaiian territorial court.49 The Article concludes with an assessment of how
Black’s ideology ultimately succeeded, even though it did not do so in the Court in
1961,50 and where Harlan’s ideology now stands.51 This is an important issue. In the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, some scholars attempted to compare the present
legal environment with the conditions of the Cold War.52 Most of these comparisons
involved inaccurate exaggerations, though the Conclusion of this Article does detail
two troubling aspects of the present environment.
41 See infra Part II.
42 See supra notes 1–4.
43 See infra Part II.
44 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
45 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
46 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
47 345 U.S. 286 (1953).
48 In re Isserman, 345 U.S. at 290–94; Sacher, 343 U.S. at 14–23.
49 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
50 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
51 See infra Conclusion.
52 See supra note 21.
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I. THE COURT AND ATTORNEY GOVERNANCE
Historically, the Court undertook a significant role in the regulation of attorneys,
particularly in determining fitness to serve as officers of the court through the contempt
and disbarment power.53 Case law precedent established that since attorneys are “offi-
cers of the court,” it is within the judicial, rather than the legislative, authority to dis-
cipline attorneys for misconduct arising from their legal obligations and performance.54
Despite creating parameters for attorney fitness determinations, with the exception of
the Civil War,55 and the singular issue of the admission of women,56 nowhere prior to
1945 did the federal judiciary ever provide guidance on the exclusion of persons from
the various bars based on political affiliation or some other class encompassed in the
First Amendment.
In 1789, Congress, in legislating the Judiciary Act, placed within the federal judi-
ciary the sole authority to adjudicate contempts against the courts.57 From that point
onward, the Court took the primary role in attorney regulation, including disbarment
proceedings, and, in matters of loyalty, determining who could be denied admission
to practice before the bar.58 For instance, in 1829, in Tillinghast v. Conkling, an un-
published decision which was uniquely incorporated authoritatively into subsequent
decisions involving attorney regulation, the Court upheld a federal district court judge’s
suspension of an attorney from practice after determining that the attorney under-
mined the efficacy of the court.59 However, one year later Chief Justice John Marshall
authored a published opinion that reversed course and readmitted Tillinghast to prac-
tice before the Court.60 In the opinion, Marshall set a precedent informing judges that
since the power to summarily convict an attorney of contempt was unique to American
jurisprudence, in that it was essentially a trial without the procedural safeguards of
jury trials, the punishment should be the least severe required.61
In 1856 in Ex parte Secombe,62 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney stressed that the fed-
eral judiciary possessed exclusive authority to determine who was qualified to serve
as an attorney in the federal courts on the premise that attorneys were officers of the
53 See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
54 See infra note 63.
55 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
56 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
57 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789). For its origins, see generally
RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER (1963), and Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power
to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts
Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847 (2010).
58 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 236.
59 For information on Tillinghast, see Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856).
60 See Ex parte Tillinghast, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 108 (1830).
61 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). Dunn is a case arising from the
power of Congress to punish a citizen for contempt. However, the opinion authored by Justice
Johnson compared the congressional power to that of the courts. Id. at 227–28.
62 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856).
2012] HUGO BLACK’S VISION 699
courts.63 However, this case arose from a disbarment challenge.64 Taney warned against
arbitrary authority in attorney regulation and cautioned that the determination of who
was unqualified to serve had to be free from “passion, prejudice, or personal hostility.”65
Taney’s decision never answered the question as to whether the federal judiciary
could bar an attorney based on anything other than the individual misconduct of the
attorney, though the case may have had a political veneer to it. The facts in Secombe
are instructive on this point.66 The case arose in the Minnesota territory on the eve of
statehood.67 David A. Secombe, a local attorney who served as mayor pro tem of Saint
Anthony, but who also had a reputation for dishonesty and incompetence,68 engaged in
actions that offended the federally appointed territorial judges, who in turn barred him
from the courts after finding him guilty of contempt.69 The territorial court’s disbar-
ment decision may have been politically motivated, but this is absent from the judicial
record and Secombe challenged the disbarment through a writ of mandamus based
on the authority of the territorial court.70 Taney determined that, because disbarment
constituted a judicial act rather than an appealable conviction, and was satisfied that
the decision was free from a taint of arbitrariness, the Court would not overturn the
territorial court.71
63 Id. at 13.
64 Id. at 9.
65 Id. at 13.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 351–53, 388 (1956).
68 LUCIUS HUBBARD & RETURN I. HOLCOMBE, 3 MINNESOTA IN THREE CENTURIES 38
(1908); JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, THE BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY LAW: COLONEL WILLIAM
WINTHROP 59–60 (2009); 1 PROCEEDINGS AND REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
MINNESOTA TERRITORY PIONEERS 151 (Harrison & Smith Printers, 1899).
69 Secombe, 60 U.S. at 15.
70 Id. For the possible political motivation underlying the disbarment, see KASTENBERG,
supra note 68, at 56. Secombe was a Republican who pushed for Black voting rights in the
state constitution. PROCEEDINGS AND REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MINNESOTA
TERRITORY PIONEERS, supra note 68, at 151; see also Secombe v. Steele, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
94 (1857). Frederick Steele, the mayor of Minneapolis and a leading Republican Party figure
in territorial politics, had instituted a suit against Secombe and several other citizens attempting
to enjoin them from claims against his property in Saint Anthony’s Falls, then an independent
township but today subsumed into greater Minneapolis. Id.
71 Secombe, 60 U.S. at 15. Taney apparently agreed with the Territorial Court finding:
The statute of Minnesota, under which the court acted, directs that the
proceedings to remove an attorney or counselor must be taken by the
court, on its own motion, for matter within its knowledge; or may be
taken on the information of another. And, in the latter case, it requires
that the information should be in writing, and notice be given to the
party, and a day given to him to answer and deny the sufficiency of the
accusation, or deny its truth.
In this case, it appears that the offences charged were committed in open
court, and the proceedings to remove the relator were taken by the court
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In 1866, the Court, in Ex parte Garland, held that the judicial branch maintained
the authority to determine who was entitled to practice before the federal courts based
on political affiliation.72 Unlike Secombe, Augustus Garland was a highly respected
attorney and former United States Senator from Arkansas who joined the Confederate
government.73 However, he was blocked from practicing before the federal courts
since a recent law prohibited former members of the Confederate government from
serving in federal offices, and congressional Republicans argued that the law stretched
to attorneys.74 Complicating the issue was the fact that President Andrew Johnson had
pardoned Garland, and the parties to the challenge spent much of their arguments on
the presidential pardoning power.75 This was an unnecessary argument to the Court,
even though the Justices gave it some attention.76 In a decision authored by Justice
Field, the majority reaffirmed that attorneys were not government officers, but rather
“officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character.”77 Moreover, Field held that the
loyalty requirement constituted a bill of attainder, or an unconstitutional means for
punishing a class of individuals without trial.78 As a result of Field’s decision, the
upon its own motion. And it appears by his affidavit that he had no notice
that the court intended to proceed against him; had no opportunity of
being heard in his defence, and did not know that he was dismissed from
the bar until the term was closed, and the court had adjourned to the
next term.
Id.
However, Secombe did not challenge the disbarment on the basis that the territorial judges
denied him the opportunity to defend himself. Had he made this challenge, Taney may have
authored the decision differently. Secombe, apparently, regained his standing to practice law
after statehood. See REV. EDWARD D. NEILL., HISTORY OF HENNEPIN COUNTY AND THE CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS: INCLUDING THE EXPLORERS AND PIONEERS OF MINNESOTA 186 (Minneapolis,
North Star Publ’g Co., 1881) (listing county officers in Minnesota).
72 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378–79 (1866). Garland was decided alongside a companion case,
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). However, Cummings was a Catholic
Priest who was convicted for teaching and performing religious duties without having taken an
oath of loyalty as required by the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 281–82. Justice Field authored
the majority opinion in Cummings, in which he and the majority determined that the test oath
required by the state constitution was an unconstitutional bill of attainder which legislatively
punished an individual without a trial. Id.; see BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT
252, 254 & 256 (2008).
73 In addition to the facts articulated in Garland, see MCGINTY, supra note 72, at 252–61,
and 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1856–1918, at
172–74 (Beard Books, 1999) (1922).
74 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 73, at 172–74. The Court had fashioned a
similar rule, but rescinded it during the Garland decision. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 378.
75 See WARREN, supra note 73, at 172–74.
76 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 380.
77 Id. at 378.
78 Id. at 377.
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determination as to who could practice before the federal judiciary was outside of the
direct reach of Congress.79 This aspect of the decision was more clearly articulated in
Justice Samuel Freeman Miller’s dissent in which he argued that since attorneys were
“essential to the very existence of government,” the decision robbed both the state and
federal legislatures of the authority to determine fitness to practice.80
In contrast to Miller’s arguments, Field and the majority did not directly address
whether the decision reached state governance of attorneys. In a companion case in-
volving a Catholic priest, the Court struck down a provision of a state constitution
on the same basis that it ruled in Ex parte Garland.81 Yet, the licensure of attorneys
was thought then, as now, to be a wholly state function and what Garland accom-
plished was a prohibition against excluding former Confederate officers from federal,
but not necessarily state courts.82 The most important aspect of Garland was its hold-
ing regarding political affiliation.83 Clearly, service as a military or government officer
in the Confederate States of America constituted a political affiliation with a design
of undermining the Union. After four years of war, which resulted in 620,000 deaths,
such service cannot have been characterized as anything else. This is an essential
fact in analyzing the Court’s conduct in the Cold War attorney licensure cases where
CPUSA membership was thought to be a danger to the national security.84
Two years after Garland, Justice Field again wrote an opinion confirming that the
admission and removal of attorneys were judicial acts.85 In Randall v. Brigham, the
Court appears to have given form to the definition of “good moral character” in terms
of attorney fitness.86 The decision originated during the Civil War when Samuel H.
Randall, an attorney for a defendant in a criminal trial, petitioned the state trial court
to dismiss larceny charges if the defendant would enlist in the Navy as a substitute for
another person.87 As part of the Civil War practice of hiring substitutes, the defendant
79 Id. at 378–79.
80 Id. at 382 (Miller, J., dissenting). Joined by Chief Justice Salmon Chase and Justices
Noah Swayne and David Davis, Miller argued:
But the question involved, relating, as it does, to the right of the legis-
latures of the nation, and of the state, to exclude from offices and places
of high public trust, the administration of whose functions are essential
to the very existence of the government, those among its own citizens
who have been engaged in a recent effort to destroy that government by
force, can never cease to be one of profound interest.
Id.
81 See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
82 FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 238.
83 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 378.
84 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
85 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
86 Id. at 535–41.
87 Randall, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 473 (1865).
702 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:691
was entitled to four hundred dollars, but Randall retained the monies even though
the defendant had already paid him for his services.88 Randall essentially committed
larceny against his client and the Superior Court of Massachusetts revoked his attorney
standing in the state; under the now accepted doctrine that removal or disbarment was
a purely judicial act, Randall was not entitled to the same procedural or evidentiary
strictures as a criminal trial.89
Justice Field agreed with the Massachusetts court, first finding that the state
court was a judicial office created by state statute and cloaked with the authority “to
admit and to remove attorneys-at-law.”90 Although Randall was afforded a chance to
refute the allegations against his character, Justice Field determined that even that was
not constitutionally required.91 “The manner in which the proceeding shall be con-
ducted, so that it be without oppression or unfairness, is a matter of judicial regulation,”
he concluded.92 Randall has not often been cited, but it is clear that “good moral
character,” as assessed by Justice Field and the rest of the Court, included the bad
acts of singular persons and not associations with a particular group.93
In the same session the Court issued Randall, it also decided Ex parte Bradley,
a case arising from another act of attorney misconduct.94 Unlike Randall, Joseph H.
Bradley’s misconduct occurred in a federal court—the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.95 Bradley was also a well-known Washington attorney,
who had successfully defended John Surratt, Mary Surratt’s son, against charges that
he conspired to assassinate Abraham Lincoln.96 In another matter, Bradley uttered
88 Id. at 474. The Superior Court cited the British case, Ex parte Brounshall, in which
Lord Mansfield said, “To strike an attorney from the roll” is not in the
nature of a punishment, it is done “because he is an unfit person to practise
as an attorney; the court exercise their discretion whether a man, whom
they formerly admitted to the bar, is a proper person to be continued on
the roll.”
Id. at 480 (quoting Ex parte Brounshall, 2 Cowp. 829 (1778)).
89 For an apt judicial description of the problems associated with the purchase of substitutes,
see Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1878). For the use of paid substitutes, see JOSHUA E.
KASTENBERG, LAW IN WAR, WAR AS LAW: BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH HOLT AND THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR AND EARLY RECONSTRUCTION,
1861–1865, at 238–39 (2011) and JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 431 (1988).
90 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 539 (1868).
91 Id. at 540.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 365 (1868).
95 Id.
96 Joseph H. Bradley Seriously Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1887, at 5. However, Bradley had
a reputation as an intemperate attorney. For instance, in 1847, a Polish military exile and
attorney named Major G. Tochman was incensed at Bradley and challenged him to a duel.
G. TOCHMAN, AN EXPOSÉ OF THE CONDUCT OF JOSEPH H. BRADLEY OF WASHINGTON, D.C.,
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contemptuous language against a judge outside of a criminal trial and in response, the
Supreme Court for the District of Columbia disbarred him.97 Bradley appealed to the
Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus claiming that as part of the unique structure
of courts in the District, the disbarment was done without jurisdictional authority.98
In an opinion authored by Justice Samuel Nelson, the majority of the Court agreed.99
From this decision, it is clear that the Court set jurisdictional parameters for disbarments
in the federal judiciary.100 Justice Nelson’s decision also determined that an attorney
who committed contempt in open court was subject to contempt proceedings in that
court with no notice; but, when the contempt occurred outside of the trial, however,
greater procedural safeguards were required.101
More than his contemporaries, Justice Field appears to have taken a keen interest
in the governance of attorney conduct. In 1873, he authored the majority opinion in
COUNSELLOR “EMPLOYED BY THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN LEGATION,” TOWARDS MAJOR G.
TOCHMAN, OF NEW YORK, COUNSELLOR RETAINED BY THE NEXT OF KIN AND HEIRS AT LAW
OF GEN. THADEUS KOSCIUSKO 3–4 (1847).
97 Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. at 370. The Supreme Court for the District of Columbia was
renamed the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1936. MINUTES OF
THE MARCH MEETING OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION, 16 J. B. ASS’N D.C. 183, 185 (1949).
98 Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. at 368–69.
99 Id. at 370. Nelson determined:
It is plain, therefore, that, according to a true construction of the act of
1863, reorganizing the courts of this district, the Supreme Court not only
possesses no jurisdiction in criminal cases, except in an appellate form,
but that there is established a separate and independent court, invested
with all the criminal jurisdiction, to hear and punish crimes and offences
within the district. And, hence, one of the grounds, if not the principal one,
upon which the return places the right and power to disbar the relator,
fails; for we do not understand the judges of the court below as contend-
ing that, if Judge Fisher, at the time of the conduct and words spoken by
the relator before him, or in his presence, was not holding the Supreme
Court of the district, but was holding a court distinct from the Supreme
Court, that they possessed any power or jurisdiction over the subject of
this contempt as complained of, otherwise the case would present the
anomalous proceeding of one court taking cognizance of an alleged con-
tempt committed before and against another court, which possessed ample
powers itself to take care of its own dignity and punish the offender.
Id. at 371–72.
100 See id.
101 Id. at 373. Nelson penned:
It is true, where a contempt is committed in the presence of the court, no
other notice is usually necessary; but a proceeding to punish an attorney
generally for misbehavior in his office, or for any particular instance of
misbehavior, stands on very different ground.
Id. Bradley’s disbarment and the Court’s proceedings were well reported in the newspapers.
See The Case of Joseph H. Bradley, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1869, at 5.
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Ex parte Robinson,102 which reversed a federal judge’s disbarment order against an
attorney after it was discovered that the attorney may have assisted a subpoenaed wit-
ness in avoiding testifying.103 The evidence against the attorney was slight and, in the
majority’s opinion, did not justify the disbarment.104 Justice Field separated the power
to hold an attorney in contempt from the disbarment power. Invoking the British and
common American practice, Field noted:
Before a judgment disbarring an attorney is rendered he should
have notice of the grounds of complaint against him and ample
opportunity of explanation and defence. This is a rule of natural
justice, and should be equally followed when proceedings are
taken to deprive him of his right to practice his profession, as
when they are taken to reach his real or personal property.105
In 1883, in Ex parte Wall, the Court upheld the removal of an attorney after a
district court determined that the attorney encouraged a lynch mob to seize and kill a
prisoner.106 In his appeal to the Court, the aggrieved attorney claimed that, even if true,
the conduct alleged occurred outside of the courtroom and the district court judge did
not first consider whether he would be indicted by a grand jury (which did not occur
at any rate).107 Authored by Justice Joseph Bradley, the majority concluded:
[I]t is apparent, that whilst it may be the general rule that a previous
conviction should be had before striking an attorney off the roll for
an indictable offence, committed by him when not acting in his
character of an attorney, yet that the rule is not an inflexible one.108
Bradley also noted that requiring a judge to wait until an indictment or conviction
“would result in allowing persons to practice as attorneys, who ought, on every ground
of propriety and respect for the administration of the law, to be excluded from such
practice.”109 Thus, a judge may, in certain circumstances, act without waiting for the
prosecutor to seek an indictment, or even register a charge, against an individual before
holding the individual in contempt.
102 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
103 Id. at 506.
104 Id. at 511.
105 Id. at 512.
106 107 U.S. 265, 265 (1883).
107 Id. at 267.
108 Id.
109 Id.
2012] HUGO BLACK’S VISION 705
Five years after Ex parte Wall, the Court issued Ex parte Terry,110 a case that origi-
nated in a habeas, rather than a mandamus, writ.111 On September 3, 1888, a woman
named Althea Terry engaged in disorderly conduct in the United States District Court
for California.112 In response, the presiding judge ordered a United States marshal
to restrain Ms. Terry, who in turn assaulted the marshal.113 Her husband, an attorney
named David Terry, also assaulted the marshal.114 The presiding judge then found
David Terry guilty of contempt, sentencing him to six months confinement.115 Prob-
lematic to the issue was that Stephen Field was the presiding judge, acting in his capac-
ity as a circuit judge rather than as a Justice of the Supreme Court, and it was Field
who sentenced Terry to six months confinement.116 In his circuit decision, Justice
Field noted that Terry had also brought a knife into the courtroom in violation of the
law.117 Also problematic to the decision was the fact that David Terry had been the
Chief Justice of the state supreme court prior to Field serving on that court, and the
two men knew each other and were antagonists.118
Justice John Harlan authored the majority opinion in which he recognized the
inherent authority of the federal circuit courts to punish contempts to its authority.119
Justice Harlan next applied a jurisdictional test to determine whether the Court could
issue the writ.120 That is, Harlan framed the issue as to whether the circuit judge had
the authority to order Terry’s imprisonment, and not whether the term of six months
was reasonable.121 Represented by Samuel Shellabarger, a two-time Republican
congressman, ambassador to Portugal, and accomplished attorney, Terry argued that
the contempt order was made in his absence, that the court never provided him notice,
and that he was not given the opportunity to defend himself.122 Justice Field had issued
the contempt order after Terry was arrested but before he was brought back into the
courtroom.123 However, in this instance, Harlan denied the habeas writ on the basis
110 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
111 Id. at 290.
112 Id. at 297–98.
113 Id. at 298 (“And whereas, said court thereupon duly and lawfully ordered the United
States marshal, J.C. Franks, who was then present, to remove the said Sarah Althea Terry from
the court-room . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 297.
117 In re Terry, 36 F. 419 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888).
118 DAVID SCHULTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 222 (2005). Ultimately, Terry
attempted to assassinate Field, but was killed by Field’s protecting United States marshal before
accomplishing the act. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 5 (1890).
119 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. at 302.
120 Id. at 304.
121 Id. at 306.
122 Id. at 291. For a biography of Shellabarger, see WILLIAM A. KINNISON, HON. SAMUEL
SHELLABARGER (1817–1896): LAWYER, JURIST, LEGISLATOR (1966).
123 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. at 310–11.
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that in issuing the contempt determination and sentence, “[t]he judicial eye witnessed
the act and the judicial mind comprehended all the circumstances of aggravation,
provocation, or mitigation; and the fact being thus judicially established, it only re-
mained for the judicial arm to inflict proper punishment.”124
In 1917, the Court in Selling v. Radford addressed the issue of comity between the
action of a state supreme court and the federal judiciary.125 The Michigan Supreme
Court had previously upheld the disbarment of George Radford, an attorney practic-
ing probate law who had defrauded several estates.126 In a decision authored by Chief
Justice Edward White, the Court determined that as long as the state courts acted in
conformance with their own procedures, the federal judiciary would respect the dis-
barment decision.127 This decision did not establish complete comity between the fed-
eral judiciary and state courts, but it is clear that the Court intended that the federal
judiciary respect state judicial contempt and disbarment decisions in all but the most
unusual cases.
In 1925, Chief Justice William H. Taft authored Cooke v. United States, a unani-
mous decision that delineated conduct outside of the traditional definition of contempt,
such as disruptive courtroom behavior or lying to the judge.128 During a civil trial,
Cooke, an attorney, became convinced of a federal judge’s bias.129 After an adverse
verdict was rendered, the attorney filed an affidavit with the court, requesting the
124 Id. at 312.
125 243 U.S. 46, 50 (1917).
126 In re Radford, 134 N.W. 472, 474 (Mich. 1912).
127 Selling, 243 U.S. at 50–51. White concluded:
In coming to solve that question three things are patent: (a) That we have
no authority to re-examine or reverse as a reviewing court the action of
the Supreme Court of Michigan in disbarring a member of the Bar of the
courts of that State for personal and professional misconduct; (b) that the
order of disbarment is not binding upon us as the thing adjudged in a
technical sense; and (c) that, albeit this is the case, yet as we have pre-
viously shown, the necessary effect of the action of the Supreme Court
of Michigan as long as it stands unreversed, unless for some reason it is
found that it ought not to be accepted or given effect to, has been to abso-
lutely destroy the condition of fair private and professional character, with-
out the possession of which there could be no possible right to continue
to be a member of this Bar.
Id. at 50.
A more recent analysis on this point can be found in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
In 1964, the Court denied certiorari with only Black and Douglas voting to grant direct review
of a state disbarment. See Conference Notes by Justice William O. Douglas to the Conference
(Oct. 9, 1967) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O.
Douglas, Box 1417). However, in 1967, the Court granted review of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s extension of comity over the disbarment. In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. at 544.
128 267 U.S. 517, 521, 532 (1925).
129 Id. at 519.
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judge recuse himself from future companion cases.130 The rules of the court required
the judge to accede to the request, but the judge believed the affidavit was insolent and
summarily found Cooke in contempt.131 Taft distinguished Cooke from Ex parte Terry
in that Cooke’s conduct occurred outside of the trial, though he noted Cooke’s con-
duct was calculated to offend the judge.132 To this end, he determined that Cooke was
entitled to mount a defense with the assistance of counsel, as though the contempt pro-
ceeding was a criminal trial.133 Taft found it reprehensible that the trial judge denied
Cooke these procedural safeguards, yet found the time to consult with an outside
counsel as a friend of the court and had the United States attorney participate in the
hearing.134 Taft concluded the decision with a reminder to trial judges that where a
counsel’s conduct is designed to inflame the judge, the judge has the responsibility to
recuse himself from determining whether contempt occurred and assessing a penalty
for the contempt.135
Like the Civil War, World War II was a watershed in terms of the Court uphold-
ing extraordinary grants of executive authority.136 United States citizens of Japanese
descent were sent into internment camps and in three decisions, the Court upheld this
action, albeit with forceful dissents.137 Moreover, the Court upheld congressional dele-
gation of lawmaking to an administrative agency in setting criminal laws.138 It also
determined that the President could prosecute unlawful enemy combatants on United
130 Id. at 533–34.
131 Id. at 532–34.
132 Id. at 535.
133 Id. at 537. Taft determined:
Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except
of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be ad-
vised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by
way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of
counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony,
relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of
the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed.
Id.
134 Id. at 537–38.
135 Id. at 539. On this point, Taft remarked:
This rule of caution is more mandatory where the contempt charged has
in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge. The judge
must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but he should not
bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great leniency.
The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency but it is
not always possible.
Id.
136 See infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
137 See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
138 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding the control of commodity prices
during war).
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States soil in military trials.139 It is not surprising that some state judicial branches
would follow suit in departing from the normal model of attorney regulation.
In 1943, the Illinois Supreme Court required affirmation of willingness to serve
in the state militia or federal military in times of emergency for admission to the bar.140
On its face, the requirement would have excluded Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mennonites,
and Quakers, among other religions. In the closing days of World War II, Clyde Wilson
Summers, a devout Methodist, appealed a state decision to prevent his bar admission
on the grounds that, owing to his sincere religious convictions, he had obtained consci-
entious objector status and was therefore excludable from admission to the bar.141 In
ruling adversely to Summers, the Illinois Supreme Court did not publish an opinion.142
As part of the unique judicial function in the state, the state supreme court ordered the
Illinois Attorney General to argue the State’s position to the Supreme Court.143 In his
139 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
140 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 565 (1945). In Illinois, attorney admissions were a
judicial, rather than legislative, function. See In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 653 (Ill. 1899). There
the court held:
The function of determining whether one who seeks to become an officer
of the courts, and to conduct causes therein, is sufficiently acquainted
with the rules established by the legislature and the courts, governing
the rights of parties and under which justice is administered, pertains to
the courts themselves. They must decide whether he has sufficient legal
learning to enable him to apply those rules to varying conditions of fact,
and to bring the facts and law before the court, so that a correct conclusion
may be reached.
Id.
141 Brief for Petitioner at 2, In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (No. 205). For a back-
ground on Summers’s life, faith, and reasons for conscientious objection to military service,
see Lea Vandervelde, A Singular Conscience: In re Summers, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 153, 160–61 (2010). Summers later was admitted to the bar and became a prominent labor
lawyer and professor. Id. at 153, 184.
Several distinguished attorneys represented Summers on his appeal including Julien
Cornell, Francis Heisler, and Arthur Garfield Hays. Brief for Petitioner supra at 1. Cornell
represented several conscientious objector cases as well as the poet Erza Pound. See Julien
Cornell, 83, The Defense Lawyer in Ezra Pound Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at D21.
Pound resided in Italy during World War II and broadcast pro-Axis statements over the radio,
but was adjudged insane and avoided incarceration. See id.
Heisler was a decorated World War I veteran who defended conscientious objectors in
World War II and during the Cold War. See MICHAEL F. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE 103
(2002); Francis Heisler, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1984, at 14. Hays was a prior general counsel to
the American Civil Liberties Union. THE ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS CIVIL LIBERTY PROGRAM:
HISTORY, N.Y.U. LAW SCH. (2011), http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/fellowships/hays
program/History/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). Along with Clarence Darrow, Hays
defended John Scopes in the Scopes Monkey Trial and the Scottsboro trial defendants. See
SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 63, 73
(2d ed. 1999).
142 In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 563–64.
143 Brief for Respondents at 1, In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (No. 205).
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brief, Summers argued that he was denied admission to the bar based on his religious
beliefs and his legal status as a conscientious objector in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.144 The Illinois Attorney General’s response was threefold. First, that the
Court did not have jurisdiction to review the case, because the decision of the state
supreme court did not consist of “a case or controversy.”145 Second, the state urged
that there was no right to become a member of the bar and that admission to practice
is a privilege outside of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections.146 Third, that the
state had an interest in ensuring that its judicial officers would uphold the entirety of
the state constitution and its laws, and a citizen who could not do so could also be
excluded from becoming an officer of the court.147
In In re Summers, a decision authored by Justice Reed, the Court’s majority de-
termined that “a case or controversy” did exist to confer jurisdiction.148 However, the
Court agreed that the state supreme court had not trammeled on Summers’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of religion.149 Reed and the majority con-
cluded that since the United States could exclude aliens from citizenship who refused
to take up arms in the defense of the nation, a state could deny a citizen admission to
the bar for the same reason.150 This meant that the consequence of Summers’s Christian
beliefs prevented him from becoming an Illinois licensed attorney. Interestingly, during
oral arguments Justice Jackson appeared to sympathize with Summers, stating, “I sup-
pose that a few literal Christians would not be a bad thing for the bar.”151 Nonetheless,
Jackson voted with the majority.152
Black disagreed and wrote a forceful dissent, with Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge
joining, arguing that Illinois had discriminated against Summers on the basis of his reli-
gious beliefs.153 He reasoned that since Summers had satisfied every other requirement
for admission to the bar, the only logical conclusion was that the state used Summers’s
faith to prevent his becoming a lawyer.154 Black also pointed out two absurdities in the
144 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 141, at 10.
145 Brief for Respondents, supra note 143, at 18.
146 Id. at 6.
147 Id. at 5, 8.
148 325 U.S. 561, 568 (1945).
149 Id. at 573.
150 Id. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), and United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931), are the two decisions referenced by the In re Summers majority for the
proposition that, because the exclusion of aliens based on a refusal to bear arms in the nation’s
defense is lawful, so too is the exclusion of a citizen from the practice of law.
151 Vandervelde, supra note 141, at 190 (quoting Letter from Julien Cornell to Zechariah
Chaffee, Jr. (May 1, 1945) (on file in the Julien Cornell Papers (DG 010), Swarthmore College
Peace Collection) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152 In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 573, 578.
153 Id. at 578 (Black, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 575. Black penned:
I cannot believe that a state statute would be consistent with our consti-
tutional guarantee of freedom of religion if it specifically denied the right
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Illinois position. First, he stated that “a lawyer is no more subject to the call for military
duty than a plumber, a highway worker, a Secretary of State, or a prison chaplain.”155
Second, he pointed out that Illinois had not drafted any citizen since 1864 and, more-
over, its constitution “prohibit[ed] the draft of conscientious objectors except in time
of war.”156
Black received considerable assistance from Justice Rutledge in formulating his
dissent.157 Initially, Black was satisfied with a dissent that focused on accusing the
state judiciary of trammeling religious liberty.158 Rutledge encouraged him to add that
the punishment of conscientious objectors, who in World War II were almost wholly
punished on religious grounds, constituted a bill of attainder, much as had been the case
in Garland, in violation of the Constitution.159 “I think those strengthen the opinion,”
Rutledge urged Black.160 Black also received editing assistance from Harold Evans, an
attorney who wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the Religious Society of Friends, a
Quaker organization.161 The original draft dissent appeared to state that under Illinois’s
scheme, a Quaker had a choice of serving in the military to retain bar membership
or being thrown out of the Society.162 Evans pointed out that this was not the case,
and Black deleted the language.163 Notably, a number of religious and international
to practice law to all members of one of our great religious groups,
Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. Yet the Quakers have had a long and
honorable part in the growth of our nation, and an amicus curiae brief
filed in their behalf informs us that under the test applied to this petitioner,
not one of them if true to the tenets of their faith could qualify for the bar
in Illinois.
Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 577.
157 Letter from Justice Wiley Rutledge to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 1, 1945) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, Box 277).
158 Draft In re Summers Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black (undated) (on file with Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, Box 277).
159 Letter from Justice Wiley Rutledge to Justice Hugo L. Black, supra note 157.
160 Id.
161 Brief on Behalf of the American Friends Service Committee as Friends of the Court,
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (No. 205).
162 Letter from Harold Evans to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 13, 1945) (on file with Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, Box 277).
163 Id. Evans wrote:
[T]here are a considerable number of members who do not [“carry out
the testimony of the Society against all war as inconsistent with their
interpretation of Christianity.”] . . . This is borne out by the fact that a
number of Quakers are serving in the armed forces. It is not the general
practice of the Religious Society of Friends to disown those who violate
its peace testimony, though that testimony remains unchanged.
Id.
Black sought clarifying language from Evans and Evans provided an alternate statement
on the Quakers which is contained in the published dissent. See Letter from Harold Evans
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organizations supported Black’s dissent, including the Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom, the Post War World Council, the United Methodist Church,
and the Congregational Church.164
Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge would, in another dissent, soon
after In re Summers, spar with Justice Reed in Fisher v. Pace,165 a contempt decision
in which the dissenting Justices argued that because the overuse of the contempt author-
ity could result in judicial tyranny, it should only be used sparingly, and not in that
particular case.166 In Fisher, a state judge’s contempt finding resulted in the imprison-
ment of an attorney who deviated from a state judge’s expectation of orderly admin-
istration of justice in a workmen’s compensation trial.167 The record presented by the
Court, including in Reed’s majority opinion, evidences a frustrated judge who likely
worsened the matter.168 In conference, Reed took exception to Rutledge’s draft dissent,
to Justice Hugo L. Black (July 18, 1945) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, Box 277); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to
Harold Evans (July 10, 1945) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers
of Hugo Lafayette Black, Box 277).
164 Letter from Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom to Justice Hugo L.
Black (July 24, 1945) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo
Lafayette Black, Box 277). Its Legislative Chairman, Sophia H. Dulles, who was later accused
of being a Communist, but was in reality a devout Quaker who believed in world disarma-
ment and by all records was faithful to the United States, wrote Black, “[a]ny curtailment of
our personal freedoms is today doubly dangerous because of the marked world drift toward
authoritarian government.” Id.; see also, e.g., ELIZABETH KIRKPATRICK DILLING, THE RED
NETWORK 212 (1977) (noting Dulles’s membership in the Pennsylvania Committee for Total
Disarmament); EDWARD THOMAS, QUAKER ADVENTURES, EXPERIENCES OF TWENTY THREE
ADVENTURES IN INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 146–55 (2005) (discussing Dulles’s post-
war reconstruction work). For more information on the League, see CARRIE A. FOSTER, THE
WOMEN AND THE WARRIORS: THE U.S. SECTION OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 1915–1946 (1995).
Norman Thomas and Oswald Garrison Villard, who had both championed the NAACP and
had campaigned against what they believed was the nation’s imperialist expansion, founded the
Post War World Council. NEIL A. HAMILTON, AMERICAN SOCIAL LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS 367,
380 (2002). Thomas wrote to Black, “You have put the country, and all lovers of true liberty and
true freedom, in your debt.” Letter from Norman Thomas to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 18,
1945) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette
Black, Box 277). The Grace Methodist Church’s leadership council informed Black that they
“rejoice[d] for your judgment in the matter.” Letter from Robert H. Hamill of Grace Methodist
Church to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 13, 1945) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black, Box 277). As to the Congregational Church, see
Letter from Merrill F. Clarke of Congregational Church to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 15,
1945) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo Lafayette Black,
Box 277).
165 336 U.S. 155 (1949).
166 Id. at 163 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 156 (majority opinion).
168 See id. at 157–59. Within a brief exchange, the trial judge sentenced Fisher first to a
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which included the language: “whatever the provocation, there can be no due process
in trial in the absence of calm judgment and action, untinged with anger, from the
bench.”169 Reed threatened to add to the majority opinion that judges could not always
be expected to preserve “an unruffled calm during trial,” alluding to the Court’s in-
creasingly stormy conference sessions, where “the only safe place for brother jurists
is under the table.”170 To this Rutledge replied, “[a]lthough there are those who believe
in the administration of justice from under the table, I am of the opinion that this
should be restricted to the conference room.”171 However, Black and Reed did not in-
clude these in their final opinions and prevented any airing of the Court’s increasingly
acidic divisions.172
In re Summers was a radical departure from the historic model of judicial gov-
ernance of attorneys. For the first time in the nation’s history, a class of citizens
ordinarily protected by the First Amendment could be excluded from the practice
of law.173 There is no evidence that the Justices in the majority opinion viewed the
decision as a means to exclude persons from admission to practice on the basis of
political affiliation, but Summers became a vehicle to accomplish just that.174 Indeed,
the decision was broadly used to enable the exclusion of CPUSA members and fellow
travelers from union leadership positions, as well as the exclusion of persons from
admission to practice law.175 Likewise, Fisher later provided a federal judge latitude
to provoke counsel representing CPUSA members in a decision discussed below.176
II. THE COURT, THE COLD WAR, AND CHALLENGES TO THE HISTORIC
MODEL OF ATTORNEY GOVERNANCE
There are three lines of post–World War II decisions, each of which enabled state
bars to deny admission to applicants based on CPUSA ties or other so-called subver-
sive organizations. The first line of these decisions involved the federal regulation of
commerce considered vital to the national economy and the partial criminalization
fine of twenty-five dollars, then fifty dollars, then three days in jail, followed by one hundred
dollars. Id. at 158. Fisher insulted the judge with the comment “you know you have all the
advantage by you being on the bench,” before the last fine. Id.
169 Memorandum from Justice Stanley F. Reed to the Conference (Feb. 5, 1949) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 182).
170 Id.
171 Memorandum from Justice Wiley Rutledge to the Conference (Feb. 5, 1949) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 182) (response
to Justice Stanley F. Reed).
172 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 573 (1945).
173 See id. at 573 (Black, J., dissenting).
174 See infra Part II.
175 See infra Part II.
176 See infra Part II.
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of free speech and association.177 The second category of decisions encompassed dis-
barment and contempt cases that originated from the previous category.178 Of impor-
tance to this line of cases, in 1941, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to extend the Court’s authority to include establishing rules for criminal
contempt proceedings.179 The third and final line of decisions involved state loyalty
programs affecting public employment.180 However, a brief analysis of Justices Black’s,
Douglas’s, and Frankfurter’s varying views on domestic Communism, as summarized
in a single World War II opinion, Schneiderman v. United States,181 is helpful in under-
standing the interplay between the three lines of decisions, as well as the ultimate hold-
ings for the three bar applicants, even though the decision predated Justice Harlan’s
service on the Court.182
William Schneiderman was a CPUSA member who immigrated to the United States
in 1908 at age three and gained citizenship in 1927.183 In 1932, he ran for the Minnesota
governorship on the CPUSA platform, evidencing his belief that Communism could
become the dominant political force through the electoral process, rather than through
the violent overthrow of the government.184 In 1939, the Justice Department was deter-
mined to strip Schneiderman of his citizenship, despite his having no criminal record
and despite a lack of evidence pointing to engagement in seditious activity.185 The
Justice Department’s reasoning had to do with Schneiderman’s Communist activities,
which predated his naturalization, though this was a specious basis because he had
never hidden his activities from the government.186 Somewhat ironically, Wendell
177 See infra Part II.B–C.
178 See infra Part II.D–G.
179 Act of November 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 779 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771–3772)
(FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 (1994)).
180 See infra Part II.H.
181 320 U.S. 118 (1943). Robert Jackson disqualified himself from the case because he acted
as Attorney General during the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals stages. Id. at 207.
He also wrote in a similar independent statement to Frank Murphy:
I take no part in this decision. This case was instituted in June of 1939
and tried in December of that year. In January 1940, I became Attorney
General of the United States and succeeded to official responsibility for
it. That is the sole cause of my disqualification, and I desire the reason
to be a matter of record.
Letter from Justice Robert H. Jackson to Frank Murphy (June 19, 1943) (on file with Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harlan F. Stone, Box 69).
182 MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15 (Justice
Harlan joined the bench Mar. 28, 1955).
183 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE
AND VINSON, 1941–1953, at 52 (1997).
184 Id.; JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY
OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 240 (2004).
185 Id.; PETER G. RENSTROM, THE STONE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 126
(2001).
186 RENSTROM, supra note 185, at 126.
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Willkie, who had run as the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, represented
Schneiderman against an Executive Branch accused of socialist sympathies.187
Justices Murphy, Douglas, Black, Reed and Rutledge believed that the govern-
ment had overreached in its zeal to contain subversive ideologies.188 However, Douglas
and Rutledge separately concurred.189 Writing for the majority, Murphy, with Black and
Reed joining, noted that there was a difference between advocating abstract principles
and a call to violent action.190 Douglas believed that Congress could legislate that a
Communist affiliation was a basis for denying citizenship, but had not done so, and
therefore Schneiderman had not broken any laws.191 Rutledge took a harder line on the
rights of citizenship than the other three Justices, concluding that denaturalization
should only occur if an individual receives citizenship by fraud.192
In his dissent, Chief Justice Stone recited Karl Marx’s admonition that an evo-
lution to Communism could only be achieved by violent ends.193 “The fountainhead of
Communist principles, the Communist Manifesto, published by Marx and Engels in
1848, had openly proclaimed that Communist ends could be attained ‘only by the forc-
ible overthrow of all existing social conditions,’” Stone wrote in his dissent.194 “After
1920 these teachings were revived and restated in Party publications which, in the
period we are now considering, were used in the Communist educational program that
petitioner was directing.”195 Frankfurter agreed with Stone, though he also urged the
187 WIECEK, supra note 23, at 295. On Republicans accusing Roosevelt of harboring
Communists, see 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 622 (1960).
188 UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 53–54; see also infra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
189 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 161, 165 (1943).
190 Id. at 157–58. Murphy specifically held:
There is a material difference between agitation and exhortation calling
for present violent action which creates a clear and present danger of
public disorder or other substantive evil, and mere doctrinal justifi-
cation or prediction of the use of force under hypothetical conditions
at some indefinite future time—prediction that is not calculated or in-
tended to be presently acted upon, thus leaving opportunity for general
discussion and the calm processes of thought and reason.
Id.
191 Id. at 163 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas urged:
If an anarchist is naturalized, the United States may bring an action
under § 15 to set aside the certificate on the grounds of illegality. Since
Congress by § 7 of the Act forbids the naturalization of anarchists, the
alien anarchist who obtains the certificate has procured it illegally what-
ever the naturalization court might find. The same would be true of com-
munists if Congress declared they should be ineligible for citizenship.
Id.
192 Id. at 166, 169–70 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 191 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
194 Id.
195 Id.
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Chief Justice to moderate the dissent with the statement that absent acts and public
statements, membership in the CPUSA alone does not “disprove[ ] attachment to the
Constitution.”196 But Stone did not include this line.197 For his part, Frankfurter dis-
played anger at being in the dissent, accusing the majority of not wanting to offend the
Soviet Union because of the wartime alliance.198 To Stone, he wrote that “political
considerations” were “the driving force behind the result of this case,” and that if
Schneiderman were a “Bundist” (a term for American Nazi Party members) the oppo-
site result would have been reached.199 “For me the essence of this case is the very
simple vindication of the old truth that one cannot serve, in thought and feeling and
action, two independent masters at the same time,” he concluded.200
In the summary of the discussion during the conference, Frankfurter noted that
while he could not “understand why the government did not confess error in this par-
ticular case and let it go at that,” he would not vote to overturn the government either.201
He added that he had “known the Schneidermans and a good many of them well since
my college days,” and he admired “their devotion to their ideals.”202 Yet, because their
devotion was “to a wholly different scheme of things from that to which this country,
through its Constitution, is committed,” he believed that Schneiderman could lose his
citizenship without having first committed a crime.203 This statement was Frankfurter’s
judicial deference philosophy in a nutshell. He believed the government was in error,
but not constitutionally so, and therefore would not vote to overturn the case.204 Also
evident in Frankfurter’s notes is a further expansion on his accusation that the majority
was politically motivated by its desire not to damage United States-Soviet relations.205
He claimed that Black and Reed both wanted to hold the case over until after the war.206
A. Anticommunist Legislation
With the conclusion of World War II, fears of Communist conspiracies to under-
mine the United States government resulted in state and federal loyalty programs of
196 See id.
197 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Harlan F. Stone (June 13, 1943) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harlan F. Stone, Box 69).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Harlan F. Stone (May 31, 1943) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harlan F. Stone, Box 69).
201 Summary of Conference Discussion by Justice Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 5, 1942), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 7, Series I (Harvard Law Sch.).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
205 Summary of Conference Discussion by Justice Felix Frankfurter, supra note 201.
206 Id.
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a nature never before seen.207 While state judicial branches remained the determinant
of good moral character for attorney admissions, the federal judiciary was positioned
to play a greater role in the oversight of attorney conduct for several reasons, two of
which are essential in explaining Konigsberg I and II, Schware, and In re Anastaplo.208
First, in 1941, the Court struck down state anti-syndicalism laws on the basis that the
federal laws in security matters preempted those of the fifty states.209 To be sure, state
governments could possess their own loyalty programs and prosecute citizens for per-
jury and obstruction of justice, but at the same time, could not criminalize membership
in the CPUSA or any other organization.210 Second, the political and judicial environ-
ment of the 1930s through the Cold War created conditions where attorneys defending
both CPUSA members, as well as those advocating civil rights, were judicially accused
of subverting the government.211
In 1938, Congressman Martin Dies was named chairman of the newly formed
House Special Committee on Un-American Activities.212 Shortly after its formation,
Dies’s committee claimed that the Executive Branch was infested with Communists,
radicals, and other dangerous persons.213 The following year, Congress passed an
amendment to the Hatch Act that prohibited Communists from federal employment.214
In 1940, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, more commonly known as the
Smith Act.215 During World War II, the Justice Department prosecuted only a few
persons under these laws, but following the Japanese surrender, the political climate
changed and national security, coupled with anticommunist sentiment, became the
leading political, and to an extent social, issue in the nation.216
207 See, e.g., ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED
MONDAY 26–29 (1999) (discussing the Truman Administration’s loyalty program created
to combat accusations that the administration is “soft on Communism”).
208 Keeley, supra note 21, at 846–47.
209 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Justice Harlan Stone, soon to become Chief
Justice, dissented in this decision and argued that a state could augment the federal government
with its own internal security laws. Id. at 74–75 (Stone, J., dissenting); MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15 (Justice Stone was promoted to
Chief Justice July 3, 1941).
210 Hines, 512 U.S. at 74 (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting states may exercise their powers
expressly or by necessary implication prohibited by “some authority delegated to the United
States”).
211 UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 159, 175 (discussing how attorneys representing Commu-
nists were convicted of contempt); see Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 3, 5–11 (1952).
212 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 354 (2004); see also 2 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL
FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
733 (2d ed. 2002).
213 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 212, at 733–34; see also TED MORGAN, REDS:
MCCARTHYISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 187 (2003).
214 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 212, at 734.
215 Id.
216 UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 159–61.
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In 1945, the House of Representatives made the Dies Committee permanent and,
from that point until its termination in 1975, it was known as the House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC).217 In 1947, the Republican-led Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act, which imposed limitations on the right to strike, particularly prohibit-
ing secondary strikes and boycotts.218 Although the law was primarily a rollback against
pro-labor New Deal legislation, Section 9 of the law prohibited CPUSA members from
serving in union leadership positions.219
In 1947, Truman issued Executive Order 9835, which set up a comprehensive loy-
alty program for vetting federal employees.220 It also enabled the Attorney General to
list subversive organizations.221 The Attorney General, Thomas C. Clark, who later
became a Supreme Court Justice, listed eighty-two organizations as subversive.222 The
list was successfully challenged in the Court, and Justice Clark recused himself from
several decisions because of his role in creating the list.223
The loyalty programs and statutes were problematic for several reasons, but, in
particular, because their overuse trammeled on individual rights.224 Moreover, oppor-
tunists, such as Senator Joseph McCarthy, were enabled to accrue power through accu-
sations and inquests.225 In regard to the attorney applicant issues, there was a further
complicating issue.
Anticommunist ideologues not only targeted CPUSA members, but also the larger
group of so-called “fellow-travelers.”226 This latter group consisted of intellectual elites
and others who believed in Communism, but not through the suppression of freedoms
as had happened in the Soviet Union and China.227 There was little consensus as to what
members in this category believed.228 Indeed, some espoused compatibility between
Christianity and Communism, an idea which was antithetical to the teachings of Karl
Marx.229 Thus, one could accept certain tenets of Communism, but refuse to partici-
pate in the means of achieving the tenets.230 The statutes and executive order did not
217 MORGAN, supra note 213, at 187.
218 UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 159–61.
219 Id.
220 WIECEK, supra note 23, at 431 (describing Executive Order 9835).
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 212, at 757.
225 Id. at 765.
226 DAVID CAUTE, THE FELLOW-TRAVELERS: INTELLECTUAL FRIENDS OF COMMUNISM 289
(1988) (noting Vice President Nixon’s announcement, “We’re kicking the communists and
the fellow-travelers . . . out of the Government . . .”).
227 Id. at 5–6.
228 Id. at 6 (noting “we can understand fellow-travelling only in terms of disillusionment”).
229 CAUTE, supra note 226, at 259 (noting similarities in Christian and Communist ethics).
230 Id. at 4 (noting that “fellow-travelling involves commitment at a distance”).
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effectively distinguish between CPUSA members and “fellow-travelers” or other
persons who merely believed that some of the CPUSA’s tenets were laudable.231
B. Federal Law on Economic Regulation and the Criminalization of Speech
In American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, the Court, with only six Justices
sitting, determined that Section 9 of the Taft-Hartley Act, requiring organized labor
union leaders take an anticommunist oath or have their union divested of the National
Labor Relations Act’s protections did not violate the First Amendment.232 Justices
Douglas, Clark, and Minton took no part in the decision.233 Section 9 was designed to
prevent politically motivated strikes that could weaken national security.234 The CPUSA
and other Communist organizations had attempted to strike at war industries’ factories
prior to World War II, and, in one case, during the war.235 Labor organizations pro-
tested the law on the basis that it contravened the First Amendment right to freedom
of association by limiting who was entitled to run for an essentially private office.236
Authored by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, the Court’s majority opinion looked to con-
gressional authority to regulate commerce, and then adopted a statement which would
later prove influential in Konigsberg I and II, Schware, and In re Anastaplo:
Although the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech, press or assembly, it has
long been established that those freedoms themselves are depend-
ent upon the power of constitutional government to survive. If it
is to survive it must have power to protect itself against unlawful
conduct and, under some circumstances, against incitements to
commit unlawful acts.237
While Vinson cited to several precedential authorities, he relied on In re Summers
for the proposition that the government could legislate on the basis of a status, which
would ordinarily be outside of the scope of laws and regulations.238 He later cited In
231 Id. at 288 (noting both CPUSA members and “fellow-travelers” were subject to
persecution).
232 339 U.S. 382, 411–13, 415 (1950).
233 Id. at 415. “Douglas was recovering from a serious injury.” WILLIAM COHEN ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 49 (6th ed. 2007). Minton had
been nominated but not yet confirmed by the Senate. Id. And, Clark recused himself from
the decision since, as Attorney General he had advised President Truman on the matter. Id.
234 Douds, 339 U.S. at 396, 400.
235 Id. at 430 (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
236 Id. at 389 (majority opinion).
237 Id. at 394.
238 Id. at 391. The majority specifically held, “The fact that the statute identifies persons by
their political affiliations and beliefs, which are circumstances ordinarily irrelevant to permissible
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re Summers as proof that if the government’s interest in the moral character of attor-
neys could prevent a class of individuals from admission to the bar, it could certainly
protect industrial peace.239 Vinson turned to In re Summers a third time for a redundant
argument that because the perceived legitimate security needs of a state government
could prevent a class of individuals from admission to the bar, the federal government
could similarly act in baring disloyal persons from leadership positions in unions.240
In other words, to Vinson, there were instances of such gravity where the civil, non-
criminal laws could single out a group that would ordinarily be afforded protection
under the First Amendment.
Frankfurter concurred in the majority’s decision with the caveat that certain pro-
visions of the Act would run afoul of the Constitution if used in the criminal courts
under a charge of perjury.241 He worried that an individual who disavowed CPUSA
membership or sympathy for Communism might still share in some of the goals of the
party and then be prosecuted for perjury.242 Likewise Jackson concurred, but with a
significant exception.243 He recognized the CPUSA’s unique features which set it apart
from other movements.244 Almost reiterating the dissent in Schneiderman, he stated
“[t]he Communist Party alone among American parties past or present is dominated
and controlled by a foreign government. It is a satrap party which, to the threat of civil
disorder, adds the threat of betrayal into alien hands.”245 Jackson clarified that Section 9
did not outlaw the CPUSA or prohibit its members from running for public office, but
subjects of government action, does not lead to the conclusion that such circumstances are
never relevant.” Id.
239 Id. at 398.
240 Id. at 405. The majority noted:
[I]n In re Summers, . . . we upheld the refusal of a state supreme court
to admit to membership of its bar an otherwise qualified person on the
sole ground that he had conscientious scruples against war and would
not use force to prevent wrong under any circumstances. Since he could
not, so the justices of the state court found, swear in good faith to uphold
the state constitution, which requires service in the militia in time of war,
we held that refusal to permit him to practice law did not violate the
First Amendment, as its commands are incorporated in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the relation between the
obligations of membership in the bar and service required by the state
in time of war, the limited effect of the state’s holding upon speech and
assembly, and the strong interest which every state court has in the per-
sons who become officers of the court were thought sufficient to justify
the state action.
Id.
241 Id. at 420 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part).
242 Id. at 418–19.
243 Id. at 422 (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
244 Id. at 422–24.
245 Id. at 427.
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rather was a legitimate congressional limitation of union activities.246 However, he be-
lieved the requirement that union officers take an oath disavowing a belief in the over-
throw of the government by violence or other unlawful means was unconstitutional.247
Jackson urged, that without an overt act, the requirement to disavow a belief violated
the First Amendment.248 “While the Governments, State and Federal, have expansive
powers to curtail action, and some small powers to curtail speech or writing, I think
neither has any power, on any pretext, directly or indirectly to attempt foreclosure of
any line of thought,” he concluded.249
Unsurprisingly, Black dissented, arguing that the Act was passed to exclude cer-
tain beliefs from the economic arena.250 He compared the act to the prosecutions of
Protestants in France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as the
then-contemporaneous English prosecutions of Catholics, Quakers, and Baptists.251
Citing to his dissent in In re Summers, Black concluded that required oaths were an
abomination to liberty.252
Problematic to Douds and Truman’s loyalty program was that when, on March 21,
1947, Truman issued Executive Order 9835, he empowered the Attorney General to
compile a list of organizations deemed subversive.253 The Attorney General, in turn,
established the Loyalty Review Board.254 Ostensibly, the Board’s members would
examine information provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and con-
gressional inquiries, and then determine whether the organization would be listed as
subversive.255 Members, or supporters, of the organization would then find themselves
labeled as subversive and the risk of denial of public employment or blacklisting from
private organizations, unions, or political processes would be very real.256
In Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, the Court granted a declaratory
judgment on behalf of three listed organizations.257 The organization named in the
decision had supported anti-Franco forces during the Spanish Revolution.258 A second
organization, the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, sought to lessen
friction between the two nations by distributing Soviet educational materials in the
United States, much of which were materials about the United States.259 The third
246 Id. at 429.
247 Id. at 422, 445.
248 Id. at 445.
249 Id. 442.
250 Id. at 446–47 (Black, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 447.
252 Id. at 447–48 (citations omitted).
253 See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 23, at 431.
254 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 125 (1951).
255 See id. at 138 n.11.
256 See id. at 142 (Black, J., concurring).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 130–31 (majority opinion).
259 Id. at 132–33.
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organization was a fraternal benefit society incorporated under New York’s Insurance
Law.260 Each of the organizations were able to prove that they did not fall into the
definition of “subversive” and that the Attorney General had ignored these facts.261
Rather than find Executive Order 9835, or simply the Loyalty Board, unconstitutional,
the Court determined the Attorney General’s act of placing the organizations on the
subversive list was arbitrary and outside of the authority conferred by the Executive
Order. They thus required the executive branch to provide an avenue for groups to
challenge their placement on the list.262
C. Dennis v. United States
If the public believed that Joint Anti-Fascist Committee signaled that the Court was
limiting loyalty programs, it was mistaken. On July 20, 1948, the Justice Department
secured indictments against twelve CPUSA leaders, including Eugene Dennis, for orga-
nizing and assembling “persons who teach and advocate the overthrow . . . of the
Government of the United States by force and violence,” and “knowingly and willfully”
advocating the same.263 The trial lasted nine months and by contemporary standards
failed due process.264 The FBI eavesdropped on the defendants’ lawyers, who in turn,
contributed to eroding the efficacy of the trial. The defense counsel was not alone in
this erosion. Judge Harold Medina’s conduct during the trial included publicly berat-
ing defense counsel.265 At the end of the trial, Medina found the defense attorneys in
contempt.266 The contempt hearings are analyzed further below, but it is worth noting
here that the media reported the trial as “the Battle of Foley Square,” and it became
known as such in the public eye.267 Indeed, the trial was extensively covered by the
media, mostly favorable to the prosecution.268
Ironically, during World War II, Medina, then serving as a defense counsel, rep-
resented a naturalized citizen named Anthony Cramer, who was convicted of treason
after assisting German saboteurs who were ultimately prosecuted and sentenced to
death.269 This point is instructive for both assessing Medina’s conduct in the trial, as
260 Id. at 134.
261 Id. at 137.
262 Id. at 137–38. For more information, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 17 (2000) (noting “that the Attorney General’s List would continue
to be a blackballing mechanism” and that “known membership in a listed group meant the end
of government employment”).
263 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 497.
264 See, e.g., UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 212, at 758–59.
265 Id. at 759.
266 UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 175.
267 See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 340; see also UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 175.
268 Communist Trial Ends With 11 Guilty, LIFE, Oct. 24, 1949, at 31–35.
269 SABIN, supra note 207, at 42–43. The decision is Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1
(1945). Jackson authored the majority with Frankfurter joining. Id. Frankfurter realized that
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well as the Court’s approach to Dennis. In Ex parte Quirin, a decision arising out of
the German saboteurs military trial, the Court upheld the executive branch’s authority
to conduct military trials over captured enemy combatants.270 The Court hinted that,
although due process might apply to those trials, this issue would be saved for another
day.271 Cramer, who was prosecuted and convicted in a United States district court, saw
his conviction overturned by the Supreme Court on the basis that the quantum of evi-
dence required to prove treason, a crime singularly enumerated in the Constitution,
required an overt act, and the act had to be done with the intent of being treasonous.272
In other words, proof of treason required more than making public speeches.
The Dennis defendants were not, however, convicted of treason, but rather of vio-
lating a statute, and the issue was rooted in the First Amendment rather than in the text
of a constitutional article.273 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the convictions in a decision authored by Judge Learned Hand.274 In doing so,
the appellate court modified the “clear and present danger” test, to “whether the gravity
of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as
is necessary to avoid the danger.”275 Because the defendants raised the issue of judicial
misconduct, Hand felt compelled to comment:
The record discloses a judge, sorely tried for many months of tur-
moil, constantly provoked by useless bickering, exposed to offen-
sive slights and insults, harried with interminable repetition, who,
if at times he did not conduct himself with the imperturbability
of a Rhadamanthus, showed considerably greater self-control and
forbearance than it is given to most judges to possess.276
The Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld the convictions and adopted Hand’s
reasoning, but it had to address Medina’s conduct, as well as the status of the defense
the decision would set a citizen free who had aided the German saboteurs but wrote Jackson
on this point:
I myself am not troubled by the fear that “A traitor could not be convicted
of treason in a case like Cramer.” In the first place that assumes . . . he
is a traitor, and in the second place it disregards the readiness of the
Constitution to let some traitors escape in order to make it more difficult
to manufacture evidence against people who are not traitors.
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson (Mar. 24, 1944) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 131).
270 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
271 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 212, at 727.
272 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 47.
273 Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494, 495–96 (1951).
274 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (Judge Hand was joined by Thomas
Swan and Harrie Brigham Chase concurred.).
275 Id. at 212.
276 Id. at 226.
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counsel.277 It granted certiorari on October 23, 1950, and set the date for oral argu-
ments for December 4, of the same year.278 The Dennis defendants retained Harry
Sacher,279 Richard Gladstein,280 George W. Crockett281 and Abraham Isserman282 as
counsel. Judge Medina had held each of these attorneys in contempt, and soon the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was to review the contempt
findings in a split decision, analyzed further below.283 While that contempt finding
traversed the federal courts, the attorneys argued for a brief delay,284 in all likelihood
hoping for a published statement on their pending contempt cases.
The vehicle for getting the Court to publish a decision on the delay request was to
petition Chief Justice Vinson to grant an additional month of preparation so that a noted
British barrister could argue in their place should the need arise.285 To prove the neces-
sity of obtaining foreign counsel, Sacher informed Vinson that “twenty-four American
lawyers” were invited to participate in the case, but had declined to do so.286 On learn-
ing of the delay request, Vinson informed the Justices and accused the attorneys of
failing “to state a substantial ground for the relief requested, and the aura of dilatory
tactics pervading it.”287 On November 24, 1950, Vinson circulated a more formal con-
ference memorandum that he intended to publish into a decision, acknowledging that
the attorneys had requested twenty-four of the nation’s most prominent counsel, and
each of the twenty-four had “declined to associate” with the appeal.288 But, he dismissed
277 Sacher v. United States, 341 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1951).
278 Dennis v. United States, 340 U.S. 863 (1950).
279 Sacher was a long-time CPUSA member. See Harry Sacher, Lawyer, Dead; Red’s
Counsel Defied Senators, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1963, § 11 (Magazine), at 35.
280 Gladstein was a labor lawyer based in San Francisco. See H.R. REP. NO. 8-41, at 20. His
clients included Harry Bridges, and John Caughlan, a Washington state lawyer indicted for
perjury in denying he had been a CPUSA member. REGISTER OF THE RICHARD GLADSTEIN
PAPERS, 1930–1969, ONLINE ARCHIVE OF CALIFORNIA (2009), http://www.oac.cdlib.org
/findaid/ark:/13030/tf9489p0fn?query=register (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
281 George Crockett was a New Deal lawyer employed in the Department of Labor from
1939 to 1943. Comm. on House Admin. of the U.S. House of Representatives, George William
Crockett, Jr. (1909–1997), in BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, 1870–2007, at 506 (2008).
A 1934 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School, Crockett was one of the first
African Americans to practice law in Florida. Id. After his government service, he represented
the United Auto Workers. Id. While he was not a CPUSA member, he was openly critical of
McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee. See id.; George W. Crockett,
Jr., CROCKETTACADEMY.COM (2011), http://www.crockettacademy.com/uploads/4/3/9/7
/4397552/george_crockett_bio.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
282 For information on Abraham Isserman, see H.R. REP. NO. 8-41, at 8.
283 See infra notes 335–44 and accompanying text.
284 Dennis v. United States, 340 U.S. 887, 887 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., individual statement).
285 Id.
286 Memorandum from Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson to the Conference (Nov. 22, 1950)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 306).
287 Id.
288 Memorandum from Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson to the Conference (Nov. 24, 1950)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 306).
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the argument that since twenty-four eminent attorneys had refused to represent Dennis
and that their American attorneys worked under a contempt sentence, only a noted for-
eign counsel could salvage the fairness required by the Due Process Clause.289 More-
over, Vinson opined that the twenty-four counsel refused to join the defense because
they would not have control over “tactics which they would disapprove.”290
Vinson also added that he was not opposed to permitting the British attorney to
join the defense team, but opposed a delay for this purpose.291 The attorneys had
claimed that the British attorney required an additional month because he was in-
volved in a trial in India.292 On this point, the Chief Justice added the delay was un-
necessary because Sacher and Isserman, in particular, were, “innately familiar with the
case, from the details of the record to the broad constitutional questions presented. In
their appearance both here and in the court of appeals they have made able, concise
and lawyerly arguments.”293
Black opposed publishing a response, writing that it was “inappropriate for the
Court to adopt the extraordinary procedure of writing a formal opinion to defend its
action.”294 He also accused Vinson of gratuitously defending the twenty-four attorneys
who refused to join in the Dennis appeal.295 As to Isserman, Sacher, and the others, he
concluded “whatever their legal skills, the District Court has held these same lawyers
guilty of contempt of court for the manner in which they tried these very cases.”296
More than Black, Douglas expressed his offense at Vinson’s draft, claiming that
it left him with the impression that the denial of postponing oral argument occurred
because the counsel were Communists representing Communists.297 He threatened to
publish a dissent from the denial of delay, which would include that, while he did not
know the reasons for twenty-three of the twenty-four attorneys who refused to partici-
pate, he did know the reasons of one.298 “[H]e did so not on the grounds advanced in
the [Chief ’s] opinion but because he would lose clients if he accepted the retainer.”299
Although Frankfurter did not oppose a published denial of the delay, and drafted
a proposed decision, he was appalled at Vinson’s memorandum for two reasons.300
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Draft Dennis Concurrence and Dissent by Justice Hugo L. Black (Nov. 24, 1950) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 306).
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to the Conference (Nov. 24, 1950) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 206).
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference (Nov. 24, 1950) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 126).
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First, he believed Vinson was dishonest in claiming that the appellants were well
represented by “unshackled lawyers,” pointing out that the government had already
committed misconduct against the Dennis defendants on the very issue their law-
yers raised.301 Namely, Herbert Vere Evatt, an Australian jurist who had been the
Commonwealth’s attorney general in World War II, President of the United Nations
General Assembly, and one of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights principal
architects, had offered to serve as lead counsel.302 But, the American embassy in
Sydney refused to admit him into the United States for this purpose, falsely claiming
that a non-American could not argue before the Court.303 Second, Frankfurter urged
that Vinson’s proposed response would provide the CPUSA a source for propaganda:
To charge these lawyers with dilatory tactics—always bearing
in mind that propaganda is to be attributed to them—is to lay
ourselves open to righteous indignation on their part that they are
embarrassed in the fair presentation of their cause by manifes-
tations of prejudice on the part of this Court.304
In the end, no unified published reason for refusing the delay was issued. Frank-
furter’s proposal included a statement lauding the qualifications of the Dennis defense
attorneys, which might have convinced the appellate court considering the contempt
findings to reverse.305 Jackson believed this would occur and opposed Frankfurter’s
draft.306 Black did not necessarily disagree with Frankfurter, but he clearly wanted to
avoid any comment because he supported the delay. Vinson and Minton, who would
write the majority decision in Dennis, would not accept Frankfurter’s version.307 Thus,
no reason for the denial was ever published. Yet, the Dennis defense attorneys had
raised a valid argument to the Court, which Black found compelling.308 If, because
301 Id.
302 See generally KYLIE TENNANT, EVATT: POLITICS AND JUSTICE (1970).
303 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference, supra note 300. On
Herbert Vere Evatt, see TENNANT, supra note 302. Evatt had also served as a Justice on
Australia’s High Court, and, having published in the Harvard Law Review, was familiar
with some of the United States’ legal processes. See id.; H.V. Evatt, The Judges and the
Teachers of Public Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1940). Additionally, he corresponded with
Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis in the 1930s and 1940s, mainly about Zionism and the potential
formation of the state of Israel. TENNANT, supra note 302.
304 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference, supra note 300.
305 Id. Frankfurter published a brief version of his proposal. Dennis v. United States, 340
U.S. 887 (1950).
306 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference, supra note 300.
307 Dennis, 340 U.S. at 887; Memorandum from Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson to the
Conference (Nov. 24, 1950) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers
of Hugo L. Black, Box 306).
308 William O. Douglas, The Black Silence of Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1952 
(Magazine), at 37–38.
726 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:691
of the government’s conduct, the independent bar was frightened from defending
notorious persons, how could a fair trial be had?
One other note on Frankfurter’s conduct is important. In Dennis, he was incon-
sistent with his published decision.309 Although he admired Judge Learned Hand and
had once lobbied Roosevelt to place Hand on the Supreme Court,310 he also believed
Hand had exaggerated the threat of internal Communism.311 To his clerk, and future
Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, he wrote that Hand had abandoned “Holmes’
‘clear and present danger test,’” and expanded the “probability of future danger” to an
evidentiary proof “big enough to outweigh the ‘mischief ’ of suppressing speech.”312
More troubling to Frankfurter, Hand “derive[d] this probability from the success of
Communists in capturing some other countries, not from an examination of where
they [were ] in our own country, which [was] about the lowest ebb of their fortunes.”313
Finally, Frankfurter cautioned that Hand had ignored the possible misuse of the newer
test in suppressing free speech.314
Richardson himself was a talented attorney. Prior to clerking for Frankfurter, he
clerked for Hand.315 Richardson lauded Hand’s extension of the clear and present
danger test in Dennis, penning to the Judge, “I have frequent occasion to return to your
Dennis opinion and I come away from it each time with increased admiration. . . .
I knew it was a great opinion when I first read it—now I really know it.”316 He also
praised Vinson’s opinion in American Communications Association v. Douds.317
“Someone, I think, deserves great credit for the Chief ’s opinion in C.I.O. v. Douds.
It seems to me a very able analysis of the relevant issues,” he wrote to Frankfurter.318
Although Frankfurter disagreed with his former clerk’s assessment,319 this did not
prevent the Justice from consulting Richardson in future cases.320
309 Compare Dennis, 340 U.S. at 888 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., individual statement), with
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance).
310 JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF
JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 216 (2004).
311 See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
312 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Elliot Richardson (Nov. 17, 1950) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Box 50).
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 See Neil A. Lewis, Elliot Richardson Dies at 79; Stood Up to Nixon and Resigned in
‘Saturday Night Massacre,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at B7.
316 Letter from Elliot Richardson to Judge Learned Hand (Aug. 9, 1951) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Box 51).
317 Letter from Elliot Richardson to Justice Felix Frankfurter (May 20, 1950) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Box 50).
318 Id.
319 See supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text.
320 See generally Correspondence from Elliot Richardson to Justice Felix Frankfurter (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Elliot Richardson, Boxes 50–51).
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D. The Court Under Attack
Between the Dennis decision and the attorney contempt challenges, a potentially
serious matter affecting judicial conduct came before the Court. In 1948, HUAC ac-
cused Alger Hiss, a prominent former government officer and Roosevelt lawyer who
had served as the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on International
Organization, which formulated the United Nations Charter, of spying for the Soviet
Union.321 Although Hiss was never prosecuted for espionage, he was twice prosecuted
for perjury in 1949 and 1950 respectively.322 Hiss had also been a Frankfurter protégé
in law school,323 and both Frankfurter and Reed testified in his defense as character
witnesses,324 though Hiss’s conviction evidenced the testimony was not helpful.325
In 1951, Congressman Joseph R. Bryson of South Carolina introduced a bill in
the House of Representatives prohibiting Supreme Court Justices from testifying in
future cases.326 Bryson provided a copy of the draft bill to Vinson, hoping for the Chief
Justice’s quiet approval.327 Vinson sought Black’s opinion as to whether he should
respond to Bryson at all.328 Black urged Vinson not to comment on the proposed bill
for two reasons: first, Black believed the bill was unconstitutional because it deprived
defendants of their right to present a full defense; and second, the Court had no business
advising Congress on how to perfect any law.329 Vinson agreed with Black’s assess-
ment that the bill was a retreat from the Bill of Rights, and that it was aimed against
Frankfurter.330 Nonetheless, Vinson did not appear to consider that the pending House
bill was also related to the attorney discipline cases then percolating through the judi-
ciary, while Black believed that since some of the attorneys found guilty of contempt
were known to the Court, the proposed bill was an attempt to stifle full consideration
of the matter.331
321 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008,
at 233 (2009); G. EDWARD WHITE, ALGER HISS’S LOOKING-GLASS WARS: THE COVERT LIFE
OF A SOVIET SPY 52–60 (2004).
322 WHITE, supra note 321, at 68, 74, 81.
323 See id. at 12–13.
324 Id. at 68.
325 See id. at 81. Hiss was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s clerk for the 1929 Term.
G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 464 (1993).
326 Letter from Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 15, 1951) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 306).
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson (June 19, 1951) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 306).
330 Id.
331 Id.
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One year earlier, journalist Westbrook Pegler accused Frankfurter of Communist
loyalties through his defense of Alger Hiss.332 In response, Congressman Bryson
publicly considered subpoenaing the Justice, and Black took notice.333 “There are
ominous signs that Justice Frankfurter is about to be made the target of powerful forces
gathering strength from the present national hysteria,” he warned his former clerk and
now Yale professor John Paul Frank.334
E. United States v. Sacher
As previously noted, the attorneys who defended the Dennis defendants became
defendants in contempt proceedings after Judge Medina concluded that they had con-
spired to subvert the trial proceedings through disrespect of the court and disruption
of its proceedings.335 In the first paragraph of his contempt ruling, Medina stated that
he would have overlooked the conduct of the defense counsel, but could not do so be-
cause the conduct was the result of a conspiracy to cause delay and confusion, provoke
a mistrial, and impair the judge’s health.336 To this end, he found Sacher, Gladstein,
Crockett, Isserman, Dennis (who defended himself), and McCabe guilty of over twenty-
five contemptuous acts, and sentenced each to between one and six months in confine-
ment and subject each to fines.337
On April 5, 1950, a three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit modified Judge Medina’s contempt finding in Sacher.338 The modi-
fication occurred as a result of a three-way split amongst Judges Augustus Hand,
Jerome Frank, and Charles Clark.339 Writing for the majority and without the detailed
legal analysis that he was noted for, Hand wanted to uphold Medina’s decision in its
entirety.340 Frank found that the evidence to prove contempt was clear, but not proof
of conspiracy to commit contempt.341 He also conceded that Medina may have been
intemperate and issued reversible rulings, but this was not an excuse for counsel’s
332 See Westbrook Pegler, Acheson, Frankfurter and Hiss, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Jan. 12,
1949, at 10.
333 Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to John Paul Frank (Feb. 28, 1950) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of John Paul Frank, Box 1).
334 Id.
335 See United States v. Sacher, 9 F.R.D. 394, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
336 Id. at 395.
337 United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir. 1950).
338 Id. at 417. Of interest, Irving Saypol, the lead prosecutor in the trial of Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg, argued for the government to the Second Circuit in Sacher. Id.; see also Douglas
Linder, The Rosenbergs Trial, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & RESEARCH: U. PITT SCH. OF LAW (2000),
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/famoustrials/rosenbergs.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
339 Sacher, 182 F.2d at 418, 453, 463.
340 Id. at 421. On Hand’s judicial reputation see Mark A. Fulks, Hand, Augustus Noble, in
1 GREAT AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 311, 311–17 (John R. Vile ed. 2003), and
Charles E. Clark, Augustus Noble Hand, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1113–15 (1955).
341 Sacher, 182 F.2d at 455 (Frank, J., concurring).
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conduct.342 Indeed, Medina’s contribution to the disorder during trial undermined
the claim of a conspiracy.343 Proof of conspiracy requires evidence of an agreement,
and Frank pointed out that if any agreement existed, it was not formulated in Medina’s
presence.344 Implicit in this finding was that Medina’s conduct stoked the defense
counsels’ outrageous conduct.345 Therefore, Frank thought that Medina should have
asked for another judge to hold the contempt hearing, and permitted the defense coun-
sel time to provide a full defense.346 But, since the conspiracy basis for the contempt
conviction was overturned,347 Frank was unwilling to dissent from Hand’s decision.348
In his dissent, Clark did not urge that the evidence failed to support Medina’s find-
ings, but, rather, he argued that the counsel had the right to a full hearing before a
different judge.349 As a result of this split, it was likely that the Court would grant
certiorari. However, it did not initially do so. On June 4, 1951, with Black, Douglas,
and Frankfurter in opposition, the Court denied certiorari.350 Frankfurter, however,
lobbied Jackson to reconsider his opposition to a review based on the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) conduct.351
Shortly before the Court denied certiorari, the conservative American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates passed a resolution condemning the conduct of
the attorneys and calling for lifetime disbarment.352 At almost the same time, the
342 Id. at 454.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 455.
345 Id. at 454.
346 Id. at 455.
347 Sacher, 182 F.2d at 420 (majority opinion).
348 Id. at 455 (Frank, J., concurring).
349 Id. at 464–66 (Clark, J., dissenting).
350 341 U.S. 952 (1951).
351 See infra notes 354–78 and accompanying text.
352 See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 75 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 102, 148–49 (1950).
The ABA declared that every attorney should:
[W]ithin a reasonable time and periodically thereafter, to file an affidavit
stating whether he is or ever has been a member of the Communist party,
or affiliated therewith, and stating also whether he is or ever has been a
member or supporter of any organization that espouses the overthrow,
by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional means, of the United States
Government, or the government of any of the states or territories of the
United States; and in the event such affidavit reveals that he is or ever has
been a member of said Communist Party, or of any such organization,
that the appropriate authority promptly and thoroughly investigate the
activities and conduct of said member of the Bar to determine his fitness
for continuance as an attorney.
Id.
In 1951, the ABA recommended expulsion of all CPUSA members from state bars. See
Proceedings of the House of Delegates: February 26–27, Chicago, 37 A.B.A. J. 309, 312 (1951).
However, not all of the delegates supported this policy. See The Proposed Anti-Communist Oath:
Opposition Expressed to Association’s Policy, 37 A.B.A. J. 123, 123 (1951).
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CPUSA threatened public protests if the lawyers were not cleared.353 Both groups
infuriated Frankfurter. He wrote to the conference:
It is one thing to be disdainful of personal attacks, no matter how
untrue and malevolent that may be . . . . It is quite another thing
to disregard efforts broadcast throughout the land to have either the
Communist Party or the American Bar Association displace this
Court in the discharge of its constitutional duty of deciding cases
properly before it, or at least creating serious public sentiment in
relation to adjudications not yet rendered.354
He then claimed he was inclined to issue an order to the American Bar Association’s
leadership “to show cause why an attachment for contempt should not issue against
the American Bar Association, who should certainly know better . . . .”355
Alone, this was not enough to sway Jackson, but Frankfurter, knowing that the
acrimony between Black and Jackson precluded Black’s success in lobbying Jackson,
continued to try.356 He dangled the possibility that neither he nor Black would criticize
Judge Medina in a dissent.357 Jackson had, in fact, worried that Frankfurter, Douglas,
and Black would attack Medina in their decisions, and he expressed reservations about
publishing a decision in which he had to defend Medina, who he also believed had
conducted himself poorly.358 Frankfurter promised Jackson:
A final word about the Sacher case. I go bail that Hugo and I will
accept anything that you may write in judgment upon Medina’s
conduct and not say anything on our own account. As to that, if
we draw any legal conclusion different from the way in which you
will characterize the conduct of the trial it will be as legal propo-
sitions, quietly stated.359
To this entreaty, Jackson responded that he did not oppose Frankfurter or Black
criticizing Medina in a dissent.360 “Under no circumstances would I want either Hugo
353 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference (Feb. 27, 1951) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 312).
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 8, 1951) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
357 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 4, 1951) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Letter from Justice Robert H. Jackson to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 6, 1951) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
2012] HUGO BLACK’S VISION 731
or you to forego the expression of your own opinions on any phase of the case. My
problem is whether a grant of a rehearing would serve any purpose,” he answered
Frankfurter.361 Yet, he agreed that the Court, at some point, should “make a clear state-
ment of the duty of the bar,” to include the representation of unpopular persons.362
However, having retreated from a concern over the Court disparaging Medina,363
Jackson saw one of two undesirable outcomes from a decision.364 Because Clark was
likely to recuse himself, the Court would divide four against four resulting in the con-
tempt charges remaining intact.365 “That would do no good to the defendants, no good
to the profession, no good to the law, and none to the Court,” he concluded.366 And,
even if Clark did not recuse himself, the Court would be split five-to-four with the
contempt charges intact, but giving Black a platform to claim that the majority enabled
the further erosion of freedom of speech.367
Frankfurter responded to Jackson, agreeing that Jackson’s perceived outcomes
were likely.368 He also joined Jackson in criticizing Black and Douglas as undermin-
ing the efficacy of trial judges.369 On the other hand, he urged Jackson that the Court
had to make a statement “as [to] the obligations of an independent bar in a democratic
society.”370 To this end, Frankfurter wanted Jackson to write the majority opinion,
knowing that it would be in opposition to his dissent, because he worried about a
Vinson, Minton, or Reed opinion providing propaganda for the CPUSA.371 Frankfurter,
moreover, sought a balance between maintaining a trial judge’s contempt authority,
but, at the same time, putting the ABA on notice that the Court was displeased with its
conduct.372 This was not all Frankfurter shared.373 There was one point, in particular,
involving Roosevelt’s second Vice President that he brought to Jackson’s attention.374
Let me refer you to a new bit of evidence of the fear that is at
present holding our profession. Henry Wallace is to appear shortly
before the McCarran Committee, in connection with the China
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id. Jackson concluded, “Others, unless they have changed their views, would announce
and probably amplify the doctrine of ‘free speech in the courtroom,’ which I think is a vicious
doctrine that would do more harm to the judicial process than affirmance.” Id.
368  Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson, supra note 356.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
732 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:691
post-mortem. It is hard to believe but it is a fact that at least half
a dozen reputable lawyers have refused to appear with him. Some
of them gave silly excuses but a few of them had at least the can-
dor to say they do not want to get mixed up in this Communist
business.375
Frankfurter went on to urge Jackson with the understatement that “the general atmo-
sphere that has been created is very unhealthy.”376
On the same day he lobbied Jackson, Frankfurter also drafted a memorandum to
the entire conference arguing for reconsideration in the Sacher case.377 Although he
criticized Black and Douglas, who threatened to publish a dissent from the denial of
certiorari—Frankfurter called it “a recent innovation resorted to only by some of the
Justices”—he also urged that the Court issue a statement to allay fears against rep-
resenting CPUSA members or other persons deemed as subversive.378
On October 9, 1951, Jackson circulated a memorandum explaining that he had
reconsidered his earlier vote and wanted to have a new vote on whether to grant
certiorari.379 Jackson notified the conference that “[e]vents have magnified the im-
portance of issues involved in this case since the Court, with my concurrence, denied
petition for review.”380 Also, before listing his reasons for urging reconsideration of
denial, Jackson placed the blame squarely on the government, arguing that it had
“instituted a program which threatens to put in the courts in different parts of the
country many prosecutions of Communists.”381 Because fair trials were a constitutional
right, Jackson now reasoned that some statement had to be made to the independent
bar.382 He conceded to the conservative majority that his concern was not about the par-
ticular attorneys Medina found in contempt, but rather the perception of fairness on the
whole.383 To Frankfurter, and presumably Black and Douglas, he also acknowledged
375 Id. Frankfurter also alluded to Brandeis’s view on the role of the Court. Id.
Brandeis said that the most important function of this Court is that of
a national educator. I repeat, because I believe so strongly, that an opin-
ion by you in this case would be a powerful lifter of fear, a dissipater
of a good deal of nonsense, and an instiller of traditional manliness in
our profession.
Id.
376 Id.
377 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference (Oct. 8, 1951) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
378 Id.
379 Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the Conference (Oct. 9, 1951) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend VI.
383 See Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the Conference, supra note 379.
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that since Medina’s ruling, Communists found themselves unable to secure zealous
counsel, unless the counsel was affiliated with the CPUSA.384
On the other hand, Jackson hinted that he would vote to uphold the Second
Circuit’s decision against the attorneys writing, “I had no belief in the claim that no
recognized leaders of the bar could be induced to take the Dennis case. It admittedly
involved one of the important constitutional questions of our day and was certain to
reach the highest court.”385 But he insisted that, instead of selecting such a counsel,
the defendants selected counsel who protected the “interests of the Communist party,”
instead of their client, the defendants.386
Jackson criticized Medina as well, attributing to him an “unnecessary” charge of
conspiracy, that the appellate court, in his opinion, rightly overturned.387 Jackson con-
ceded that neither Medina’s conduct, as modified by the appellate court, nor the broader
question of the independent bar presented a means for certiorari.388 However, he
noted that since the Court had never addressed whether Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 42(a)389—the contempt rule—permitted a summary contempt hearing after
the conclusion of trial, this would be the singular issue as to which he would agree
to grant certiorari.390
With Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and now Jackson, enough votes were achieved
to grant certiorari, and the Court did so on October 22.391 However, Jackson would
not join with the dissenters, and, indeed, to Frankfurter’s relief, Vinson assigned
him to write for the majority.392 On January 9, 1952, Paul L. Ross argued on behalf
of the petitioner attorneys to the Court.393 In 1949, Life Magazine listed Ross as
a “dupe” of the CPUSA.394 Two years earlier, Ross had run for mayor of New
York City on the American Labor Party (or Socialist) ticket.395 Joining Ross on the
appeal were Martin Popper of the National Lawyers Guild, Earl B. Dickerson, a
prominent African American civil rights attorney, and Robert W. Kenny, who was
a former California Attorney General and president of the Los Angeles chapter of
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
390 Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the Conference, supra note 379.
391 Sacher v. United States, 342 U.S. 858 (1951).
392 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 3 (1952).
393 Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the Conference, supra note 379.
394 Red Visitors Cause Rumpus: The Russians Get a Big Hand from US Friends, LIFE,
Apr. 4, 1949, at 39, 42. Life Magazine listed Ross alongside of Adam Clayton Powell and
Albert Einstein as having given support to Communism. Id.
395 See VOTE FOR MAYOR, NEW YORK CITY, 1950–1953, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FACTS FOR 1957, at 299 (Harry Hansen ed., 1957).
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the National Lawyers Guild.396 In 1942, Kenny, along with Wendell Willkie, defended
William Schniederman.397
Although it was clear from the conference that Jackson would vote to sustain
the contempt findings and the sentences,398 he shared his drafts with Frankfurter, who
in retrospect appears to have guided the majority opinion even though he was a
dissenter.399 Initially Jackson’s draft opinion noted that in two decisions, Dennis and
Sacher, six “judges with trial and appellate experience almost unparalleled in length
and variety, had occasion to consider the contempt charges.”400 Frankfurter agreed that
Jackson had fairly characterized the attorneys’ conduct,401 but he took exception that
Jackson cited to Dennis.402 “[W]hat L. Hand, with the concurrence of Swan and Chase,
said about this conduct in the Dennis case is no more relevant to judgment on the pro-
cedure in dealing with that conduct than is my equally condemnatory conduct of them
controlling with what I think the proper procedure should have been,” Frankfurter
urged.403 Moreover, he disagreed with Jackson’s complimentary tone toward Clark
and Frank penning, “I think Clark and Frank stick enough feathers in their own heads
without having you further adorning them.”404 To this, Jackson responded that the
aggregate experience of Judges Augustus Hand and his cousin Learned Hand, as
well as Swan, Chase, Frank, and Clark, exceeded the longevity of the six most senior
Justices on the Court.405 Frankfurter prevailed, however, in convincing Jackson to
delete compliments to Frank and Clark.406 “They are, neither, exemplars as judges and
you ought not contribute needlessly to their already unbridled vanity,” he concluded.407
In Sacher v. United States, Jackson, writing the majority opinion, concluded that
Medina’s authority to sit in judgment of the contempt proceedings remained intact,
396 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 3. On Dickerson, see generally ROBERT J. BLAKELY, EARL B.
DICKERSON: A VOICE FOR FREEDOM AND EQUALITY (2006). On Robert E. Kenny, see ED
CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 171–73 (1997). On Martin Popper,
see 81 H.R. REP. NO. 3123, at 18 (1950).
397 See REGISTER OF THE ROBERT W. KENNY PAPERS, 1823–1975, 3 ONLINE ARCHIVE OF
CALIFORNIA, cdn.calisphere.org/data/13030/b1/tf3199n661/files/tf3199n6b1.pdf.
398 See Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the Conference, supra note 379.
399 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson (Jan. 26, 1952) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
400 Draft Sacher Opinion by Justice Robert H. Jackson (undated) (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
401 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson, supra note 399
(“Count me in . . . as to the ‘views of these men’s conduct’”).
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 See id.
406 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson (Jan. 27, 1952) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 168).
407 Id.
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even though he was the victim of the contempt.408 Among other claims, the attorneys
argued that because Medina had not immediately acted against them, Due Process
required another presumably neutral judge determine whether contempt had actually
occurred.409 On one hand, Jackson recognized that the defense counsel shared much
of the ideology of their clients and believed that the attorneys had defended more than
the eleven defendants, namely their ideology.410 On the other hand he acknowledged
that the overuse of the contempt power could intimidate the legal profession from
defending persons who “are [the] objects of hostility of those in power.”411 This was
the very point that Rutledge and Black dissented on in 1949 in Fisher v. Pace.412 To
counter this threat Jackson, made clear that the Court would intervene to protect
lawyers.413 But, Jackson also cautioned that the Court would not “equate contempt
with courage or insults with independence.”414
Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter separately dissented,415 though Black and Douglas
joined in Frankfurter’s more technical dissent.416 Black reviewed the record to show
that Medina had frequently baited the defense counsel, who unfortunately acted con-
temptuously in turn.417 To this point, he urged that Medina had ascribed the clients’
causes to the counsel:
Unless we are to depart from high traditions of the bar, evil
purposes of their clients could not be imputed to these lawyers
whose duty it was to represent them with fidelity and zeal. Yet
from the very parts of the record which Judge Medina specified,
it is difficult to escape the impression that his inferences against
the lawyers were colored, however unconsciously, by his natural
abhorrence for the unpatriotic and treasonable designs attributed
to their Communist leader clients.418
It also disturbed Black that Medina had called the defense counsel “liars” on the
record.419 Black argued, “Liar ordinarily is a fighting word spoken in anger to express
408 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pro-
vided a more detailed review of the attorneys’ conduct, and concluded that Judge Medina had
acted patiently until he could no longer do so without the loss of control over the courtroom.
See United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 423–28 (2d Cir. 1950).
409 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 7.
410 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert H. Jackson, supra note 399.
411 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
412 336 U.S. 155, 163, 168 (1949).
413 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 13.
414 Id. at 14 (Black, J., dissenting).
415 Id.; id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
416 Id. at 19 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
417 Id. at 15–17 (Black, J., dissenting).
418 Id. at 19.
419 Id. at 17.
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bitter personal hostility against another. I can think of no other reason for its use here,
particularly since the Judge’s charge was baseless.”420 As a result of Medina’s conduct,
Black pressed that Medina had become unfit to serve as judge during the contempt
proceedings.421
In his dissent, Frankfurter accused Medina of arbitrarily administering the court’s
contempt power against the defendants.422 He argued that although the appellate court
had reversed the conspiracy charge, the fact that Medina believed a conspiracy existed
made his failure to recuse himself inexcusable.423 It has been alleged that Frankfurter
already had slight regard for Medina.424 This may be why he appended several pages
to his opinion detailing Medina’s poor conduct from the bench.425 Yet, Frankfurter par-
tially excused Medina for his judicial conduct when he explained:
But precisely because a judge is human, and in common frailty or
manliness would interpret such conduct of lawyers as an attack on
himself personally, he should not subsequently sit in judgment on
his assailants, barring only instances where such extraordinary pro-
cedure is compellingly necessary in order that the trial may proceed
and not be aborted.426
Douglas’s dissent was simply a two paragraph agreement with Frankfurter and
Black.427 It began:
[O]ne who reads this record will have difficulty in determining
whether members of the bar conspired to drive a judge from the
bench or whether the judge used the authority of the bench to
whipsaw the lawyers, to taunt and tempt them, and to create for
himself the role of the persecuted.428
However, in his draft dissent, he included that Medina was “garrulous, egocentric,
[and] publicity minded.”429 Black successfully lobbied Douglas to take this description
out, though he admitted he too believed it accurate.430
420 Id. at 16.
421 Id. at 17.
422 Id. at 36–39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
423 Id. at 28.
424 WIECEK, supra note 23, at 576.
425 Id.; Sacher, 343 U.S. at 42–89.
426 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 35.
427 Id. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
428 Id.
429 Draft Sacher Dissent by Justice William O. Douglas (Mar. 1952) (on file with Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 312).
430 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 89; Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Justice William O. Douglas
(Mar. 1952) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black,
Box 312).
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As a footnote, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the
Senate Judiciary Committee subpoenaed Sacher, demanding he testify on April 19,
1955, and answer whether he was ever a CPUSA member, or within the party’s legal
section.431 After Sacher refused to answer questions to the subcommittee’s satisfaction,
he was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined
$1,000.432 He appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, but the three judge panel consisting of future Chief Justice Warren
Burger, Walter Bastian, and George Thomas Washington, did not provide him relief.433
In a per curiam decision, the Court remanded the issue to the appellate court for con-
sideration in light of Watkins v. United States,434 a recent decision that curtailed the
contempt power of Congress to inquiries which afforded individuals a fair opportunity
to ascertain whether they are within their right to answer.435 Watkins was another deci-
sion that pitted Black’s First Amendment jurisprudence against Frankfurter’s belief that
the decision rested on statutory grounds, even though the result in each line of argument
was to overturn the conviction.436
431 Sacher v. United States, 240 F.2d 46, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
432 Id.
433 Id. at 46, 48. While Sacher was unwilling to answer whether he was ever a CPUSA
member, he stated that he had never belonged to an organization which advocated the violent
overthrow of the government. Id. at 51. In the decision authored by future Chief Justice
Burger, the appellate court found Sacher’s statements as evidence of contempt. Id. at 51–52.
In the opinion of the Author, Burger’s reasoning was flawed because Sacher believed he was
privileged against divulging his political affiliation, not his individual beliefs.
434 Sacher v. United States, 354 U.S. 930, 930 (1958) (citing Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957)). Authored by Chief Justice Warren, the Court’s majority in Watkins
criticized the operative statute under which HUAC was created:
It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution.
Who can define the meaning of “un-American”? What is that single,
solitary “principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution”? There is no need to dwell upon the language, however.
At one time, perhaps, the resolution might have been read narrowly to
confine the Committee to the subject of propaganda. The events that
have transpired in the fifteen years before the interrogation of petitioner
make such a construction impossible at this date.
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted).
435 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 215–16.
436 Frankfurter argued to Warren that Watkins was not a First Amendment case. Letter from
Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Earl Warren (May 27, 1957), microformed on Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Reel 27, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.). “This on its face is not a First
Amendment case . . .” he wrote in the margins of Warren’s draft. Draft Watkins opinion from
Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice Felix Frankfurter, (May 21, 1957), microformed on Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Reel 27, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.). In his correspondence to Warren,
Frankfurter wrote:
Watkins is not a First Amendment case as the emphasis of your opinion
overwhelmingly demonstrates. This is by no means a technical point. It
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In an en banc decision, with four dissenting judges, the appellate court sustained
the contempt charge against Sacher.437 Troubling to Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan,
and Frankfurter, was the purpose behind HUAC’s original reason for forcing Sacher to
testify; a proposed bill barring CPUSA members from admission to any federal bar.
To Black, this decision was yet another example of the government permitting the
diminution of the Bill of Rights.438 Thus, the Court outright reversed itself after its
review of the lower court’s second decision.439
F. In re Isserman
Sacher was not the only attorney regulation case to arise from Dennis. In 1952 the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a lifetime disbarment of Abraham Isserman, based
on the contempt conviction from Judge Medina.440 Isserman was well known to the
Court.441 He had filed amicus briefs supporting the Jehovah’s Witnesses petitioners in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, challenging the constitutionality of
mandatory flag saluting in the schools.442 More recently, he successfully represented
a petitioner in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.443 In issuing its dis-
barment opinion, the state court found that since the Court had upheld the contempt
convictions in Sacher and Isserman was included in this decision, the state Ethics
Committee had acted reasonably in disciplining Isserman.444 However, there was an
added element to Isserman’s disbarment. In 1925, Isserman was convicted of statutory
rape, and suspended from practice for six months.445
is very important for us to make clear, as you do make clear, that a wit-
ness before a committee may object to questions without having to estab-
lish that he is deprived of some right under the First Amendment. . . . I
deem the foregoing vital lest witnesses before a congressional committee
parrot-like repeat the phrase, “First Amendment, First Amendment, First
Amendment.” We get into a lot of trouble by talking about the plain and
unequivocal language of the First Amendment in its provision about
“abridging the freedom of speech.”
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Earl Warren, (May 27, 1957), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 27, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
Frankfurter concluded that earlier investigations such as Teapot Dome would have been
hampered had Black’s First Amendment jurisprudence been accepted. Id.
437 Sacher v. United States, 252 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
438 See UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 177.
439 Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577–78 (1958).
440 In re Isserman, 87 A.2d 903, 904 (N.J. 1952).
441 Isserman had previously argued before the Court on behalf of defendants affiliated with
CPUSA. See COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 7, at 118–19.
442 319 U.S. 624, 624, 629 (1943).
443 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
444 In re Isserman, 87 A.2d at 904–05.
445 Id. at 907.
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In In re Isserman, the Court, in a decision authored by Chief Justice Vinson, con-
cluded that New Jersey’s disbarment of Isserman was lawful.446 Yet, the issue before
the Court was not whether the New Jersey court decided against Isserman in error, but
rather whether Isserman should be disbarred for life from practicing before the Supreme
Court and, by implication, the federal judiciary.447 Vinson conceded that under the rule
established in Selling v. Radford,448 the federal judiciary was not forced to automatically
respect the New Jersey Supreme Court.449 Having recognized this rule, he did not take
exception to any of the State’s findings.450 Instead, Vinson focused on why the Court
had the authority to disbar attorneys in the first place, stating that when the Court pro-
tects itself, it protects society.451 He also added that while the New Jersey Supreme
Court barely recognized Isserman’s 1925 statutory rape conviction, he found it notable
that Isserman had never disclosed the conviction when applying to practice before the
Court in 1930.452
An unusual alliance of Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson formed a dissent,
which Jackson authored.453 All four Justices agreed that as a result of Sacher, the pro-
ceedings against Isserman in the District Court for the Southern District of New York
could not be rechallenged.454 However, that court had simply disbarred Isserman and
the others for two years, not life, and the Justices found this reasonable because the
attorneys had ultimately not been found guilty of a conspiracy to bring disrepute to the
court.455 The four Justices also took exception to Vinson’s commentary regarding
Isserman’s failure to disclose the 1925 conviction, because the court did not require
a disclosure when Isserman applied for admission in 1930.456
Relying on the 1830 published Tillinghast decision, the dissenters noted that
Chief Justice Marshall’s decision never held that a conviction for contempt required
disbarment.457 Indeed, historically that had not been the case.458 The dissent pointed
out that in the late nineteenth-century criminal trial of William M. Tweed, attorneys
Willard Bartlett, Elihu Root, and David Dudley Field had been held in contempt, but
their careers went unhindered after being admonished.459 Tweed’s trial presents an
446 345 U.S. 286, 290 (1953).
447 Id. at 287.
448 243 U.S. 46 (1917).
449 In re Isserman, 345 U.S. at 288.
450 Id.
451 Id. at 289.
452 Id. at 290.
453 Id. at 290 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
454 Id. at 290–91.
455 Id. at 291.
456 Id. at 292.
457 Id.
458 Id.
459 Id. at 293. For information on the Tweed trial, see WARREN ZIMMERMAN, FIRST GREAT
TRIUMPH: HOW FIVE AMERICANS MADE THEIR COUNTRY A WORLD POWER 129–31 (2002).
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interesting analogy. The leader of New York’s Democratic Party machine known as
Tammany Hall, Tweed controlled much of New York City’s corrupt governance, in-
cluding control over the city’s contracts.460 Tweed was not, however, a member of a
political party seeking to alter the United States government. To the dissenters, although
Isserman’s conduct was intemperate, he was “performing a legitimate function of the
legal profession, which is under a duty to leave no man without a defender when he is
charged with [a] crime.”461 Moreover, they recognized that on prior instances before
the Court, Isserman had conducted himself in a professional manner.462
The unified dissent was, in fact, a melding of four separate and very distinct
draft dissents, with the four Justices setting aside their differences to make a stronger
statement.463 But this occurred as a result of a compromise.464 Black believed that
Isserman had been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.465 He found
it important that the state ethics committee had passed on a recommendation to the
state supreme court before it held a full hearing, and the court adopted the recommen-
dation without ordering a full hearing.466 Black penned:
The full record persuades me that he was denied an adequate
opportunity to confront witnesses against him and to offer evi-
dence in his behalf. Instead of hearing evidence and making its
own findings, it adopted those made by a federal district court
judge who had summarily convicted [Isserman] of contempt
without a hearing.467
Jackson’s contribution to the published dissent was the clear articulation that
Isserman’s conduct was spontaneous and not borne from a conspiracy, and therefore
460 See KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, BOSS TWEED: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CORRUPT POL
WHO CONCEIVED THE SOUL OF MODERN NEW YORK 2–8 (2005).
461 In re Isserman, 345 U.S. at 293–94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
462 Id. at 294. The dissenters noted, “On the occasions when Isserman has been before this
Court, or before an individual Justice, his conduct has been unexceptionable and his professional
ability considerable.” Id.
463 See infra notes 465–76 and accompanying text.
464 Id.
465 Draft In re Isserman Dissent by Justice Hugo L. Black (undated) (on file with Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 315).
466 Id. Black wrote on this point:
The challenge to the New Jersey disbarment raises such serious ques-
tions that I am unable to dismiss them as lightly as the Court does. I am
unable to see from the record in that case where Isserman was afforded
the kind of hearing that is a prerequisite of the due process clause [sic]
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
467 Id.
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a lifetime disbarment was too extreme a sanction.468 Douglas once more unsuccess-
fully attempted to provide the dissent with harsher criticism of Medina, writing, “[a]
reading of the record in Dennis v. United States . . . gave me the distinct impression
that neither Judge Medina nor the defense attorneys were without responsibility for
the deterioration of the atmosphere of the trial.”469 In this draft, which he did not show
to anyone but Black, Douglas had gone so far as to argue, “Isserman was in my view
unjustly convicted of contempt and unjustly sentenced to jail. But even if his con-
viction was deserved, disbarment need not necessarily follow.”470 In the end, Black
agreed to remove his Fourteenth Amendment argument and Douglas agreed to remove
his criticism of Judge Medina in order to form the singular dissent.471
Isserman applied to the Court for a rehearing shortly after the decision, based
on the rule that the Court could not disbar an attorney without a majority of the
Justices participating.472 As Clark had not participated, he had a valid argument,
because In re Isserman was decided by a four-to-four vote, but the Court ultimately
denied the petition for rehearing.473 On September 8, 1953, Vinson died after
suffering from cardiac arrest.474 One month later, Black, in his capacity as acting Chief
Justice, circulated a reinstatement order to the Court.475 Reed, Minton, and Burton
dissented based on their In re Isserman and Sacher votes.476 Black, Jackson, Frank-
furter, and Douglas, the four dissenters now constituted a majority, and Isserman was
reinstated to the bar in a per curiam decision on October 11, 1954.477 Although not in
the formal record, it was Black who authored the brief per curiam.478 Contemporane-
ous with the Court’s reinstatement of Isserman, it issued a per curiam decision
holding that New York’s disbarment of Sacher for life was also excessive.479
468 Draft In re Isserman Dissent by Justice Robert H. Jackson (Dec. 17, 1952) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 315).
469 Draft In re Isserman Dissent by Justice William O. Douglas (Mar. 1953) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 315). On April 6,
1953, Douglas dropped his dissent and joined with Black, Jackson, and Frankfurter. See In
re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 290 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
470 Draft In re Isserman Dissent by Justice William O. Douglas, supra note 469. Douglas
also argued that “[a] judge has a duty to prevent misconduct in the courtroom. He has an even
greater obligation to refrain from encouraging by his own conduct intemperate behavior on
the part of counsel.” Id. This languages was not included in the final unified dissent. In re
Isserman, 345 U.S. at 290.
471 See In re Isserman, 345 U.S. at 290.
472 In re Isserman, 348 U.S. 1 (1954) (petition for rehearing).
473 Id. at 1–2.
474 JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & LINDA C. GUGIN, CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. VINSON OF KENTUCKY:
A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 336 (2002).
475 Draft In re Isserman per curiam Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black (Oct. 8, 1954) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 315).
476 Id.
477 In re Isserman, 348 U.S. 1 (1954).
478 Draft In re Isserman per curiam Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black, supra note 475.
479 Sacher v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y., 347 U.S. 388, 389 (1954).
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G. Other Prosecutions: Black’s Fears of a Double Standard
In addition to Sacher and In re Isserman, there were other instances where attorney
conduct and trials of CPUSA and other communist sympathizers came to the Court’s
attention.480 Two of the more important issues, the Rosenberg trial and another con-
tempt finding, are briefly noted below.481 Yet, in disbarment decisions not involving
the Smith Act or espionage trials, the Court appeared to provide reasoned guidance for
disbarment. For instance, in 1957, in Theard v. United States, the Court, in a decision
authored by Frankfurter, acknowledged that disbarment was “always painful.”482 In
that case, the petitioner attorney had been charged with forgery in 1935, but was com-
mitted to an insane asylum and not released until 1948, and therefore not prosecuted.483
On his release, Louisiana unsuccessfully attempted to reinitiate the prosecution.484 In
1950, the state bar association, with the concurrence with the state supreme court,
disbarred him.485 The Court, citing to Selling, recognized that normally the federal
judiciary honored state decisions, but it would not do so in this instance, stating,
“[w]e do not think that ‘the principles of right and justice’ require a federal court to
enforce disbarment of a man eighteen years after he had uttered a forgery when
concededly he ‘was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition,
some degree of insanity.’”486
Although Theard appeared as a unified decision, Black and Warren concurred
without publishing their reasons for not completely agreeing with the majority.487
Black, along with the Chief Justice and initially Clark, believed that as written, Theard
would enable state bars to exclude applicants on the basis of political affiliation
without due process.488 Frankfurter circulated his majority draft on June 6, 1957.489
The following day, Black informed the conference that he was troubled by the
majority’s reference to In re Rouss,490 a 1917 New York appellate decision authored
by future Justice Benjamin Cardozo, for the proposition that admission to the bar “is
480 See, e.g., Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
481 See infra Part II.G.1.
482 354 U.S. 278, 279 (1957).
483 Id. at 279, 281–82. Theard was argued on December 13, 1956 and decided on June 17,
1957, one month after Konigsberg I and Schware. Id. at 278, 281. In authoring the decision,
Frankfurter made clear that the Court was not overturning the state disbarment judgment, and
it was without authority to do so. Id. at 281. Instead, the Court was deciding whether the fed-
eral judiciary had to honor the state disbarment. Id. at 281–82.
484 Id. at 279.
485 Id. at 279–80.
486 Id. at 282.
487 Id. at 283 (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, J., concurring in the judgment).
488 See infra notes 490–95 and accompanying text.
489 Draft Theard Majority Opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 6, 1957), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 26, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
490 116 N.E. 782 (1917).
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a privilege, tolerated at the pleasure of the courts.”491 One month earlier, the Court de-
cided Konigsberg I and Schware, and Black worried that Theard undermined those
decisions.492 Frankfurter convinced Clark that Theard did not weaken the prior deci-
sions, and Clark opted to join the majority opinion.493 Only Warren shared Black’s con-
cern over the decision—even Brennan and Douglas did not share in Black’s view of the
majority opinion.494 Black eventually opted not to include a published concurrence.495
1. Rosenberg Trial
One significant matter that troubled Black in the Sacher and In re Isserman con-
tempt cases was that the judiciary was enabling a double standard.496 In United States
v. Rosenberg, a trial that resulted in the death penalty and ultimately the execution of
two pro-Communists for espionage of classified atomic data, the conduct of prosecutor
Irving Saypol deplorably failed the canons of professional ethics.497 During the trial,
Saypol provided information to the press that the prosecution would call a witness
named William Perl who would corroborate the Rosenbergs’ guilt.498 Saypol never
called Perl to the stand because he too had been indicted.499 The indictment was
unsealed before Perl would testify, and, in turn, Perl recanted and asserted his right
491 Draft Theard Concurrence by Justice Hugo L. Black (June 7, 1957), microformed
on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 2, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.), (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 330).
492 Id.
493 Letter from Justice Tom C. Clark to Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 6, 1957), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 26, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
494 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 7, 1957), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 26, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.), (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 330). Frankfurter
informed Black:
I called up Bill Brennan and put to him in detail, and I am confident that
I can say with accuracy, the point you raised about the quotation from
Cardozo in my Theard opinion. He said he would think about it and call
me back. He has called me back with the statement, “I am all for your
opinion, including the quotation from Cardozo, and I really don’t see
Hugo’s point about it.” I then repeated to him the problem that it raised
in your mind and he said he understood that was your problem, but he
sees no difficulty.
Id.
495 See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 283 (1957) (Warren, C.J. and Black, J.,
concurring in the result).
496 See infra notes 497–505 and accompanying text.
497 See JOSEPH SHARLITT, FATAL ERROR: THE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE THAT SEALED THE
ROSENBERGS’ FATE 15 (1989).
498 United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1952); see also SHARLITT, supra
note 497, at 15.
499 See SHARLITT, supra note 497, at 15.
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against self-incrimination.500 This enabled Saypol to present to the jury that a viable
witness existed who refused to testify.501 Some jurors heard or read about Saypol’s
comment, but the Rosenbergs’ attorney did not motion for a mistrial and the Federal
District Judge Irving Kaufman made no comment on Saypol’s conduct.502 On appeal,
in United States v. Rosenberg, a three-judge panel consisting of Thomas Swan, Jerome
Frank, and Harrie Chase concluded that Saypol’s conduct was “wholly reprehensible,”
though they also determined that the conduct did not affect the outcome of the trial.503
To Black, a double standard was evident here.504 The Rosenberg trial occurred in New
York City before a federal judge, in the same region where Dennis occurred, but the
prosecutor, Saypol, was never disciplined in any manner.505
2. Cammer v. United States
In Cammer v. United States, Black was able to convince a majority of Justices to
reverse a lower court’s contempt finding which arose from another Smith Act trial.506
A District of Columbia grand jury, composed of a majority of federal employees,
indicted a prominent union leader, Benjamin Gold, who had also been a CPUSA
member, for filing a “false non-Communist affidavit.”507 Gold’s attorney, Harold
Cammer, also defended two of Gold’s associates.508 Concerned with the idea of an
inquest composed of federal employees who had sworn a loyalty oath, Cammer sent
out a questionnaire to the grand jury to determine “the effect of the government’s loy-
alty program,” on the jurors.509 Gold never denied sending the questionnaire, and it had
been permitted on prior occasions,510 but not in this particular instance.511 Moreover,
on two prior occasions, a federal grand jury of nonfederal employees in New York had
twice refused to indict Gold.512 Harlan did not participate in the decision,513 and the
decision itself did not cause a great deal of discussion in comparison to the Rosenberg
trial, or the In re Isserman and Sacher decisions.514
500 Id.
501 Rosenberg, 200 F.2d at 669–70.
502 Id. at 670.
503 Id. at 667, 670.
504 See SHARLITT, supra note 497, at 31–32.
505 Id.
506 350 U.S. 399 (1956) (majority opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black).
507 Id. at 400. Gold himself was convicted in a criminal trial but the Court reversed the
conviction. Gold v. United States, 352 U.S. 985 (1957).
508 Cammer, 350 U.S. at 400.
509 Id. at 401.
510 Id. at 402–03.
511 Id. at 400–01.
512 Id. at 401.
513 Id. at 408 (Harlan, J. not participating).
514 The only discussion appearing in the correspondences of the Justices is a simple note from
Burton to Black stating, “I agree and compliment you on the clear way you have presented the
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H. State Loyalty Programs Affecting Public Employment
The Court’s record on loyalty oaths and public employment between 1950 and
1961 was mixed. The starting point of these cases, though not a loyalty oath issue,
occurred in 1946 in United States v. Lovett.515 There, the Court determined that a fed-
eral law that precluded payments to thirty-nine named government employees that
the Dies Committee had deemed “radical bureaucrats” and “affiliates of Communist
front organizations” was unconstitutional.516 With no dissenting Justices and a singular
concurrence by Frankfurter with Reed joining, Black authored the majority opinion.517
Citing to Garland, Black determined that since Dies had singled out the thirty-nine
employees and referred to his committee’s findings as indictments, the law constituted
a bill of attainder.518 He also noted that both the Senate and President Roosevelt acqui-
esced to the law because Dies and the House had threatened to cut off war funding if
they failed to approve the law.519
In 1951, in Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, the Court upheld the
termination of seventeen city employees who refused to comply with California’s
loyalty oath requirements for public servants.520 The decision, authored by Clark, dis-
tinguished the issue from Ex parte Garland in finding that the oath requirement did not
constitute a bill of attainder.521 The normally conservative Burton dissented because the
law used to terminate the employment of the seventeen petitioners enabled a similar
fate for persons who had been members of the CPUSA when the party was transpar-
ently legal.522 Likewise, both Black and Douglas dissented.523 Douglas conceded that
issue.” Letter from Justice Harold H. Burton to Justice Hugo L. Black (Mar. 5, 1956) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 325).
515 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
516 Id. at 308–09 (internal quotation marks omitted).
517 Id. at 304, 318.
518 Id. at 315–16 (citing Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)). Frankfurter con-
curred but argued that the law was not a bill of attainder, but rather an invalid withholding
of pay. Id. at 330 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
519 Id. at 312–13. For his part, President Roosevelt denounced Dies’s actions as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 212, at 810.
520 341 U.S. 716, 721, 724 (1951).
521 Id. at 723.
522 Id. at 729 (Burton, J., dissenting and concurring, each in part). Burton argued:
The oath is so framed as to operate retrospectively as a perpetual bar to
those employees who held certain views at any time since a date five
years preceding the effective date of the ordinance. It leaves no room
for a change of heart. It calls for more than a profession of present loy-
alty or promise of future attachment. It is not limited in retrospect to
any period measured by reasonable relation to the present. In time this
ordinance will amount to the requirement of an oath that the affiant has
never done any of the proscribed acts.
Id.
523 Id. at 730–31 (Douglas. J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
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in Ex parte Garland the petitioner was an attorney, and this constituted admission into
a profession of private employment, and, in Garner, the petitioners were municipal
employees.524 Nonetheless, because the termination of employment occurred as a re-
sult of prior, rather than present, political beliefs, the required oath constituted a bill
of attainder.525
In 1952, in Adler v. Board of Education of New York, the Court upheld New
York’s loyalty oath requirement to teach at public schools.526 Unlike in other employ-
ment cases, no teacher had been fired, but a class of teachers sued, claiming that the
requirement was unconstitutional.527 Writing for the majority, Minton conceded that
individuals have the right to “assemble, speak, think and believe as they will” but then
he followed with “they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their
own terms.”528 Frankfurter dissented on the basis of a lack of standing to sue.529 Douglas
dissented with Black joining him, arguing that an employee does not forfeit their civil
rights, including those rights protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.530
Particularly troubling to both Justices was the element of guilt by association, in which
an organization is deemed subversive by the Justice Department without a chance to
defend itself, and then an individual citizen is at risk for losing municipal employ-
ment by having been a member of the organization.531 The time-honored standard of
showing proof of guilt through evidence of overt acts was abandoned under this legal
construct.532 Although he joined with Douglas, Black also separately dissented, adding
that the state statute would mold people into a singular intellect.533 “Quite a different
governmental policy rests on the belief that government should leave the mind and
spirit of man absolutely free,” he pointed out, alluding to the First Amendment.534
The year following Adler, the Court decided Wieman v. Updegraff,535 reversing the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and finding unconstitutional a state law that prohibited
524 Id.
525 Id. at 731, 736.
526 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
527 Id. at 486–87.
528 Id. at 492.
529 Id. at 498 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
530 Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
531 Id. at 508–09.
532 Id. at 509–10. On this point, Douglas argued:
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state.
Teachers are under constant surveillance; their pasts are combed for signs
of disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous thoughts.
A pall is cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom
in that environment. Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in
line for fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect.
Supineness and dogmatism take the place of inquiry.
Id. at 510.
533 Id. at 497 (Black, J., dissenting).
534 Id.
535 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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public employment to anyone who failed to swear that they were not a member of an
organization on the Attorney General’s list.536 Writing for the majority, Clark reasoned
that membership in a subversive organization could be innocent, in the sense that a
person could be a member of an organization but not know of the leadership’s un-
lawful designs.537 Additionally, a person could join an organization at a time when
the organization was lawful, only to terminate the relationship when the organization
ceased being so.538 However, the majority sidestepped the First Amendment questions
Black found critical to this line of cases.539 “We need not pause to consider whether an
abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory[,]” the majority concluded.540 Black filed a concur-
rence, joined by Douglas, in which he reminded the majority that the First Amendment
was what was at stake in these decisions.541 Historian Melvin I. Urofsky points out that
Clark intended to make clear that “[m]ere membership in [a subversive] organization
was not enough to prove that a person was a subversive.”542 If so, Clark’s intent was
lost on the state bar committees and state supreme courts, as well as Harlan’s dissent
in Konigsberg I,543 the majority in Konigsberg II,544 and In re Anastaplo.545 Moreover,
Black would not have, in all likelihood, shared Urofsky’s belief in the majority’s in-
tention in Wieman. To Irving Dillard, a Saint Louis Post-Dispatch journalist, Black
explained his concurrence as:
It may be significant that many of those who are supposed to be
the strongest for First Amendment liberties go no further than did
these Federalists of the alien and sedition laws period. An opposite
view then was that the United States was without power to pass
laws that abridded [sic] discussion of public questions at all. That
view prevailed when Jefferson was elected. No group seems to be
advocating such a view today.546
In Beilan v. Board of Education,547 the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s termination
of a public school teacher for refusing to answer before HUAC on whether he had ever
536 Id. at 184–86, 192.
537 Id. at 189–90.
538 Id. at 190.
539 Id. at 192.
540 Id.
541 Id. at 192–94 (Black, J., concurring).
542 UROFSKY, supra note 183, at 163.
543 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
544 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
545 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
546 Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Irving Dillard (Jan. 7, 1953) (on file with Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 317).
547 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
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been an officer in a Communist organization.548 However, in this particular instance,
the school superintendent responsible for terminating Beilan’s employment had spe-
cifically warned Beilan that under state law the failure to answer would automati-
cally result in the loss of employment.549 Black and Douglas dissented, again, partly
on the basis that the termination constituted a finding of guilt and partly on the basis
of a First Amendment right.550 Warren dissented on the basis that a Fifth Amendment
right to refuse to answer a question in a congressional hearing could not form the basis
for employment termination.551
In 1958, in Lerner v. Casey,552 the Court, in an opinion authored by Harlan, up-
held New York’s public security law in the context of the employment termination of
a subway conductor who had refused to answer whether he was a CPUSA member.553
Lerner raised a unique issue claiming that not only did the Fourteenth Amendment
protect his refusal to answer inquiries into his political affiliations, but also because
New York was essentially acting as an agent of the federal government in supporting
national security, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applied as
well.554 Harlan and a majority, however, found no merit to either contention, and, not
surprisingly, Black, Warren, Douglas, and Brennan dissented.555
Garner, Adler, Beilan, Wieman, and Lerner are simply a snapshot of decisions in-
volving the Court’s analysis of the relevancy of membership in subversive organiza-
tions to municipal employment. Although admission to the bar is a different issue than
the rights of public employees, the Court cited to this line of state employment cases
in the bar admissions cases.556 The state employment decisions, moreover, evidence the
continued divide between Harlan and Black over the extent to which civil rights, and
particularly the First and Fourteenth Amendments, protected citizens.
III. THREE PETITIONERS, FOUR DECISIONS: THE COURT DETERMINES ITS
ROLE IN ATTORNEY LICENSING AND BLACK DEFINES THE IMPORTANCE OF
ATTORNEYS IN PRESERVING DEMOCRACY
Between the Sacher and In re Isserman contempt decisions and the four licen-
sure cases, a dramatic change occurred on the Court. Chief Justice Vinson, a man that
548 Id. at 400–03.
549 Id. at 408.
550 Id. at 412–14 (Black, J., dissenting).
551 Id. at 411–12 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
552 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
553 Id. at 470–71.
554 Id. at 478–79.
555 Id. For Douglas’s and Black’s dissent, see Beilan, 357 U.S. at 412. For Warren’s dissent,
see id. at 411. For Brennan’s dissent, see id. at 417.
556 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 90, 93 (1961) (citing Ex parte Garner, Beilan and
Lerner); Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36, 45, 52–54, 76 (1961) (citing Beilan, Ex parte Garner and
Wieman); Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252, 256, 262, 267, 310 (1957) (citing Wieman and Ex parte
Garner); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39, 246 (1957) (citing Wieman).
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Truman had hoped would be his presidential successor, died on September 8, 1953,
and was replaced by Earl Warren on October 5 of the same year.557 Warren’s ascen-
sion to the chief justiceship ushered in a period of an active Court that no longer gave
staunch deference to the legislative and executive branches,558 nor deferred to state
governments where it believed individual rights had been encroached upon.559 One
year after Warren became Chief Justice, Robert Jackson died and Eisenhower nomi-
nated John Marshall Harlan in his place.560 The Senate easily confirmed Harlan, and
once on the Court, he largely continued Jackson’s jurisprudence.561 However, Harlan
and Black developed a friendship, and the two men did not become bitter enemies
over jurisprudential differences.562 Two years later, Minton retired and was replaced
by Brennan, who would agree with Black on the attorney licensure cases,563 and be-
come a reliable liberal.564
In addition to the changed composition of the Court, there were several other near
contemporaneous decisions which provided context to the four licensure decisions.
On June 17, 1957, in what became known as “Red Monday,” the Court issued several
decisions which appeared to weaken the Smith Act.565 In Service v. Dulles,566 the Court,
in an opinion authored by Harlan, determined that an agency was bound by the letter
of its internal rules, and reversed the job termination of a State Department employee
accused of sympathy for China’s Communist Party.567 Harlan did not view the issue
557 For more on Eisenhower’s selection of Warren, see POWE, supra note 262, at 24. Warren
was not confirmed until March 1, 1954. Cray, supra note 396, at 259–60. On Truman’s hope
that Vinson would run for the presidency in 1952, see ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 474,
at 195.
558 See MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–1964,
at 20–21 (2005).
559 Id. at 2–3; CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39–40 (1998) (discussing the Warren
Court’s state-centered approach to criminal procedure).
560 TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN
COURT 86–87 (1992).
561 Id. at 111–13, 116–26 (discussing Harlan’s confirmation and the molding of Harlan’s
jurisprudential opinions that were somewhat in the vein of Justice Frankfurter and like Justice
Robert H. Jackson, but against Justice Black).
562 Id. at 138. Although Harlan was considered a conservative, he followed Frankfurter’s
judicial ideology deference, and newer conservatives such as Rehnquist’s supporters derisively
considered him a “squishie.” JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 18 (2007).
563 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Konigsberg II, 366
U.S. 36, 80 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Black authored the majority in Konigsberg I and
Schware, and Brennan did not dissent in Konigsberg I. See Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252, 252–
53, 276 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 233 (1957).
564 POWE, supra note 262, at 89–90; see also BALL, supra note 13, at 157.
565 See BELKNAP, supra note 558, at 63–65.
566 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
567 See generally id.
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as constitutional,568 but rather one in which, although the law permitted the Secretary
of State to terminate the employment of a foreign service officer for national security
reasons, the agency itself had created more restrictive rules and was therefore bound
by them.569 In Yates v. United States,570 another decision authored by Harlan, the Court
seemingly narrowed Dennis and the Smith Act to speech that incites the overthrow of
government rather than articulating abstract principles.571 In essence, urging people to
do something could be illegal,572 but urging people to believe in something was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.573 Additionally, the Court limited the Act’s provision
regarding “organizing” to persons who organized a movement, rather than joined an
existing movement.574 Because the CPUSA already existed, a CPUSA member could
be charged for incitement, but not organizing.575
Watkins, addressed previously, and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, a decision that more
or less applied Watkins to state governments,576 also contributed to reassessing the bal-
ance between the First Amendment and claims of national security.577 It is notable that
Harlan did not dissent from any of the “Red Monday” cases, and, indeed, authored two
of them.578 In Sweezy, he joined Frankfurter’s concurrence, which defended academic
freedom against legislative intrusion.579 Likewise, in Jencks v. United States,580 a de-
cision issued two weeks prior to “Red Monday,”581 Harlan sided with the majority in
reversing a conviction of a union leader where the government and trial court had sup-
pressed statements made by FBI informants.582 Jencks was not a First Amendment
case, however, but rather a decision involving the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair
568 Id. at 372 (citing Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1955)) (declining to reach
the equal protection issue raised in Peters).
569 Id. at 387–89.
570 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
571 Id. at 324–27 (distinguishing between abstract principles and advocacy of action in
regards to the trial court’s holding and the government’s argument).
572 Id. at 326–27.
573 Id. at 318–24. For a detailed discussion, see POWE, supra note 262, at 94–95.
574 Id. at 303.
575 Id. at 303–12.
576 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (citing Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957)).
577 See id. at 235; id. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Watkins, 354 U.S. at 182. For a
discussion of these cases, see BELKNAP, supra note 558, at 64–65.
578 For a discussion of Harlan’s views on the “Red Monday” cases, see YARBROUGH, supra
note 560, at 190–91. Harlan authored Service v. Dulles and Yates v. United States. See Dulles,
354 U.S. 363, 365 (1957); Yates, 354 U.S. 298, 300 (1957). Harlan joined Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Sweezy. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He did not
join Justice Clark’s dissent in Watkins. See Watkins, 353 U.S. at 217.
579 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 255, 266 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Frankfurter’s concurrence, see BELKNAP, supra note 558, at 65.
580 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
581 POWE, supra note 262, at 93.
582 Jencks, 353 U.S. at 666–67.
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trial.583 On the other hand, Jencks arose in New Mexico and involved suspected
CPUSA activities in that state,584 and this certainly colored Harlan’s approach to
Schware, discussed below.585
Prior to examining the decisions, a generic note has to be made about the three
petitioners. There were similarities between Raphael Konigsberg, Rudolph Schware,
and George Anastaplo. All three of these men were born to immigrant parents who
could be fairly characterized as “working class.” None of them, as described below,
enjoyed a privileged background.586 Each was a veteran of the United States Armed
Forces, who had honorably served in World War II.587 Each was a graduate from an
accredited law school and by any measure was qualified for bar admission.588 How-
ever, their political backgrounds diverged. A discredited California legislative investi-
gation included information from a singular questionable witness accusing Konigsberg
of being a CPUSA member.589 Schware admitted to once being a CPUSA member, but
prior to World War II when membership in the party was unquestionably legal and the
party was listed on various state and federal election ballots.590 No evidence was ever
produced that Anastaplo was a CPUSA member or had any affiliation or shared belief
with that party or any other organization on the Attorney General’s list.591 Ironically,
of the three, only Anastaplo would never be admitted to a state bar.592
Because the three petitioners were combat veterans who had risked their lives,593
in retrospect, one has to wonder whether a challenge to their loyalty was even valid.
Black believed this to be the case.594 He had already developed a sense that veterans
were owed a special status in society, and he often sided with them. This ranged from
583 Id. at 659.
584 Id. at 661–65 (describing the investigation in New Mexico).
585 See Schware, 354 U.S. at 250–51 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); infra notes 744–55 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence that was joined by Harlan).
586 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 98 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Konigsberg I, 353
U.S. 252, 265 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1957).
587 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting); Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at
266; Schware, 353 U.S. at 237–38.
588 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 98; Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 266; Schware, 353 U.S.
at 238.
589 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 266–68.
590 Schware, 353 U.S. at 244.
591 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 85–86.
592 See Ed Buckner, A Review of George Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist: Notes on the
First Amendment, 32 CRIM. JUST. REV. 173–74 (2007) (reviewing GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT (EXPANDED) (2005)). Konigsberg was
admitted to the bar in 1978. Burt A. Folkart, Raphael Konigsberg; Politics Delayed Admission
to State Bar, L.A. TIMES , June 12, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-12/news/mn-539
_1_california_state_bar.
593 See supra note 587 and accompanying text.
594 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 106–07; Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 260–61; Schware,
353 U.S. at 244–45.
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dissenting from the denial of citizenship for veterans595 and war brides,596 and even
protecting servicemen accused of CPUSA membership, where the military had failed,
similarly to Service v. Dulles, to follow regulations.597 Black’s support of veterans was
not necessarily unique,598 but he found the fact that the three attorney applicant peti-
tioners had fought in World War II evidenced that the states had minimized military
service as a factor in assessing fitness for admission to the state bars particularly
galling, and one in which he believed strengthened his First Amendment claims.599
A. Konigsberg I
In 1953, Raphael Konigsberg, a World War II veteran and graduate of the
University of Southern California Law School, took and passed the California Bar
Examination.600 However, the State Committee of Bar Examiners (SCBE), the orga-
nization charged with determining fitness for admission to the bar,601 refused to certify
him for practice after deciding he could not prove his moral character, or that he did
not advocate overthrowing the federal or state government.602 The SCBE granted
Konigsberg a hearing to refute allegations he belonged to a subversive organization
or sympathized with Communist goals, but Konigsberg was unable to convince the
organization’s members of his loyalty.603
In large measure, his inability to disprove association with the CPUSA or a sub-
versive group dedicated to the overthrow of the government occurred because of his
refusal to answer inquiries into whether he had been a member of such a group, or
associated with such a group.604 His reasons for refusing became clear in the SCBE’s
595 See Tak Shan Fong v. United States, 359 U.S. 102, 107 (1959). The Court, in an opinion
authored by Brennan, upheld the denial of citizenship to a foreign national who served honor-
ably in the Korean War in the Army. Id. Black dissented, but did so without publishing. Id.
Yet he authored a draft dissent which said: “He did serve honorably, not merely for 90 days,
but for two years. It is an obvious inference that the Immigration authorities held up the
proceedings to have petitioner serve two years in the Army during the war in Korea.” Draft
Tak Shan Fong dissent by Justice Hugo L. Black (1959) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 338). Black concluded the two page
dissent by stating he would reverse the conviction for illegal entry into the country and order
the government to naturalize (provide citizenship) to Tak Shan Fong. Id.
596 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 546–47, 550 (1950).
597 See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 580, 582–83 (1958).
598 Justice Brennan, for example, supported veterans in his majority opinion in Spieser v.
Randall. 357 U.S. 513, 528 (1957) (“The State is powerless to erase the service which the vet-
eran has rendered his country; though he be denied a tax exemption, he remains a veteran.”).
599 See supra notes 587, 593–97 and accompanying text.
600 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252, 253, 266 (1957).
601 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 344 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1959) (describing the SCBE’s
authority).
602 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 253.
603 Id. at 253–54.
604 Id. at 258.
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transcript, later appended by Harlan to his dissent.605 The California legislature had
established a committee that roughly, but less effectively, mirrored HUAC.606 Known
as the Tenney Committee,607 the state legislature subpoenaed hundreds of citizens, in-
cluding newspapermen, professors, and even William Schneiderman.608 In any sense,
Tenney’s committee tarnished the reputations of citizens with little regard to individual
rights.609 In 1951, the Court in Tenney v. Brandhove610 upheld the principle of legisla-
tive immunity under the Civil Rights Acts for the actions of legislators arising out of
the lawful investigative committees.611 Nonetheless, Black in his concurrence, likened
Tenney’s committee to Argentina’s dictatorship which had suppressed free press.612
An ambitious politician and former union leader who began as a liberal but ulti-
mately supported Senator Joseph McCarthy, Jack Tenney himself had once been
accused of being a Communist by HUAC in 1943.613 Konigsberg feared that if he
honestly disavowed ties to Communist organizations, the Tenney committee would
release its files on him, even though those files contained unreliable information,
opening him to a charge of perjury.614
Konigsberg appealed to the California Supreme Court, but that court denied his
petition for review.615 Notably three judges, including Roger Traynor, who was per-
haps the most distinguished state judge in the twentieth century,616 dissented from the
denial but did not leave a published opinion as to why.617
605 Id. at 286 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
606 See KEVIN STARR, EMBATTLED DREAMS: CALIFORNIA IN WAR AND PEACE, 1940–1950,
at 303 (2002).
607 Id. (noting the committee was headed by state senator Jack Tenney).
608 Id. at 303, 305 (noting that William Schneiderman was secretary of the Communist
Party of California).
609 Id. at 307.
610 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Frankfurter, who authored the majority opinion, id. at 369,
wanted to deny certiorari. See Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference
(Apr. 30, 1951) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William
O. Douglas, Box 207). Tenney used his committee to harass a journalist and private citizen,
William Brandhove. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 369–71. Brandhove sued Tenney under the Civil
Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment alleging that the committee (which consisted of more
than two individuals) conspired to deprive him of his civil rights. Id.
611 Id. at 379.
612 Id. at 380–81 (Black, J., concurring).
613 STARR, supra note 606, at 302–03, 311 (describing HUAC’s investigation of Tenney,
Tenney’s subsequent shift to the right and Tenney’s support of McCarthy’s tactics).
614 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252, 284–86 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
615 Id. at 253–54 (majority opinion).
616 On Roger Traynor, see Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law
Enforcement Affected His Work as Chief Justice, in HARRY N. SCHEIBER, EARL WARREN AND
THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW, 98 (2007); G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES
243–66 (3d ed., 2007); Warren E. Burger, A Tribute, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1037–38 (1983).
617 See Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 254, 258. Traynor did, however, author a dissent on
remand. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 344 P.2d 777, 780–83 (1959).
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Warren recognized Black’s interest in the issue and assigned him to write for the
majority.618 Indeed, in conference, Black pushed for granting certiorari, writing that
Konigsberg’s military service alone proved his loyalty to the United States, and he ac-
cused the Tenney Committee of undermining “the basic liberties of the people.”619
Warren, likewise, despised Tenney and Tenney’s ally on the state committee, the
future Los Angeles Mayor, Sam Yorty.620 Although Tenney and Yorty had supported
Warren’s state loyalty program in 1950 when Warren was the governor of California,621
by the time Konigsberg’s case came before the Court, Warren viewed their excessive
investigations as a threat to individual liberty.622 After the conference, Warren pro-
vided Black with newspaper clippings detailing that in Hungary, the Communist gov-
ernment had disbarred over 800 attorneys, and called over 3,000 attorneys to testify
as to their loyalty to the central government.623 In 1956, Hungarian citizenry revolted
against the Soviet-backed government, but the Soviet military crushed the revolt by
the end of the year.624
Prior to the grant of certiorari, Frankfurter, along with Harlan, signaled he would
oppose reversing the state supreme court.625 On May 4, 1956, Frankfurter drafted a
grant of certiorari inviting counsel to consider additional questions not raised in their
briefs.626 This is a permissible judicial function,627 but it is only done in a minority of
cases before the Court.628 Frankfurter posed two considerations. First, did the state
supreme court’s denial of a petition constitute a disposition “in the nature of a review”
or merely a refusal of that court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction?629 Second, if
618 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 253.
619 Memorandum from Justice Hugo L. Black to the Conference (Jan. 11, 1957) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 329). Black noted
that the SCBE’s evidence against Konigsberg had all come from Tenney’s Committee. Id. “It
seems a little odd that a man with such a background should be rejected without some authentic,
reliable evidence,” Black concluded. Id.
620 CRAY, supra note 394, at 202.
621 JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 227 (2006).
622 M.J. HEALE, MCCARTHY’S AMERICANS: RED SCARE POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION,
1935–1965, at 44 (1998); see also CRAY, supra note 394, at 200–05 (describing Warren’s view
of loyalty oaths and personal liberty); NEWTON, supra note 621, at 217–19 (discussing the
political climate in California before the Konigsberg decision).
623 Letter from Justice Earl Warren to Justice Hugo L. Black (Sept. 15, 1956) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 329).
624 See, e.g., CHARLES GATI, FAILED ILLUSIONS: MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, BUDAPEST, AND
THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLT 1–2 (2006).
625 Draft Grant of Certiorari in Konigsberg I by Justice Felix Frankfurter (1956), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 22, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
626 Id.
627 See, e.g., U.S. SUP. CT. R. 25.6; Pa. R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T.H.R. Co., 116 U.S. 472
(1886).
628 See, e.g., 14 CYC. OF FED. PROC. § 66:9 (3d ed.) (review is confined to question in brief
unless by special leave or court’s motion).
629 Draft Grant of Certiorari in Konigsberg I by Justice Felix Frankfurter (1956), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 22, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.) (citation omitted).
2012] HUGO BLACK’S VISION 755
the state supreme court’s denial was, in fact, a review, was it also a rejection of a claim
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment?630 Initially, Frankfurter shared his draft only
with Harlan, who replied that it “would sharpen the thrust of the doctrinal question.”631
After further work on the draft certiorari grant, on May 15, 1956, Frankfurter raised
a third question as to whether Konigsberg had even raised, in plain language, a Four-
teenth Amendment claim to the state supreme court.632 Clearly Frankfurter suspected
Konigsberg had not raised such a claim, and this set up his dissent in which he would
argue that the Court was not the proper place to raise a claim of first instance.633
The California attorney general, with the state supreme court’s concurrence, hired
Frank B. Belcher to represent the state bar before the Court.634 Belcher was a mem-
ber of the state Republican Party and a delegate to the 1952 Republican Convention,
where he backed Richard M. Nixon for the vice presidency.635 He was also a one-time
president of the Los Angeles Bar Association and the state bar association.636 A 1914
graduate of the University of California’s law school, Belcher’s list of clients included
actor John Wayne, who in 1952 starred in a movie titled Big Jim McLain, in which
Wayne’s character worked for HUAC investigating Communists in Hawaiian labor
unions.637 Belcher was Wayne’s agent at the time of this film, and he had also repre-
sented the state bar in disbarment hearings.638 Konigsberg was represented by Edward
Mosk, whose brother, Stanley Mosk, had been state attorney general and later a justice
on the state supreme court.639 Mosk too had Hollywood clients, albeit those under
630 Id.
631 Id. Harlan penciled these comments in the draft. Id.
632 Draft Grant of Certiorari in Konigsberg I by Justice Felix Frankfurter (May 11, 1956),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 22, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.) (circulated
copy); Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference (May 15, 1956), micro-
formed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 22, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.). Justice Burton
agreed with including Frankfurter’s questions, writing that the draft “suits me,” even though
he ultimately did not agree with Frankfurter’s dissent. Letter from Justice Harold H. Burton to
Justice Felix Frankfurter (May 15, 1956), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 22,
Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
633 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 253, 276 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also BELKNAP,
supra note 558, at 62.
634 See Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 253 (majority opinion).
635 California Delegation to the 1952 Republican National Convention, POLITICAL
GRAVEYARD.COM (July 1, 1996), http://politicalgraveyard.com/parties/R/1952/CA.html.
636 BAR ASSOCIATION NEWS, 29 A.B.A. J. 676 (1993) (announcing, a year later, Russell
O’Hara as Belcher’s successor); BAR ASSOCIATION NEWS, 28 A.B.A. J. 853 (1942) (announc-
ing Belcher as State Bar Association President); Myrna Oliver, Nancy Watson, 77; Judge
Presided Over Trial of Alphabet Bomber, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, http://articles.latimes
.com/2004/feb/12/local/me-watson12.
637 DONALD SHEPHERD ET. AL., DUKE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN WAYNE 176, 179,
246–47, 350 (1985).
638 Id.; see also, e.g., In re Craig, 82 P.2d 442, 443 (1938).
639 Interview by Germaine LaBerge with the Honorable Stanley Mosk, Justice of the
California Supreme Court (ret.), Editor of the University of California at Berkeley State
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suspicion of Communist leanings.640 He had supported Upton Sinclair’s 1934 “End
Poverty in California” campaign for governor, as well as Henry Wallace’s 1948 quest
for the presidency.641 Likewise, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Lawyers Guild filed amicus briefs.642
Black’s first draft opinion, dated March 27, 1957, differed little from his fourth and
final draft, which he circulated to the Court on May, 6, 1957.643 Echoing the Illinois
Attorney General’s arguments in In re Summers,644 Belcher initially argued that the
Court lacked jurisdiction over Konigsberg’s claims since he had not succinctly raised
the claims in an identical manner before the state court.645 Black dismissed this argu-
ment because the state court possessed original jurisdiction over Konigsberg’s claims
and had the opportunity to expand on the original claim.646 Black also bypassed a
question of whether a refusal to answer questions could result in denial of admission
to practice law, because neither the state bar nor Konigsberg, argued this point.647 This
point became important in Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo, where the Court would
decide adversely to both petitioners, holding that refusal to answer the bar could result
in denial of admission.648
Black then focused on whether Konigsberg had proven he possessed the “good
moral character” required for bar admission.649 He found it overwhelming that forty-two
persons attested to Konigsberg’s fitness including religious leaders, law professors, and
Archives State Government Oral History Program, in Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 18, 1998), ii, 1,
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/oral-history/pdf/mosk.pdf.
640 EDWARD DMYTRYK, ODD MAN OUT: A MEMOIR OF THE HOLLYWOOD TEN 183 (1996).
641 Mosk was a freshman at UCLA and was present at a play when Sinclair announced his
candidacy. See Fay M. Blake & H. Morton Newman, Upton Sinclair’s EPIC Campaign, 63
CALIF. HIST. 305, 307 (1984). He was “thrilled” to hear the announcement. Id. The Southern
California Library for Social Studies and Research has a collection of Mosk’s writings on
politics and support of Sinclair and Wallace. For an index of these documents, see REGISTER
OF THE EDWARD MOSK PAPERS, 1934–1961, available at http://cdn.calisphere.org/data/13030
/vj/kt3r29r7vj/files/kt3r29r7vj.pdf.
642 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252, 253 (1957). For the ACLU’s brief, see Respondent’s Brief,
Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252 (No. 244). For the National Lawyers Guild’s Brief, see Brief
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252 (No. 5).
643 See generally Draft Konigsberg I Opinions (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 329). His writing even impressed the normally conser-
vative Harold Burton. Letter from Justice Harold H. Burton to Justice Hugo L. Black (Apr. 24,
1957) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box
329). On April 24, 1957, Burton informed Black that neither Frankfurter, who he usually
aligned with, nor Harlan had swayed him away from Black’s opinion. Id.
644 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
645 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 642, at 37–38 (citing In re Summers, 325 U.S. at
561, 570–71).
646 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 257.
647 Id. at 260–62.
648 See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 94 (1961); Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961).
649 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 262.
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lawyers.650 Black also presented a brief biographical sketch of Konigsberg including
his Austrian birth (an origin he shared with Frankfurter),651 graduation from Ohio State
University in 1931, and previous employment as a high school history teacher and
social worker.652 Most important to Black was Konigsberg’s war record, which included
service in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany, as well as ending the war as a
captain.653 After the war, Konigsberg unsuccessfully ran for the Los Angeles Board of
Public Education.654 At the age of thirty-nine, he enrolled in law school in search of a
new career.655 Against Konigsberg was the word of a single ex-Communist witness who
could not accurately describe to the SCBE how she knew Konigsberg.656 Even had the
witness been more clear, Black convinced the Court to note in the majority opinion that
the CPUSA was a legal entity in 1941, and membership in it prior to World War II
could not be used as a means to deny a member bar admission.657
As to the other criteria that the state considered, namely Konigsberg’s criticism
of certain public officials, Black found it amusing that the state’s rationale in denying
Konigsberg admission included criticism of the Dennis decision, informing the con-
ference that if the SCBE applied their current standard to the Court, it would preclude
Douglas and himself from the practice of law in California.658 In his conclusion, Black
recognized that the states were entitled to set standards for bar admission, but to do
so in an arbitrary manner that ignored basic freedoms would ultimately intimidate
society.659 His closing sentence reminded the state bars that:
[T]he mere fact of Konigsberg’s past membership in the Communist
Party, if true, without anything more, is not an adequate basis for
concluding that he is disloyal or a person of bad character. A life-
time of good citizenship is worth very little if it is so frail that it
cannot withstand the suspicions which apparently were the basis
for the Committee’s action.660
The majority reversed the state supreme court’s denial of Konigsberg’s appli-
cation based on his alleged past political affiliation,661 but it did not order the lower
650 Id. at 264–65.
651 See BELKNAP, supra note 558, at 9.
652 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 262.
653 Id. at 266.
654 See Folkart, supra note 592.
655 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 266.
656 Id. at 266–67.
657 Id. at 268.
658 Memorandum from Justice Hugo L. Black to the Conference (Jan. 11, 1957) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 329).
659 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 273.
660 Id. at 273–74.
661 Id. at 262, 273–74.
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court to admit Konigsberg to the bar.662 This was a point made clear in Frankfurter’s
dissent,663 and one that would enable the state to exclude Konigsberg on a slightly
different matter.
Frankfurter dissented on purely technical grounds.664 Like Black, his draft dis-
sent differed little from the published version.665 He argued that the Court had intruded
into the state supreme court’s province because that tribunal had not yet considered
Konigsberg’s arguments now raised before the nation’s highest court.666 That is, he
claimed that Black and the majority had erred in their Fourteenth Amendment analy-
sis, because there was no evidence that the California Supreme Court had considered
whether that amendment protected Konigsberg against denial of admission to practice
law.667 For his adherence to a technical mandate, he refused to join in Harlan’s dissent
because he believed that the exclusion might violate the Fourteenth Amendment.668
Frankfurter simply wanted that decision to come from the California Supreme Court,
or in the event that the state supreme court found it could prevent admission to the bar
based on a prior political affiliation, then the Supreme Court could overturn.669 “The
record is too disturbing for me to deny the petition for certiorari. On the other hand, the
record is in too clouded a condition for bringing up the issues which I see in it,” he
noted to the conference before concluding that the state should have the opportunity
“to clarify what is now left debatable.”670 There is a troubling aspect to Frankfurter’s
decision based on his research of the state supreme court. John T. Fey, the clerk of
the court, after consulting with his counterpart on the state supreme court, informed
Frankfurter that the state’s highest court reviewed all bar matters.671 Thus, in instances
where that court did not render a published decision, it could not be said that the court
662 Id. at 274.
663 Id. at 276–82 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
664 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 274–76 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
665 Compare id., with Draft Konigsberg I Dissent by Justice Felix Frankfurter (May 1956)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 430).
666 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 274–76. Frankfurter specifically argued:
Before this Court can find that a State—and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of California expresses “the power of the State as a whole,” Rippey
v. Texas, 193 U.S. 504, 509; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 79—has
violated the Constitution, it must be clear from the record that the state
court has in fact passed on a federal question. As a safeguard against
intrusion upon state power, it has been our practice when a fair doubt is
raised whether a state court has in fact adjudicated a properly presented
federal claim not to assume or presume that it has done so.
Id. at 275.
667 Id. at 275–76.
668 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 276 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
669 Id. at 274–76.
670 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference (May 15, 1956) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 430).
671 Memorandum from John T. Fey to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 29, 1957),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 22, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
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did not consider the facts, and, therefore, a non-opinion constituted a fully reviewed
affirmance of the SCBE.672
Harlan’s dissent, with Clark joining, not only illustrated the divide between his
belief of how the bar should function and Black’s,673 it also—like Frankfurter’s—
distinguished what the majority had not determined.674 Namely, he pointed that the
Court did not explicitly rule that the First or Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state
from inquiring into an individual’s past political affiliations.675 Nor, he argued, did
either amendment prohibit a state from excluding a citizen who advocated the use of
force or violence to overthrow the government,676 or placing the burden on the prospec-
tive bar applicant to prove good moral character.677 Most importantly, Harlan wrote that
the Court did not rule that the First or Fourteenth Amendment protected an applicant’s
refusal to answer questions of a political nature on his or her personal background.678
He also appended a large portion of the SCBE’s questioning of Konigsberg, as well as
the statement of the singular witness who claimed to have knowledge of Konigsberg’s
past ties to the CPUSA.679
Harlan’s dissent proved to be a successful avenue for state bars to exclude appli-
cants suspected of having ties to subversive organizations. Indeed, he narrowed Black’s
opinion to a reversal based on factual insufficiency.680 Harlan also argued that the
Court had intruded into the state’s authority to govern a profession.681 In this case,
he believed that the state bar had the right to inquire into Konigsberg’s past relations
with the CPUSA, because such an inquiry would test the sincerity of Konigsberg’s
“unequivocal disavowal of advocacy of the overthrow of the Government by force
or violence.”682
B. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners
Rudolph Schware was born to immigrant parents and raised in poverty in New
York City.683 His father, as the New Mexico Supreme Court would point out, was “a
672 Id.
673 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 273, 279–82 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
674 Id. at 278.
675 Id. at 311. Harlan also joined with Frankfurter and when Frankfurter issued his draft
dissent, Harlan noted, “I am indebted to you for your ‘statement of the issue’ in Konigsberg.
I cannot improve on it, so will take the liberty of using it as written.” Letter from Justice John
M. Harlan to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 25, 1957), microformed on Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Reel 22, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
676 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 278.
677 Id.
678 Id. at 278.
679 Id. at 284–309.
680 Id. at 279.
681 Id. at 276–77.
682 Id. at 277.
683 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 236 (1957).
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needles [sic] trade worker, an immigrant, a poor man and a socialist.”684 During the
period known as the Great Depression, Schware worked in New York City, Chicago,
Detroit, and Los Angeles in a variety of jobs ranging from making pocketbooks to
being a longshoreman.685 On occasion, he used an Italian alias to gain employment
in the hopes of thwarting anti-Semitism.686 He also joined the CPUSA as a youth, but
claimed to have divested his membership by 1940.687 In the 1930s he was arrested
several times during pro-labor demonstrations, but never charged or prosecuted for
violating any laws.688 Additionally, he assisted in recruiting American citizens to
travel to Spain to fight alongside the Republicans against General Francisco Franco’s
regime.689 The Soviet Union and CPUSA supported the Republicans against Franco,
while President Roosevelt proclaimed neutrality.690 The Board of Bar Examiners and
the state supreme court would place significant weight on this fact in determining
that violating the Neutrality Act constituted a crime, and therefore was proof of bad
character.691 However, from 1944 to 1946 Schware also served honorably in the United
States Army, and took part in combat in New Guinea against the Japanese Army.692 He
attended the University of New Mexico’s law school in his late thirties and success-
fully completed his coursework.693 Prior to taking the bar examination, the Board of
Bar Examiners, partly relying on confidential information, determined Schware did
not possess the requisite good moral character for bar admission and denied him the
opportunity to take the exam.694 After this denial, he successfully appealed for a per-
sonal appearance with the board and provided its members with substantially the same
information he had written in his application.695 However, the personal appearance
did not change the Board of Bar Examiners’ adverse decision and he appealed to the
684 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 291 P.2d 607, 610 (N.M. 1955).
685 Id. at 611, 613–14, 619.
686 Schware, 353 U.S. at 236–37.
687 Schware, 291 P.2d at 610–13.
688 Id. at 628.
689 Id. at 613, 630. Known as the “Abraham Lincoln Battalion,” approximately 2,600
Americans fought on the side of the Republicans against Franco who was supported by
Hitler and Mussolini. GUERNICA—THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, PBS.org, http://www.pbs.org
/treasuresoftheworld/a_nav/guernica_nav/gnav_level_1/1acivil_war_guerfrm.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2012); see DOMINIC TIERNEY, FDR AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: NEUTRALITY AND
COMMITMENT IN THE STRUGGLE THAT DIVIDED AMERICA, 64 (2007). However, FDR directed
the Justice Department not to prosecute Americans who fought against Franco for violations
of the Neutrality Act. Id. at 66.
690 TIERNEY, supra note 689, at 64, 66. See also JOAN MARIA THOMAS, ROOSEVELT AND
FRANCO DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR: FROM THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR TO PEARL
HARBOR 13–16 (2008).
691 Schware, 291 P.2d at 630.
692 Schware, 353 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1957).
693 Id. at 250.
694 Id. at 235 n. 2.
695 Id. at 234.
2012] HUGO BLACK’S VISION 761
state supreme court.696 The state court decision came in four parts: the majority ruled
adversely to Schware, followed by a single dissent, followed by the majority response,
ending with a final word from the dissent.697
The New Mexico Supreme Court possessed plenary authority to review the Board
of Bar Examiners’ decisions, and was under no requirement to adopt the board’s
determinations.698 Like Konigsberg I, where the entire state supreme court consid-
ered the issue,699 all five justices on the New Mexico Supreme Court sat in review of
Schware’s claims.700 Justice James C. McGhee, who was elected to the state court in
1947, and reelected in 1954, authored the majority decision.701 In his first year on the
state supreme court, McGhee lambasted the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams
v. Georgia,702 a decision in which the Court found that the exclusion of African
Americans from a jury required a remand to the state supreme court to fashion a
remedy in a death penalty case.703 In response, the Georgia Supreme Court indignantly
upheld its prior decision, with the implicit criticism that the Court had intruded into
its state jurisdictional sphere.704 Although the Court did not overturn the conviction,705
McGhee wrote to his counterpart on the Georgia Supreme Court, “I rejoice that the
members of a state supreme court have had the courage to refuse to honor the con-
tinued usurpation of the powers, prerogatives and privileges of the various state courts
in the administration of their local laws.”706
696 Schware, 291 P.2d at 608.
697 See generally id.
698 Id. at 608.
699 Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. at 254.
700 Schware, 291 P.2d at 607.
701 See Supreme Court Justices of the State of New Mexico Since Statehood, NEW MEXICO
SUPREME COURT, http://nmsupremecourt.nmcourts.gov/justices/justices_since_statehood.pdf
(last updated Apr. 7, 2010); see also Schware, 291 P.2d at 607.
702 YARBROUGH, supra note 560, at 158.
703 349 U.S. 375, 377, 391 (1955).
704 Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 1955). The Georgia Supreme Court replied to the
remand by stating:
Not in recognition of any jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to influence
or in any manner to interfere with the functioning of this court on strictly
State questions, but solely for the purpose of completing the record in
this court in a case that was first decided by us in 1953, and to avoid
further delay, we state that our opinion in Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 665,
82 S.E.2d 217, is supported by sound and unchallenged law, conforms
with the State and Federal Constitutions, and stands as the judgment of
all seven of the Justices of this Court.
Id. at 377.
705 Id. at 373–77.
706 Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams
v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1469 (1994); see also YARBROUGH, supra note 560,
at 158.
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Justices James C. Compton, Eugene Lujan, and Daniel K. Sadler joined McGhee
in the majority.707 The judicial biographical record on the New Mexico judges, in com-
parison to those on the California708 and Illinois Supreme Courts,709 is sparse; there are
no biographical treatises on any of these men, but given the tenor of McGhee’s sup-
port for the Georgia Supreme Court, it is clear that he believed the Warren Court had
unnecessarily intruded into domains reserved to the states.
McGhee cited to several state jurisdictions in upholding New Mexico’s standards
for excluding Communists and fellow-travelers from admission to the Bar on the basis
of failure to show good character.710 However, before reviewing more current state
decisions, McGhee turned to In re Rouss, the 1917 New York appellate decision
authored by then Judge Cardozo, for the proposition that character and fitness to
practice law were related.711 In authoring In re Rouss, Cardozo wrote “[m]embership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private and professional
character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is essential at the moment
of admission; but it is equally essential afterwards.”712 But, In re Rouss involved an
attorney representing a corrupt police officer, where the attorney participated in a
fraud as an equal partner to his client and then testified against his client.713 The case
was a challenge to a disbarment of an already admitted attorney, and did not involve
political affiliations.714 The other state cases cited by McGhee were not on point with
the matter of political affiliations either.715 For instance, a 1926 North Carolina deci-
sion that McGhee placed particular reliance on involved a justice of the peace who had
converted seized assets for his own personal use and collected fees for the service of
legal summons without delivering the summons.716
707 Schware, 291 P.2d at 607, 618; see also Supreme Court Justices of the State of New
Mexico Since Statehood, supra note 701.
708 Past and Present Justices, CALIFORNIA COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/12523.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
709 Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court: 1818–1850, THE THIRD BRANCH—A CHRONICLE
OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT, http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Historical/Justice
TL.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
710 Schware, 291 P.2d at 608–09.
711 Id. (citing In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)).
712 Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
713 In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782.
714 Id.
715 See Spears v. State Bar of Cal., 294 P. 697, 697–700 (Cal. 1930) (finding false statements
about past criminal convictions a ground for denial to bar admission); In re Wells, 163 P. 657
(Cal. 1917) (finding concealment of past criminal frauds a basis for exclusion from admission
to practice); Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 141 N.E. 58, 59 (Ind. 1923) (holding that acts of a
criminal nature such as the unlicensed sale of alcohol and the seduction of a minor proof of
bad moral character); In re Weinstein, 42 P.2d 744, 745, 747 (Ore. 1935) (finding egregious
conduct as a collection agent grounds for preventing admission to the bar).
716 In re Farmer, 131 S.E. 661, 662 (N.C. 1926). The applicant had made disparaging re-
marks about the United States Supreme Court. Id. Additionally, the applicant absconded with
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McGhee also turned to Douds in two instances. The first was to minimize
Schware’s contention that when he was a member of the CPUSA, the party itself
was a legal political affiliation with no criminality affixed to it.717 The second time
McGhee cited to Douds, he incorporated Jackson’s concurrence to articulate why the
“communist theology” was different from any other political affiliation.718 Included
in McGhee’s reasoning was that the CPUSA was controlled by a foreign government
and espoused “[v]iolent and undemocratic means” to effectuate change.719 Because
of Schware’s past CPUSA associations, the New Mexico Court concluded that the
Board of Bar Examiners reasonably determined that he could not support the United
States or New Mexico Constitutions.720
Justice Henry Alexander Kiker dissented from the majority, pointing out that
Schware’s character references included a respected rabbi, the secretary to the dean
of the state’s law school, and a practicing attorney.721 He also found it dispositive that
Schware had left the CPUSA in 1940, severing ties to its members, and served honor-
ably in the Army during World War II.722 As for Schware’s use of pseudonyms, Kiker
funds belonging to the Ku Klux Klan. Id. A sizeable population of the county involved success-
fully protested the justice of the peace’s admission to practice law in the state. Id. at 662–63.
The second applicant was successfully sued by a former wife for infidelity. Id. at 665.
717 Schware, 291 P.2d at 609. McGhee specifically articulated:
The legal status of the Communist Party in the United States is far dif-
ferent today from that which obtained during the years of the Depression
and following, when petitioner was a member of it. He calls our attention
to the fact that as late as 1948 the Communist Party was a recognized
political party and had candidates for the Presidency of the United States
every four years up to and including 1948. We do not overlook the fact
that during the years petitioner was a member of the Young Communist
League and the Communist Party, from 1932 to 1940, such member-
ship was not unlawful. But that fact does not restrain us from exam-
ining his former associations and actions, including his arrests and his
use of aliases, and his present attitude toward those matters, as con-
tained in his statements to the board, in order to arrive at a conclusion
as to his character.
Id.
718 Id. at 617.
719 Id.
720 Id. at 617–18.
721 Id. at 618 (Kiker, J., dissenting).
722 Id. at 631. Kiker elaborated that Schware’s divorce from the CPUSA was not evidence
of untrustworthiness:
It strikes me that applicant in this case at the time he left the Communist
party was thinking along the same straight lines, and that his rebirth to
the principles of democracy is no more strange than his passing from
disbelief in God to faithful adherence to the religion of his birth.
Id. at 624.
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pointed out that prior to his judicial service he assisted a businessman of Polish ances-
try in changing his name, even though the name the businessman sought to change
had already been used for several years prior to the request.723 Name changes were
not uncommon in American history, and Kiker drew an analogy with the noted author
Samuel Clemens who most Americans knew by the pseudonym Mark Twain, as well
as Paul the Apostle’s true identity of Saul of Tarsus.724 Perhaps in the hope of the Court
granting certiorari, Kiker turned to Black’s dissents in Douds and In re Summers for
the purpose of criticizing test oaths.725 He also noted that the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas had previously denied another prospective
applicant standing to practice in federal court based on allegations of CPUSA member-
ship and while the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had upheld the
lower court, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision remanding the case, be-
cause the lower courts had failed to create a sufficient record for their determinations.726
Finally, Kiker protested that the majority decision appeared to permanently foreclose
bar admission against Schware.727
During the conference, Warren assigned Black to write for the majority.728 Initially
it appeared that Frankfurter, Clark, and Harlan would vote to uphold the New Mexico
Supreme Court,729 though this did not occur.730 Black was willing to forgo a full Four-
teenth Amendment analysis to Frankfurter’s satisfaction.731 Indeed, one of Schware’s
leading arguments was that the Board of Bar Examiners had relied on confidential
information in deciding to deny him the opportunity to take the bar examination.732
Although the state supreme court had not reviewed the confidential information, it
relied on the Board’s determination, and Black initially urged that refusing Schware
access to the classified information constituted a denial of due process.733 Black could
have made a stronger case by pointing out that the state supreme court violated the
1873 decision Ex parte Robinson, which required a judge to provide all evidence to
723 Id. at 621.
724 Id.
725 Id. at 624–25 (citations omitted).
726 Id. at 626–27 (citing Application of Levy, 214 F.2d 331 (Ca. 1954), rev’d sub nom. In
re Levy, 348 U.S. 978 (1955)).
727 Id. at 631–32.
728 See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 232–33 (1957); Conference Notes
by Justice Hugo L. Black (undated) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 330).
729 Draft Schware Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black (undated) (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 330) (handwritten notes).
730 See Schware, 353 U.S. at 247; Draft Schware Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black, supra
note 729.
731 Schware, 353 U.S. at 247.
732 Id.
733 Draft Schware Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black, supra note 729.
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a lawyer charged with contempt.734 Also, unlike the state supreme court, Black high-
lighted Schware’s military service during World War II, and he also pointed out the
law school dean had full knowledge of Schware’s background and encouraged him
to finish law school.735
Where Black brought the Fourteenth Amendment into play was in his articulation
of the general principle that a state could not exclude a person from a profession based
on political beliefs any more than it could based on race.736 This was an important
point because by the time Schware’s case came before the Court, disgruntled southern
segregationists had allied with northern anticommunist leaders in attacking the Court.737
Black also found it dispositive that even the state supreme court recognized Schware
enjoyed a good reputation with the law school’s faculty and in the local community.738
He found the use of aliases to circumvent bigotry understandable,739 and noted that as
to Schware’s pre–World War II arrests, none resulted in a conviction.740 Indeed, the
arrests that occurred in California resulted in charges under the state’s anti-syndicalism
laws, which Black referred to as “broad and vague.”741 As to the Neutrality Act vio-
lation, Black also equated support for Spain’s anti-Franco forces with Americans who
volunteered in the British Royal Air Force to fight Nazi Germany prior to the United
States entry in World War II.742 Black’s opinion importantly undermined Douds,
and, in referencing the New Mexico Supreme Court’s citing of Jackson’s concurring
opinion, the Court noted that it “did not purport to be a factual finding,” and could
not “be used as a substitute for evidence” against Schware.743
Frankfurter authored a concurring opinion in which Harlan and Clark joined.744
Clark initially had determined to dissent,745 then was willing to join in Black’s
opinion,746 but ultimately went over to Frankfurter’s concurrence.747 “Some time ago
I sent you my agreement to your opinion. My restudy of Konigsberg leads me to the
conclusion that my original vote here was correct—probably,” Clark penned Black.748
734 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 506, 512–13 (1873).
735 Schware, 353 U.S. at 237–38.
736 Id. at 238–39, 244.
737 BELKNAP, supra note 558, at 66–67.
738 Schware, 353 U.S. at 239–41.
739 Id. at 240–41.
740 Id. at 241.
741 Id. at 241–42.
742 Id. at 242–43; see also Draft Schware Opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black, supra note 729.
743 Schware, 353 U.S. at 244.
744 Id. at 247.
745 Letter from Justice Tom C. Clark to Justice Hugo L. Black (May 2, 1957) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 330).
746 Id.
747 Schware, 353 U.S. at 247.
748 Letter from Justice Tom C. Clark to Justice Hugo L. Black, supra note 745.
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“However, I have decided rather than being the sole dissenter on such a close question
that I will join Frankfurter, J.”749 Frankfurter’s concurrence stressed that the Court was
not an overseer of bar admissions.750 He agreed with Black’s concept that attorneys
had a critical role in ensuring justice, but he would not agree that political affiliation
could not be used to deny admission to the bar.751 Yet, he too found a Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation, because New Mexico had accorded far too much
weight to Schware’s youthful affiliation with the CPUSA.752 “History overwhelm-
ingly establishes that many youths like the petitioner were drawn by the mirage of
communism during the depression era, only to have their eyes later opened to reality,”
Frankfurter concluded.753 In this respect, Frankfurter’s concurrence was consistent with
his stance in Schneiderman, fifteen years earlier in which he distinguished CPUSA
membership from leadership in the organization.754
C. Interregnum: In re Sawyer
In between 1957 and 1960, the Court decided another disbarment case involving
an attorney with CPUSA ties.755 Harriet Bouslog Sawyer, a Hawaii lawyer who had
been admitted to the territorial Bar since 1941, along with Richard Gladstein who
had served his contempt sentence from Sacher, but had not been disbarred for life,756
defended five citizens accused of violating the Smith Act in the United States District
Court.757 During the trial, Sawyer publicly spoke to an assembly, denouncing the Smith
Act.758 This speech occurred 182 miles from the site of the trial.759 Judge Jon Wiig, the
749 Id. Had Clark dissented, the case would have appeared more fractured. Harlan did not plan
on dissenting, as he had in Konigsberg I. Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice Hugo
L. Black (Mar. 28, 1957) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo
L. Black, Box 330). Prior to reading Frankfurter’s concurrence, he informed Black that he
simply wanted to be on record as concurring without publishing a written concurrence. Id.
750 Schware, 353 U.S. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
751 Id. at 247, 250–51.
752 Id. at 250–51.
753 Id. at 251.
754 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 183, 185, 196–97 (1943).
755 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
756 Id. at 623; Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 3, 14, 42 (1951).
757 See Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 623. The trial is found at United States v. Fujimoto, 107 F.
Supp. 865 (Haw. 1952). Before the trial, Sawyer unsuccessfully motioned Judge J. Frank
McLaughlin to recuse himself because he had opposed the University of Hawaii, honoring
the scientist, Linus Pauling. See United States v. Fujimoto, 101 F. Supp. 293, 297 (Haw. 1951).
In 1954, Pauling was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. The Nobel Prize in Chemistry
1954: Linus Pauling, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry
/laureates/1954/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
758 Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 628–30.
759 Id. at 623.
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federal territorial judge, after reading extracts of the speech in a newspaper, questioned
Sawyer and ordered the United States Attorney to investigate her conduct.760 After the
trial, Sawyer interviewed a juror in the hopes of discovering grounds for appeal.761 In
response, Wiig requested the Hawaii Bar Association investigate Sawyer’s conduct,
as well.762 Remembering Medina’s conduct, however, he did not summarily hold a
contempt hearing.763 Both of these acts resulted in the Hawaii Bar Association pre-
ferring the ethics allegations to the Territorial Supreme Court, which in turn referred the
charges to the territorial Bar Association’s Legal Ethics Committee.764 The Committee
determined that Sawyer’s speech impugned the integrity of the trial judge, Jon Wiig,
and found the interview of the juror improper.765 The Territorial Supreme Court then
suspended Sawyer for one year.766 Sawyer appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but that court did not grant relief.767
The Ninth Circuit’s decision primarily focused on its jurisdiction, writing, “[i]f
we have jurisdiction it hangs by the narrowest thread.”768 Turning to Schware and
Konigsberg I, the appellate court found that it had jurisdiction only if Sawyer’s claim
was that she had been deprived of due process under the Fifth Amendment—the right
against self-incrimination—regarding her First Amendment rights.769 In other words,
the court would have jurisdiction to consider a matter if Sawyer had refused to answer
questions about her association with a political group. But that was not the case in
her suspension from practice, and, therefore, the court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction.770 Nonetheless, the court criticized Sawyer’s conduct throughout the
decision, and, indeed, it noted that she had failed to show contrition to the state bar.771
760 In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1958).
761 Id. at 192–96.
762 Id. at 192.
763 Id. at 191–92, 199, 225.
764 Id.
765 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 624–25, 636–37 (1959).
766 In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d at 196.
767 Id. at 190. The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc characterized the meeting as, “it would be
fair to characterize the gathering as some kind of an old fashioned ‘indignation meeting.’”
Id. at 191. The appellate court also noted that the speech was well publicized throughout the
Islands. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision rejected Sawyer’s defenses including that
the cannons of ethics did not specifically prohibit public speeches. Id. at 200, 203–04.
768 Id. at 201.
769 Id.
770 Id.
771 Id. at 202. The court penned:
But so long as she conceives that she has a right to litigate a given case
by day and castigate by night (or at recess) the very court, the honored
place in which she is working, berating the conduct of the trial which she
will resume on the morrow, she does not deserve to practice law.
Id.
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After the conference, Warren assigned Brennan, rather than Black, to write the
majority opinion.772 Brennan included excerpts of Sawyer’s speech in the opinion, in-
cluding commenting that “horrible and shocking things” occurred during the Smith
Act trials in Hawaii and accusing the government of union busting.773 To this issue,
Brennan noted that lawyers are free to criticize the state of the law.774 Moreover, he
pointed out that Sawyer’s criticisms against the government and the Smith Act were
not an attack on the judiciary.775 As to the juror interview, Sawyer had discovered that
the juror was mentally unstable and even the territorial court did not find the juror
interview alone would merit suspension.776 Thus, the Court reversed the lower courts
and with it, the suspension.777 In a conference memorandum, Brennan informed the
Justices that he was not inclined to focus on due process, and his “opinion simply
detail[ed] at length the reasons supporting the conclusion that the charge that Mrs.
Sawyer in the speech impugned the integrity of Judge Wiig’s conduct of the Smith
Act trial was not proved.”778
Black concurred in the result.779 However, he disagreed that Hawaiian law per-
mitted the suspension in the first place, and, more importantly, that Hawaii had pro-
vided a disbarment proceeding which comported with due process.780 Thus, where
Brennan and the majority determined that the quantum of evidence was not of a
magnitude to support disbarment, Black’s opinion was that the disbarment proceed-
ing failed to provide basic rights required in federal hearings.781 Stewart concurred as
well, but on the basis that the legal profession could not exist without the full pro-
tection of freedom of speech.782 He conceded that there were limitations to his general
statement.783 For instance, Stewart noted that, because client confidentiality is para-
mount to the profession, an attorney could not use the First Amendment as an excuse
for divulging client communications.784 Stewart’s concurrence was in response to
772 In re Sayer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
773 Id. at 628–31, 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).
774 Id. at 631.
775 Id. at 632–33. Later in the opinion, Brennan explained, “[e]ven if some passages can
be found which go so far as to imply that Judge Wiig was taking an erroneous view of the
law . . . it is no matter; appellate courts and law reviews say that of judges daily.” Id. at 635.
776 Id. at 636–37.
777 Id. at 638.
778 Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Conference (undated) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Box I:25).
779 Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 646 (Black, J., concurring).
780 Id.
781 Id.
782 Id. at 646–47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
783 Id.
784 Id. at 646.
2012] HUGO BLACK’S VISION 769
Frankfurter’s dissent, which suggested that the majority would enable a free speech
defense for a violation of ethics rules.785
Frankfurter authored the dissent, with Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker joining.786
He argued that, since the Bar association and the territorial and appellate courts had
reasonably concluded that the suspension was justified, the Court was not empow-
ered to set aside the order.787 As in Watkins788 and the two admissions decisions,789
he refused to concede that the First Amendment was implicated in Sawyer’s case.790
He also accused Brennan of parsing through Sawyer’s speech to arrive at the con-
clusion that Judge Wiig was not personally attacked, while in truth, the attack on Judge
Wiig “was direct and clear,” and the record of her conduct “replete with evidence to
support the conclusion that virtually the entire speech constituted a direct attack on the
judicial conduct of the trial.”791 To Frankfurter, in turn, this “impugned” the integrity
of the judge.792 Finally, Frankfurter injected into his dissent a comment that appeared
directed more at Black and his concern over a double standard toward defense coun-
sel than in opposition to Brennan. Frankfurter noted that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit had recently admonished a United States Attorney for
giving a public lecture on the ills of organized crime during a criminal trial of reputed
mob men.793 However, a public reprimand and disbarment are two different levels of
discipline, and if anything Frankfurter’s notice strengthened Black’s position that a
double standard existed.794
In a correspondence to Brennan, Whittaker summed up the judicial divide on the
relationship of attorney regulation and political affiliation between Black, Brennan,
Douglas, and Warren on the one side and Frankfurter, Clark, and Harlan on the other.795
Whittaker wrote that, “I have studied as carefully as I am able your opinion and Felix’
[sic] dissenting opinion in this case, both of which are strong. However, you and Felix
appear to be talking about different cases.”796
785 Id. at 646–47.
786 Id. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
787 Id. at 648.
788 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
789 Sacher v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1958); In re Isserman 345 U.S. 286 (1953).
790 Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 666–67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
791 Id. at 661, 664. Frankfurter conceded that the speech was not an act of obstruction of
justice. Id. at 661–62.
792 Id. at 662.
793 Id. at 667 (citing United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 270–72 (2d Cir. 1959)).
Indeed, the appellate court did not find the prosecutor’s misconduct rose to the level of a
reversible error. Id.
794 See supra Part II.G.
795 Letter from Justice Charles E. Whittaker to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Copy:
Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 24, 1959), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 38,
Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
796 Id.
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D. Konigsberg II
Following the Court’s remand in Konigsberg I, the California Supreme Court
ordered the SCBE to reopen its inquiry and provide Konigsberg another opportunity
to answer whether he had ever been a member of the CPUSA (or other organization
listed as subversive by the Attorney General).797 The SCBE renewed its line of ques-
tioning, and Konigsberg steadfastly refused to answer the Committee’s inquiry.798
Once more, the Committee found that Konigsberg failed to establish his “good moral
character” and “that he did not advocate [the] forceful overthrow of the government.”799
Konigsberg appealed to the state supreme court, challenging the finding on the same
basis as before.800 This time the court issued a published per curiam decision adverse
to Konigsberg,801 but with two justices dissenting.802
Justices Homer Spence, B. Rey Schauer, Marshall McComb, and John W. Shenk,
the Court’s conservative justices, determined to uphold the SCBE’s determination.803
In 1948, Shenk, Schauer, and Spence dissented against a decision which invalidated
California’s antimiscegenation law.804 In that decision, Traynor, in writing for the
majority, determined that the state could not constitutionally perpetuate racism by pro-
hibiting interracial marriage.805 Citing to Black’s majority decision in Konigsberg I,
in Konigsberg’s second review, the state supreme court held that the refusal to answer
the SCBE’s questions remained a viable avenue for excluding him and others similarly
797 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 344 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1959) (per curiam), aff’d 366
U.S. 36 (1961).
798 Id. at 779.
799 Id. at 778–79. Shenk served on the State Supreme Court from 1925 to 1959. GUIDE TO
THE JOHN W. SHENK PAPERS, 1900–1935, OAC.ORG (2009), available at http://www.oac
.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf029000wk?query=John (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
800 Konigsberg, 344 P.2d at 778.
801 Id. at 777.
802 Id. at 777, 778 (Traynor, Acting C.J., joined by Peters, J., dissenting).
803 Id. at 780. On McComb, see The Law: Zzzz, TIME MAG., Nov. 15, 1976. In 1972, he
dissented in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 889 (Cal. 1972) (en banc), which held that
the death penalty was unconstitutional. He became so angry at the majority that he stormed
out of the courtroom when the decision was publicly announced. Id. On the Court’s com-
position, see generally 2 J. EDWARD JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
OF CALIFORNIA, 1900–1950 (1966).
804 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 35, 47 (Cal. 1948). Recently, comparative analysis regard-
ing California’s attempted prohibition of same-sex marriage has brought Shenk out of complete
obscurity and has characterized him as a racist. See William N. Eskridge, Foreword: The
Marriage Cases—Reversing the Burden of Inertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1785, 1820 (2009). Eskridge writes, “[a]lmost any judge would prefer to
be remembered as Roger Traynor, who wrote the plurality opinion in Perez, rather than John
W. Shenk, who wrote a shrill dissenting opinion that many today would view as racist.” Id.
805 Perez, 198 P.2d at 25–27.
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situated who refused to answer inquiries into prior political activities, even though the
prior activities themselves might not be a basis for denying admission.806 Other than
citing to Konigsberg I, the per curiam decision cited to just two other United States
Supreme Court decisions, Beilan and Lerner.807
Traynor dissented once more, conceding that while Konigsberg I did not preclude
the SCBE’s denial of admission based on Konigsberg’s refusal to answer questions, a
more recent decision, Speiser v. Randall, did.808 He also accepted that present CPUSA
membership could adversely reflect on character.809 In Speiser, the Court struck down
a California tax exemption for veterans, except those unwilling to take a loyalty oath
or those who belonged to an organization on the Attorney General’s list.810 The Court’s
majority held that the exclusion of individuals on the basis of a loyalty oath was an
unconstitutional use of the state’s authority to tax because it was designed to deter the
right to free speech.811 In striking down the tax code provision, the Court also reversed
the state supreme court, which held, in a decision authored by Shenk, that the tax code
limited the freedom to act which is a narrower freedom than the freedom of speech.812
Traynor dissented from the majority in that decision, as well, urging that “a restraint
on free speech is not less a restraint when it is imposed indirectly through withhold-
ing a privilege rather than directly through taxation, fine, or imprisonment.”813 Now
in Konigsberg, Traynor dissented on the basis that the court had already established
Konigsberg’s moral character, as well as on the basis of ensuring an independent bar.814
The court’s newest Justice, Raymond Peters, also dissented.815 A 1927 graduate
of Boalt Hall,816 and classmate of Traynor’s,817 Peters became known as the second
liberal justice after Traynor.818 His dissent accused the majority of misconstruing
Konigsberg I, where the Court took notice of Konigsberg’s good character.819 “[I]f
the record before the high court established [Konigsberg’s good moral character] as
806 Konigsberg, 344 P.2d at 780.
807 Id. (citing Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) and Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958)).
808 Id. at 782 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
809 Id. at 781–82.
810 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
811 Id. at 528–29.
812 First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. Cnty. of L.A., 311 P.2d 508 (1957), rev’d, 357 U.S.
545 (1958).
813 Id. at 523 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
814 Konigsberg, 344 P.2d at 783 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
815 Id. at 783 (Peters, J., dissenting).
816 Roger J. Traynor, Justice Raymond E. Peters, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 559, 559 (1969).
817 Louis Farrell, Jr., It’s Great to Have Former Students Like This, 57 A.B.A. J. 823 (1971).
818 See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 54 (1989); ROGER K. NEWMAN, THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 545 (2009).
819 Konigsberg, 344 P.2d at 787–88 (Peters, J., dissenting).
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a matter of law, the record now before this court also, necessarily shows these facts
as a matter of law,” he concluded.820
Warren knew that Black remained steadfast in his determination to see Konigsberg
and others similarly situated admitted to their respective state bars, because to permit
exclusion would not only undermine the First Amendment, but also erode a critical
check against tyranny, the independent bar.821 But Black’s coalition numbered only
Warren, Douglas with Brennan filing a separate dissenting opinion.822 Harlan, had
Frankfurter, Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart to build on his original dissent in which
he determined that the original decision only held that Konigsberg had established
a prima facie case of good character.823
Frankfurter provided Harlan considerable input in the decision, encouraging him
to ensure Douds remained controlling precedent.824 Frankfurter’s clerk also reminded
him and Harlan that if Black were to prevail a second time, it “would require a reex-
amination of the premises of In re Summers.”825 Frankfurter agreed with this assess-
ment and conveyed it to Harlan.826 In contrast to Traynor’s dissent, Harlan made clear
that the Court, in Konigsberg I, had not mandated that Konigsberg possess the requisite
moral character for admission to the bar because such a mandate exceeded the Court’s
jurisdiction.827 He also sought to return the determination of bar admission solely to
the individual states.828
Harlan also challenged Black’s belief that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented
a state from denying admission based on an applicant’s refusal to provide otherwise
privileged answers.829 In part, his analysis rested on Adamson v. California,830 in which
820 Id. at 788.
821 See Conference Notes by Justice Earl Warren (undated) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 473).
822 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. 36, 56–80 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). Brennan filed a separate
dissenting opinion. See id. at 80–81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
823 Id. at 42–43 (majority opinion).
824 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice John M. Harlan (undated),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 63, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
825 Memorandum from Clerk T.A. to Justice Felix Frankfurter (undated), microformed on
Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 63, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
826 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice John M. Harlan (undated),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 63, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
827 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 43.
828 Id. at 44. Harlan cited to several decisions on this point including Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), which enabled a state to place a defendant in double jeopardy, but the
doctrine of deference on this matter, was overturned in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969). Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 44. Black voted with the majority in each decision.
Benton, 395 U.S. at 798; Palko, 302 U.S. at 329. Harlan would dissent in Benton, arguing
that Palko remained sound. Benton, 395 U.S. at 808 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
829 Id. at 44–45, 49–51 (relying in part on Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).
830 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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the Court earlier upheld the California’s criminal trial rules to permit a prosecutor to
comment on a defendant’s failure to take the stand in his own defense.831 In federal
criminal trials such an act would have been considered plain error in violation of the
Fifth Amendment,832 but, in Adamson, the Court decided that the states were free to
ignore this rule so long as the argument did not shift the burden of guilt on to the
defendant.833 By analogy, Harlan concluded that since in an administrative investi-
gation, the burden of evidence was already on the petitioner—unlike a defendant in
a criminal trial—the refusal to provide an answer was open for consideration.834
It was of no importance to Harlan that the requirement to answer the SCBE was
based on the judiciary’s supervisory authority.835 By implication, it was also irrelevant
that Konigsberg, and others similarly situated, who denied—even truthfully denied—
association with a subversive organization might then face a criminal charge of perjury,
because of the slovenliness and outright vindictiveness inherent in the contemporaneous
legislative investigations such as the Dies and Tenney Committees.836 In ignoring this
aspect of Konigsberg’s claim, Harlan minimized the efforts Black had undertaken to
diminish the weight given to CPUSA membership.837 Finally, Harlan distinguished that
Speiser overturned a rule designed to coerce, if not penalize, beliefs and it applied to
taxpayers rather than occupations.838
Harlan’s opinion was unlikely to impress Black who had dissented in Adamson
v. California,839 regretted his Palko v. Connecticut affirmance,840 and vehemently
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment wholly applied to state action.841 Joined by
Warren and Douglas, Black dissented, accusing the SCBE, the California Supreme
Court and Harlan’s majority of ignoring Konigsberg I.842 To Black, California’s pri-
mary argument—that the refusal to answer questions formed the basis for denial of
admission—was untenable.843 He pointed out that no law or judicial announcement ap-
plicable to all applicants existed which barred applicants who made similar refusals.844
Secondarily, he argued that CPUSA membership had never been declared a disqualifier
from admission, and, if the state determined that membership was a disqualifier, the
831 Id. at 57–58.
832 Id. at 55.
833 Id. at 58.
834 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 55–56.
835 Id. at 52–53.
836 See generally Lawrence A. Harper, Legislative Investigation of Un-American Activities
Exhibit A: The Tenney Committee, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 502 (1951).
837 See Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 44–45.
838 Id. at 53–55.
839 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see also BALL, supra note 13, at 214–18.
840 See BALL, supra note 13, at 212.
841 Id. at 211.
842 Konigsberg II, 366 U.S. at 56–57 (Black, J., dissenting).
843 Id. at 57–59.
844 Id. at 58.
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declaration would violate the prohibition against bills of attainder.845 After articulating
why the majority diminished the importance of the First Amendment, Black warned
that the majority’s decision could easily extend into blacklisting civil rights advocates
from practicing law.846 Black finalized his dissent with the observation that, “the fact
that Communists practice repression of these freedoms is, in my judgment, the last
reason in the world that we should do so.”847 Brennan separately dissented as well,848
with Warren joining him, on the basis that Speiser protected Konigsberg from being
denied admission to the bar.849
E. In re Anastaplo
No decision showed Black’s conception of the status of lawyers greater than In re
Anastaplo.850 The decision originated from an appeal of a denial of bar admission by
the Illinois Committee on Character and Fitness (ICCF).851 In 1950, George Anastaplo,
a University of Chicago Law School graduate,852 passed the Illinois Bar examination
but could not gain admission to the bar because he refused to answer inquiries as to
whether he had any affiliation with organizations listed on the Subversive Organizations
List, or had been a member of the Communist Party.853 The ICCF’s decision was not
unanimous, and the one dissenting member, Stephen Love, would side with Anastaplo
throughout the judicial process.854
Like Konigsberg and Schware, Anastaplo was a World War II veteran.855 At the
age of eighteen he enlisted and then served as an Army Air Forces navigator serving
845 Id. at 59–60.
846 Id. at 73–74. Here Black argued:
[I]n the currently prevailing atmosphere in this country, I can think of
few organizations active in favor of civil liberties that are not highly
controversial. In addition, it seems equally clear that anyone who had
already associated himself with an organization active in favor of civil
liberties before he developed an interest in the law, would, after this case,
be discouraged from spending the large amounts of time and money
necessary to obtain a legal education in the hope that he could practice
law in California.
Id. at 74.
847 Id. at 79.
848 Id. at 80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
849 Id. at 80–81.
850 366 U.S. 82, 115 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
851 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 827–28 (Ill. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 946 (1955),
reheard, 163 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. 1959), aff’d, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
852 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting).
853 Id. at 83–86 (majority opinion).
854 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d at 828.
855 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting).
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in both the Pacific and European theaters of operations.856 Born to a immigrant Greek
parents,857 who settled in the rural part of the state,858 Anastaplo possessed an academic
aptitude.859 After his military service he attended the University of Chicago860 and
earned bachelor and doctoral degrees in philosophy and then earned a juris doctor,
graduating at the top of his class.861 Unlike the other two petitioners, the state bar had
no evidence that Anastaplo had ever been a member of the CPUSA or even harbored
sympathy for that party’s aims.862 On the other hand, he believed that the inquiry
into his political beliefs intruded into his rights.863
In 1951, rather than appealing to the ICCF, Anastaplo appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court, challenging the ICCF’s decision.864 Anastaplo was determined to
represent himself pro se.865 However, the American Civil Liberties Union filed an
amicus brief signed by Leon Despres,866 a future Chicago alderman,867 Abner Mikva,
a future congressman and judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,868
Alexander Polikoff, who championed integrated fair public housing869 and Bernard
Weisberg, a future federal magistrate.870 Likewise, the National Lawyers Guild filed
an amicus brief.871
The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Joseph E. Dailey,
decided the appeal without dissent against Anastaplo.872 In addition to Dailey, the
court consisted of Justices Walter V. Schaefer, George W. Bristow, Ralph L. Maxwell,
William J. Fulton, Harry B. Hershey and Ray I. Klingbiel.873 Schaefer was a noted
856 Id. at 98.
857 COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 7, at 5.
858 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 98.
859 COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 7, at 6.
860 Id.
861 Id.
862 Id. at 7; see also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 86–87.
863 COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 7, at 6–7.
864 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 827–28 (Ill. 1954).
865 Id. at 827.
866 Id.
867 Hannah Fine, Leon Despres, Chicago Alderman and Civil Rights Activist with University
Ties, Dead at 101, CHI. MAROON, May 12, 2009, available at http://chicagomaroon.com
/2009/05/12/leon-despres-chicago-alderman-and-civil-rights-activist-with-university-ties
-dead-at-101/.
868 Abner Mikva, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, http://oce.house.gov/abner-mikva
.html (last updated Jan. 25, 2012).
869 See ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GATREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION,
HOUSING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO 6–7 (2006).
870 Kenan Heise, Obituary, Magistrate Bernard Weisberg, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1994 at 7.
871 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d at 827.
872 Id.
873 Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, THE THIRD BRANCH—A CHRONICLE OF THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT, http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/historical/justiceTL3
.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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legal scholar who authored and edited several treatises and his work has since been
cited by several federal and state courts.874 At one point President Lyndon Johnson, on
the advice of Abe Fortas, considered nominating Schaefer to the Supreme Court, but
did not do so, ultimately nominating Abe Fortas instead.875 Fulton was lesser known,
but had assisted in writing uniform rules for disbarment proceedings prior to World
War II.876 In 1969, Klingbiel became the subject of an investigation after a citizen un-
covered that he purchased stock in a corporation while an officer of the corporation had
a criminal conviction on appeal pending before the court, and had not recused himself
from the case.877 Klingbiel did not publicly report his purchase and voted to reverse
the conviction.878 He resigned rather than face impeachment, though in an interesting
decision authored by Schaefer, the court held that absent clear legislation, the impeach-
ment of judges was a judicial, rather than legislative, function.879
Daily noted that ordinarily the state judiciary would not review an appeal from the
ICCF’s decisions, but since Anastaplo claimed an abuse of discretion they would do
so.880 The Illinois court briefly summarized Anastaplo’s performance before the ICCF
as stating that a Communist Party member who is otherwise qualified should be ad-
mitted to the bar, and that he personally would “embrace” the overthrow of the govern-
ment “by force of arms” if “he could not agree with the existing government, or found
874 In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 n.10 (1983), the Court cited Walter V.
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956): “Of all
the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.” In 2003, the New
Jersey Superior Court cited to the same article for the proposition that, although a due process
rule might invalidate a confession to murder setting a potentially guilty defendant free, “[t]he
quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforce-
ment of its criminal law.” State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 483, 804 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)
(citing Schaefer, supra, at 26). For Schaefer’s other works, see, for example, WALTER V.
SCHAEFER, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1967). See also ILLINOIS CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT ANNOTATED, WITH FORMS: UNDER DIRECTION OF ILLINOIS STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION (1933); WALTER V: SCHAEFER, COURTS AND THE COMMONPLACES OF
FEDERALISM (1959); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE CONTROL OF “SUNBURSTS”: TECHNIQUES
OF PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING (1967); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY;
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES (1967).
875 See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
177 (1988). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., In Memoriam: Walter V. Schaefer, 80 NW.
U. L. REV. 1141, 1145–46 (1986).
876 See Charles S. Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 TEX. L. REV. 161, 181 (1946).
877 Jerome B. Meites & Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the
Assault on Judicial Independence, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 741, 755 (1998). One general history
on the scandal has been published. See KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE
SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN PAUL STEVENS 3–4 (2001).
878 Meites & Pflaum, supra note 877, at 755.
879 Id. at 756–57; see also Cusack v. Howlett, 254 N.E.2d 506, 511–12 (Ill. 1969).
880 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ill. 1954).
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it unsatisfactory.”881 None of his answers indicated that he was a member of the CPUSA
or even a “Fellow Traveler.”882 Anastaplo’s theory of government mirrored more of a
Jeffersonian and Madisonian view than it did a Marxist belief. As a result, the Illinois
Supreme Court focused its decision as to whether Anastaplo’s refusal to answer
whether he was a CPUSA member or a member of another subversive organization
masking as a Communist front could be a basis for denial of admission.883
The state supreme court began its analysis with the related principles that the right
to practice law is a privilege, and the conferring of a license enables a person to practice
law.884 This construct was governed by state statute, and, moreover, as the state had
an interest in ensuring lawyers would adhere to the rules of fairness, the requirement
of good moral character is a reasonable requirement.885 Additionally, the state supreme
court found that the oath to support both the United States Constitution, and the Illinois
Constitution was relevant to the public’s confidence in the state and federal judicial
systems.886 Until this point, few legal scholars or attorneys would have likely refuted
the state supreme court’s logic. Indeed, the state court intertwined the line of public
employment cases in finding that lawyers hold a unique position of public trust.887
The state supreme court, however, next analyzed Communism as a political force,
as well as the CPUSA’s goals.888 Its analysis came almost solely from Dennis and
Jackson’s concurrence in Douds.889 From Dennis, the Illinois Court quoted: “[t]heir
conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow
of the Government of the United States by force and violence created a ‘clear and
present danger’ of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence.”890
From Jackson’s Douds concurrence, the state supreme court quoted “the Communist
Party is something different in fact from any other substantial party we have known,
and hence may constitutionally be treated as something different in law.”891 Finally,
the state supreme court found it relevant that the state appellate courts of California,892
881 Id. at 828–29.
882 Id.; see also supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
883 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d at 830–31.
884 Id. at 829.
885 Id.
886 Id.
887 Id. at 830–31.
888 Id. at 829–30.
889 Id.
890 Id. (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–517 (1950)).
891 Id. at 830 (citing Am. Comm’n Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 424 (1958) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
892 See Bd. of Educ. of City of L.A. v. Wilkinson, 270 P.2d 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
Notably, the California intermediate appellate court held:
In the life-and-death struggle into which our people have been plunged
by the monstrous conspiracy called communism, it is becoming more 
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Massachusetts,893 and New York894 had similarly found that the CPUSA was a sub-
versive, continuing conspiracy against the government.895 However, each of these three
cases involved public teachers rather than lawyers, and while a teacher possesses public
stature, there was, and is, a different requirement to become a teacher than a lawyer.896
Interestingly, the Illinois Supreme Court also found it compelling that a Canadian
appellate court had upheld a prohibition against communists becoming admitted to
the bar.897
The state supreme court conceded that it had never determined whether CPUSA
membership was a disqualifier from bar admission, but it now did so, holding that be-
cause “[t]he relation of the court and its attorneys to the people is one of high re-
sponsibility, involving on the one hand complete trust and confidence and on the other
absolute fidelity and integrity,” membership in the CPUSA was an automatic barrier
to bar admission.898 This aspect of the decision was problematic from the standpoint
of notice. Prior to the state court ruling, no CPUSA member was on notice that this
affiliation could serve as a prohibition against admission.899
Finally, the state supreme court briefly addressed Anastaplo’s contention that
the ICCF had infringed on his right of free speech.900 The court held that since ad-
mission to the bar is a privilege rather than a right,901 the reasonable regulation of
the First Amendment was lawful since Anastaplo could “retain his beliefs and go
elsewhere.”902 In support of this position the state court pointed to its opinion in In
re Summers.903 Anastaplo petitioned the Court for a grant of certiorari, but only Black
and more apparent that it is essential for the continuance of our national life that
we know who is for us and who is against us. This is no time to allow any person
who would destroy us, our liberties, our religious convictions, and our
government to be employed in any branch of that government, . . . “to bite the
hand that feeds it.” The men and women of America who pay their salaries have
a right to know whether or not any of their employees are communists.
Id. at 86.
893 Faxon v. Sch. Comm. of Boston, 120 N.E.2d 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 1954).
894 Daniman v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 119 N.E.2d 373 (N.Y. 1954).
895 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ill. 1954).
896 Id. at 831.
897 Id. at 830 (citing Martin v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173). The Canadian court
provided that, “[t]he Marxist philosophy of law and government in its essence is so inimical
in theory and practice to our constitutional system and free society that a person professing
them is io ipso not a fit and proper person to practice law.” Id.
898 Id. at 831 (internal quotation marks omitted).
899 But see id. at 832–33 (arguing that applicants are aware of character and fitness require-
ments and are thus on notice that they must respond to inquiries).
900 Id. at 831.
901 Id. at 832.
902 Id.
903 Id.
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and Douglas voted in favor of the grant.904 However, he would ultimately prevail in
obtaining a grant.905
After the Supreme Court issued Schware and Konigsberg I, Anastaplo succeeded
in petitioning the ICCF to reconsider its earlier decision to block him from entry into
the bar.906 Between February 28 and May 19, 1958, the ICCF held hearings, generat-
ing over four hundred pages of transcripts.907 During their questioning of Anastaplo,
one of the ICCF members queried him on his religious beliefs.908 The ICCF itself
determined the questions on applicants religion were improper and this issue would
not escape the Court’s attention.909 Several University of Chicago faculty members, as
well as licensed attorneys, testified as to Anastaplo’s fitness for admission.910 None-
theless, because Anastaplo did not renounce the abstract possibility of supporting the
overthrow of the state or federal government, the ICCF, by a vote of eleven to six, con-
tinued to refuse him admission into the bar.911 His refusal to renounce the overthrow
of the government was not the central reason for denial of admission, partly because
he did, in the hearings, state emphatically that he would never advise or encourage
a client to this course of action and comply with the canons of attorney ethics.912 The
principal reason for the Committee’s refusal was that he declined to answer whether
he was a CPUSA member.913
Interestingly, the state supreme court had recently decided another bar admission
case, in which the applicant, Ira Latimer, had admitted to being a CPUSA member,
until that party’s leaders refused to work alongside of socialists and other political
groups.914 Also, unlike Anastaplo, Latimer had a poor academic record, having been
removed from DePaul University’s law school as well as the Chicago- Kent Law
School.915 As part of his challenge, Latimer castigated the individual members of the
ICCF.916 He also failed to list numerous lawsuits he was involved in despite being
904 In re Anastaplo, 348 U.S. 946 (1955) (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting).
905 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
906 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ill. 1960).
907 Id.
908 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 83, 102 (Black, J., dissenting); In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d
at 441 (Bristow, J., dissenting).
909 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 85.
910 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d at 442–43.
911 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 86–87 (majority opinion); id. at 100 (Black, J., dissenting).
912 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d at 432–33.
913 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 86–87.
914 In re Latimer, 143 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Ill. 1957).
915 Id. at 22. Latimer had a colorful past. He was the mayor of Minneapolis’s illegitimate
son. See People, TIME MAG., July 8, 1935, at 56. It is said that he accosted his father in
public. Id.
916 Latimer, 143 N.E.2d at 23–24.
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questioned on his personal litigation.917 Not surprisingly the state supreme court up-
held the denial of admission.918
Although the state supreme court granted review, it did not provide Anastaplo
with any relief.919 For one, the author of the first decision, Joseph Daily,920 joined in
the second decision issued per curiam.921 Justice Maxwell died in office in 1956 and
was replaced by Byron O. House, and Charles H. Davis succeeded William Fulton
who had retired.922 This time Daily and the majority stated that CPUSA membership
could be a complete bar to admission to practice law.923 Daily also relied on Orloff
v. Willoughby924 a national security decision, to support the denial of admission to
CPUSA members.925 Moreover, he also determined that the importance of assuring
good character was related to proof that an applicant could, “in good conscience take
the attorney’s oath to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and the
State of Illinois.”926 Citing to In re Isserman, Dennis, and Sacher, he hinted that a
CPUSA member or individual who shared the party’s aims could not provide the oath
in good conscience.927
This time Bristow, who sided with the denial of admission in the first decision,
dissented on the basis of Konigsberg I and Schware.928 He called the majority’s char-
acterization of Anastaplo “distorted,” and accused the per curiam of trying “to create
917 Id. at 25.
918 Id. Unlike Anastaplo, Latimer eventually became a lawyer. See Ira Latimer; Battled for
Civil Rights, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1985, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-02-17/news
/8501090867_1_small-business-civil-rights-public-utility-companies.
919 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. 1959), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
920 In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 827 (Ill. 1954) (Daily, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 348
U.S. 946 (1955).
921 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d at 429.
922 See Illinois Office of the Secretary of State, BLUEBOOK OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 148
(1961); MANASTER, supra note 877, at 88; Charles H. Davis: Previous Illinois Supreme Court
Justice, THE THIRD BRANCH—A CHRONICLE OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT, http://www
.state.il.us/court (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
923 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d at 439 (arguing that, because CPUSA supports the over-
throw of the government, failing to answer questions shows that the applicant does not recog-
nize the higher state interest of protecting the integrity of the legal profession, and, therefore,
fails to demonstrate proper character).
924 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953). In Orloff, a medical doctor had successfully
sought a commission in the Air Force, but, after military officials discovered he had been a
member of a listed subversive organization, his commission was revoked. Id. at 89. The Army
then drafted the medical doctor as an enlisted man. Id.
925 In re Anastaplo, 163 N.E.2d at 434.
926 Id. at 439.
927 Id. at 438 (citing In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953), Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S.
1 (1952), and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
928 Id. at 439 (citing Konigsberg I, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), and Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs,
291 P.2d 607 (N.M. 1955)).
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the taint that [Anastaplo] believes in a subversive political philosophy by quoting iso-
lated statements out of context from the 1951 record . . . .”929 Bristow argued that the
per curiam opinion had also ignored the weight of support leaders of the bar had given
Anastaplo that reflected he possessed the scholarly ability to become a leader of the
bar.930 Although Bristow could not have known that the Court itself would shortly
undermine Konigsberg I, he protested the per curiam’s “ineffective” efforts “to whittle
it away and to avoid it as precedent.”931 In particular, Bristow found it offensive that
the per curiam simply viewed Konigsberg I as a reflection of California’s failure to
adequately warn an applicant that his refusal to answer questions involving political
beliefs violated fairness.932
Schaefer and Davis also dissented, but were unable to add their dissents to the im-
mediate published opinion.933 Both justices urged that the issue was more complex
than Anastaplo’s failure to answer questions the committee deemed relevant, particu-
larly because there simply was no evidence that he was ever a CPUSA member or even
had any sympathy for the goals of that, or any other subversive, party.934 To this end,
both justices argued that Anastaplo had proven, by a wide margin, that he possessed
the requisite character for admission.935
As in the case of Konigsberg II, Warren found himself with Black, Douglas, and
Brennan in the dissent.936 Frankfurter then assigned Harlan to write for the majority.937
Again, Frankfurter provided considerable input to Harlan, encouraging him to mini-
mize the ICCF’s inquiry into Anastaplo’s religious faith, calling it “an ugly incident,”
929 Id. at 440 (Bristow, J., dissenting).
930 Id. at 442–43.
931 Id. at 446.
932 Id. at 447.
933 Id. at 451.
934 Id. at 928–29 (Schaefer and Davis, JJ., dissenting).
935 Id. at 929. Particularly instructive on this point is Schaefer’s statement:
We think that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to decide this matter
as though it called for an exercise of the ultimate limits of State power
with respect to admission to the legal profession. What is involved is
no more than an appraisal of the applicant’s moral character and his
fitness to practice law. His views upon the right of revolution were
fully expounded before the Committee. Those views are incompatible
with membership in the Communist Party, or with anything resembling
subversion. It is hard to understand the logic of a position that permits
the applicant to expound at length upon his views as to the right of revo-
lution but prevents him from answering questions as to Communist Party
membership. But we cannot say that what seems to us to be a logical
inconsistency is a reflection upon his character
Id. at 928–29.
936 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97 (1960).
937 Id. at 83.
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but insisting “its occurrence cannot be said to have deprived Anastaplo of due warn-
ing as to the consequences of failing to answer the question regarding Communist
Party membership.”938
In the opinion, Harlan discussed the lengthy ICCF inquiry in which “Anastaplo
undertook to expound and defend, on historical and ideological premises, his abstract
belief in the ‘right of revolution,’ and to resist, on grounds of asserted constitutional
right and scruple, Committee questions which he deemed improper.”939 Harlan con-
ceded that the ICCF had uncontroverted evidence of Anastaplo’s good character.940
However, citing to Konigsberg I, he reiterated that the state’s interest in enforcing
a rule against non-disclosure of questions involving subversive organizations out-
weighed Anastaplo’s free speech rights.941 Ironically, Harlan distinguished Anastaplo’s
case from Konigsberg II by stating that while Konigsberg was confronted by “some,
though weak, independent evidence,” of a tie to the CPUSA, no evidence existed
against Anastaplo.942 However, Harlan also noted that Anastaplo had clearer warning
than Konigsberg that his refusal to answer an inquiry into ties to subversive organi-
zations would preclude him from bar admission.943 Perhaps because Harlan believed
he provided ample constitutional analysis in Konigsberg I, he concluded with a non-
answer to the issue raised by stating there was “nothing to suggest that he would not
be admitted now if he decides to answer, assuming of course that no grounds justify-
ing his exclusion from practice resulted. In short, petitioner holds the key to admission
in his own hands.”944
Joined by Warren, Douglas, and Brennan, Black coupled his Konigsberg II dissent
to In re Anastaplo.945 He emphasized that no evidence to tie Anastaplo to any subver-
sive organization existed and that Anastaplo’s statements on the right of rebellion came
straight from the Declaration of Independence, hardly a communist document.946 That
the ICCF sent agents to Anastaplo’s childhood residence and still found nothing was
particularly galling to Black.947 He derided Harlan’s balancing test as “any State may
938 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter for Justice John M. Harlan (undated),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 63, Series II (Harvard Law Sch.).
939 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 85.
940 Id. at 85.
941 Id. at 89.
942 Id. at 89–90 (noting that while the cases are technically distinguishable, there is “no
valid constitutional distinction” to be made between them).
943 Id. at 90–91. Harlan noted, “[o]n the part of Anastaplo, he stands in the unusual
position of one who had already been clearly so warned as a result of his earlier exclusion
from the bar for refusal to answer the very question which was again put to him on
rehearing.” Id. at 91.
944 Id. at 97. Harlan also concluded that the Court would not go so far to intrude into the
state’s own rules on attorney admissions in this instance. Id.
945 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
946 Id. at 103–04.
947 Id. at 106–07.
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now reject an applicant for admission to the Bar if he believes in the Declaration of
Independence as strongly as Anastaplo and if he is willing to sacrifice his career and
his means of livelihood in defense of the freedoms of the First Amendment.”948 But
Black was not finished, and, in his conclusion, he provided his views on the necessity
of the independent bar and the duties of lawyers to defend individuals considered
noxious to American ideals, even when the attorneys found their defendant’s beliefs
abhorrent to democracy.949 To do so, he listed historic examples of preeminent attor-
neys who held political beliefs across the spectrum from the conservative former Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Sr. to Clarence Darrow.950 Finally, Black ended with
the admonition that “[w]e must not be afraid to be free.”951
When Black circulated his draft dissent on March 30, 1961, only Douglas recom-
mended stylistic changes.952 By April 19, 1961, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan had
joined,953 though Brennan added his own minor dissent which essentially mirrored his
dissent in Konigsberg II.954 Both Brennan and Warren voiced concerns to Black re-
garding the concluding “sweep of history,” at the end of the dissent but went along
with Black at any rate.955
948 Id. at 112.
949 Id. at 115–16.
950 Id. at 115. Here Black argued:
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of
the law—men like Malsherbes, who, at the cost of his own life and the
lives of his family, sprang unafraid to the defense of Louis XVI against
the fanatical leaders of the Revolutionary government of France—men
like Charles Evans Hughes, Sr., later Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who stood
up for the constitutional rights of socialists to be socialists and public
officials despite the threats and clamorous protests of self-proclaimed
superpatriots—men like Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and John W. Davis,
who, while against everything for which the Communists stood, strongly
advised the Congress in 1948 that it would be unconstitutional to pass
the law then proposed to outlaw the Communist Party—men like Lord
Erskine, James Otis, Clarence Darrow, and the multitude of others who
have dared to speak in defense of causes and clients without regard to
personal danger to themselves. The legal profession will lose much of its
nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like
these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-
serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.
Id. at 114–16 (citation omitted).
951 Id. at 116.
952 Draft Konigsberg II Dissent by Justice Hugo L. Black (Mar. 30, 1961) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 468).
953 Draft Konigsberg II Dissent by Justice Hugo L. Black (Apr. 19, 1961) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 468).
954 Draft Konigsberg II Dissent by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 10, 1961) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 468).
955 NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 507. However, Warren’s reticence is not contained in
Black’s correspondence in which Warren simply asked to join in the dissent. See Letter from
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There is another aspect to Black’s In re Anastaplo dissent that differed from his
relations with the other two petitioners. Black developed a personal relationship with
Anastaplo,956 and he found it humorous that, in 1960, as the decision was pending
before the Court, Anastaplo traveled across Europe with his family and while in the
Soviet Union was arrested, prosecuted, and expelled from the country under its polit-
ical subversion laws.957 Anastaplo became a noted professor and author.958 In 1965, he
asked Black to write a preface for one of his books, but Black apologetically declined
stating that he had adopted “a practice against writing prefaces and book reviews.”959
In 1969, Anastaplo wrote to Black, explaining that his reason for not pursuing ad-
mission to the bar, even after the political conditions had changed was to pursue other
scholarship.960 Black responded,
Maybe there is no need for me to do so, but I take great pride in
the course you have followed since your case in Illinois and at this
Court. You have acted with great dignity and have, in my judg-
ment, established the fact that you are not destined to be the great
extremist which some people thought you were sure to become.961
CONCLUSION
In a 1996 Drake Law Review article Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg penned:
In a series of divided opinions running from 1957 until 1971—
decisions less than crystalline in quality—the Court dealt with
denial of bar membership based on refusal to respond to inquiries
Justice Earl Warren to Justice Hugo L. Black (Apr. 3, 1961) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 468).
956 See generally Correspondence of Justice Hugo L. Black and George Anastaplo (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 345).
957 Letter from George Anastaplo to Justice Hugo L. Black (Aug. 28, 1969) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 345); see also, e.g.,
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 252–53 (1976).
958 See George Anastaplo, George Anastaplo: An Autobiographical Bibliography (1947–
2001), 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 581, 581 (2000) (outlining the work of George Anastaplo).
959 Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to George Anastaplo (June 1, 1965) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 345).
960 Letter from George Anastaplo to Justice Hugo L. Black, supra note 957. Anastaplo
penned Black, “In the event, I decided that the best ‘argument’ I could make on behalf of the
position I stood for was to forget about the bar and provide the minority that had supported me
a record of decent work by me in the classics, political philosophy and constitutional law.” Id.
961 Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to George Anastaplo (Sept. 2, 1969) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 345).
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concerning Communist Party membership. The Court held it im-
proper to close the profession to persons based solely on party
affiliation, but allowed inquiry designed to determine whether an
applicant had joined an organization intending to further unlawful
ends. Developments in First and Fifth Amendment law coinciding
with the wind down and end of the Cold War era may render this
wavering line of decisions slim in precedential value.962
In a broader context, Cold War historian David Caute assessed the judiciary’s role
during the age of McCarthyism as: “[s]hamefully as the American judiciary bowed
and bent to the Realpolitik of the ‘American Century,’ it never completely abdicated
its independence and was soon able to stage an admirable recovery of nerve, restoring
sap to the Bill of Rights, vitality to the Constitution . . . .”963
The latter two licensure cases, however, have never been overturned, and Justice
Ginsburg’s observations and Caute’s broader statement, though perhaps correct, are
only so in the respect that it is exceedingly rare that a prospective attorney is denied
admission based on a belief, and in such instances the denial is based on individual
beliefs, such as the refusal to provide legal services on the basis of race or gender,
rather than political associations.964 However, there is a difference between prece-
dential value and historic importance, the former being a narrower category than the
latter. And, the last two licensure decisions have been utilized and incorporated in
both quiet and not so quiet ways.
While the Court deliberated on the second two licensure cases, it also decided
Cohen v. Hurley, which arose from a New York disbarment proceeding.965 On its
face, the facts had nothing to do with the zealous representation of persons accused
of subversion,966 or attorney applicants who claimed a privilege against divulging
political associations.967 The disbarment occurred after an attorney asserted a privi-
lege against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions regarding his legal
practice during a judicial inquiry into fee splitting in what was then termed as the
962 Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Supreme Court Discourse on the Good Behavior of Lawyers:
Leeway Within Limits, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 183, 189 (1996) (citation omitted).
963 DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND
EISENHOWER 17 (1978).
964 See, e.g., In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1999) (Heiple, J., dissenting). After the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the decision of its appointed board, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari without comment. Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness of the Ill. Bar,
530 U.S. 1261 (2000). Finally, for Hale’s second and unsuccessful attack against the state bar
in the federal judiciary see, Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness for the State of Ill., 335
F.3d 678 (2003).
965 366 U.S. 117, 117 (1961).
966 Id. at 120–21.
967 Id.
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“Brooklyn ‘ambulance chasing’ Judicial Inquiry.”968 Clearly, the discipline of attor-
neys who violated ethics rules was essential to the integrity of the profession, and, on
this point, both Black and Harlan agreed.969 However, Harlan cited to Konigsberg II
and In re Anastaplo for the proposition that the refusal to answer inquiries could result
in denial of practice.970 Harlan also pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
protect the petitioner, even if the assertion of the privilege was made in good faith.971
Not surprisingly, Black dissented, but this time only Warren and Douglas joined.972
In his dissent, Black provided perhaps his most eloquent exposition of the importance
of attorneys in preserving freedom.973 After accusing the majority of permitting discrim-
ination against attorneys by allowing a state to penalize an individual for the assertion
of a privilege, he stated:
I would think that the important role that lawyers are called upon
to play in our society would make it all the more imperative that
they not be discriminated against with regard to the basic freedoms
that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical
exertion of governmental power. For, in my judgment, one of the
great purposes underlying the grant of those freedoms was to
give independence to those who must discharge important public
responsibilities. The legal profession, with responsibilities as
great as those placed upon any group in our society, must have
that independence. If it is denied them they are likely to become
nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields
governmental power at the moment.974
As Black concluded, he admonished the majority for pursuing a legal theory found
in Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson,975 and then exposed what he felt
was the true danger in the majority’s decision—the risk to the First Amendment.976
He reminded the majority that the Dennis attorneys were unjustly imprisoned and
disbarred,977 Harriet Sawyer’s career was barely saved by a five-to-four vote,978 and
968 Id. at 119.
969 Id. at 122–24 (majority opinion); id. at 138 (Black, J., dissenting).
970 Id. at 122–23 (majority opinion).
971 Id. at 125.
972 Id. at 131 (Black, J., dissenting).
973 See generally id. at 131–45.
974 Id. at 138.
975 Id. at 142 n.23.
976 Id. at 142–43.
977 Id. at 144 (discussing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
978 Id. at 144–45 (discussing In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959)).
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two prospective attorneys were prevented from admission to the bar because they
would not terminate their First Amendment rights.979
The dissent in Cohen was, in part, a victim of its own making as ambulance chasing
attorneys can hardly be argued as engendering public sympathy.980 Douglas attempted
to inject sarcasm into the dissent, writing in his draft that if he were “facetious, [he]
could imitate a recent T.V. orator and say there must have been Communists among
the Founding Fathers; why else did they write the Fifth Amendment.”981 Once more
Douglas decided to omit a caustic passage.982 There is one other point of importance
regarding Cohen and its relation to Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo. In Spevack
v. Klein,983 a 1967 disbarment decision which arose from an attorney’s assertion of a
Fifth Amendment privilege before a disciplinary investigation, the Court’s majority in-
cluded the odd language, “[w]e conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled.”984
But it did not overrule Cohen, and this partly had to do with Justice Fortas’s insis-
tence on a narrowly tailored decision.985 Nor would the Court ever expressly overrule
Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo.
In 1967, in Felber v. Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York,986 Black dis-
sented from a denial of certiorari to a petitioner who unsuccessfully sued for reinstate-
ment on grounds similar to those raised in Theard.987 The petitioner in Felber was
convicted in 1941, but an appellate court voided the conviction.988 Nonetheless, the
979 Id. at 145.
980 Douglas seemed to understand this issue writing to Black, “[i]n light of the Beilan . . .
and Lerner . . . cases, this case, if granted, would seem to stand very little chance of being
reversed. . . . [However,] [i]f the action in the Konigsberg case and Anastaplo is eventually
determined to exceed due process because arbitrary, this case might well go the same way.”
Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 1, 1960) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 1249). Warren
warned Black on this point too. See Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice Hugo
L. Black (Apr. 24, 1961) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of
William O. Douglas, Box 1249).
981 Draft Cohen Dissent by Justice William O. Douglas (undated) (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 1249). Douglas noted
that he obtained this statement from Judge Rifkind. Id.
982 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 150 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
983 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
984 Id. at 514.
985 On this point, see Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice William O.
Douglas (Jan. 12, 1967) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of
William O. Douglas, Box 1388). Fortas believed that a broad opinion would enable police
and public servant misconduct, and Black, Brennan, and Douglas acquiesced. Id.
986 386 U.S. 1005 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
987 Id.; Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957) (regarding the disbarment of a lawyer
for forging a promissory note).
988 Felber, 386 U.S. at 1005.
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Bar had continued to refuse to readmit the petitioner, and Black urged that the Court
would strengthen Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo unless it granted certiorari and
reversed the New York bar.989 However, he could only muster Douglas to join him.990
In two of Black’s last decisions, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and In re Stolar
he was able to muster a majority to protect the First Amendment rights of attorney
applicants,991 but not to the point of overturning Konigsberg II or In re Anastaplo.992
In Baird, the petitioner refused to answer whether she had ever been a CPUSA mem-
ber or a member of another subversive organization, and the state bar subsequently
denied her admission.993 The state’s perjury statute applied to the bar application.994
The decision rested on the First Amendment, as well as the privilege against self
incrimination,995 and in it Black concluded that admission to the bar is a right conferred
after proving moral character and attainment of learning.996 Nonetheless, the Court did
not overturn Konigsberg II or In re Anastaplo, a fact pointed out by Blackmun in his
dissent.997 Blackmun appeared to pick up where Harlan had left off. Indeed, Blackmun
disregarded his clerk’s advice, and was coached by Harlan.998 “I realize that it is pos-
sible for one to have had membership in the party or even presently to have it and at
the same time not subscribe to its advocacy of violent overthrow. Yet, I always get the
impression that in cases of this kind, the applicant is dodging something,” Blackmun
informed his clerks.999 “He is not arguing innocently First and Fifth and Fourteenth
989 Id. at 1006; see also Draft Felber Dissent by Justice Hugo L. Black (Apr. 14, 1967)
(on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 394).
In his draft Black stated that Konigsberg II and Anastaplo were wrongly decided. Id.
990 Id. at 1005.
991 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 24 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 2 (1971).
992 Baird, 401 U.S. at 11–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
993 Id. at 4–5 (majority opinion).
994 Id. at 5.
995 Id. at 6.
996 Id. at 8.
997 Id. at 11–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
998 See Letter from Clerk D.B.E. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Jan. 29, 1971) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 119). After
assuring Blackmun that Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo would remain in effect regardless of
Black’s majority opinion, his clerk D.B.E. wrote, “I think that your argument that Konigsberg
and In re Anastaplo somehow support the proposition that refusal to answer questions other than
those touching on C.P. membership would be ‘obstructive’ is unconvincing.” Id. On Harlan’s
input, see Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 3, 1971) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 119).
Blackmun, also wished to publicly air the Court’s divide on this issue informing the reporter
of decisions not to name Black, but to refer to his decision as “the plurality.” Letter from Justice
Harry A. Blackmun to Henry Putzel, Jr. (Mar. 5, 1971) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 119).
999 Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Clerk D.B.E. (Oct. 13, 1970) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 119).
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Amendment rights as a matter of theory, but as a protective device. He wants the
privileges of our government, and yet would overthrow it.”1000
Black also prevailed in In re Stolar, a case decided on similar grounds as Baird,
but without overturning Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo.1001 Blackmun’s clerk
found the two licensure cases to be nearly successful attempts to rid the bar of the
politically unpopular and limit representation for dissident groups.1002 But in Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., v. Wadmond, Black once more found
himself in the dissent.1003 This decision arose from a challenge from law students who
had not yet applied for bar admission, challenging state bar inquiries into past mem-
bership of listed subversive organizations.1004 Stewart wrote the majority opinion,1005
and Black dissented on First Amendment grounds.1006 In a conference memorandum,
Blackmun penned, “[i]t seems to me that the state may properly inquire whether the
applicant is a knowing member of an organization that advocates violent overthrow
of the government,” before claiming that entering the practice of law is a privilege and
not a right.1007 Black disagreed stating, “I do not think that a State can, consistently
with the First Amendment, exclude an applicant because he has belonged to organi-
zations that advocate violent overthrow of the Government, even if his membership
was ‘knowing’ and he shared the organization’s aims.”1008
Justice Ginsburg authored her article before the “War on Terror.”1009 As noted in
the Introduction, in the past decade, some writers have argued that attorneys defending
suspected terrorists have been held to a double standard,1010 as Black feared existed.1011
But, the state bars have not excluded persons on the basis of race or religious or polit-
ical associations.1012 Admittedly, al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations do not have
the numbers of members the CPUSA or fellow travelers once had,1013 and the CPUSA
1000 Id.
1001 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971); id. at 31. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1002 Letter from Clerk D.B.E. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 998.
1003 401 U.S. 154, 174–75 (1974) (Black, J., dissenting).
1004 Id. at 157, 164 (majority opinion).
1005 Id. at 156.
1006 Id. at 174. (Black, J., dissenting).
1007 Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference (undated) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Box 121).
Harlan agreed with Blackmun’s assessment. Id.
1008 Law Students Research Council, 401 U.S. at 175 (Black, J., dissenting).
1009 Ginsberg, supra note 962, at 183; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (joint resolution starting the “war on terror”).
1010 See e.g., Basile, supra note 21, at 1831; Clare, supra note 21, at 661–62; Keeley, supra
note 21, at 847; Margulies, supra note 21, at 192; Moliterno, supra note 21, at 752–53.
1011 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 86, 114–16 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
1012 But see In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1999) (denying petitioner’s application to the
bar due to his open racism).
1013 Compare Ken Silverstein, The Al-Qaeda Clubhouse: Members Lacking, HARPERS, July 5,
2006, http://harpers.org/archive/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed-1151963690
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was an adversary of a different nature.1014 Yet, when a government attorney named
Charles “Cully” Stimson, employed by the Department of Defense, publicly urged
defense contractors discontinue their attorney-client relationship with counsel defend-
ing suspected terrorists, the Defense Department’s leadership distanced the government
from Stimson’s comments, and the bar largely condemned the remarks.1015 Thus, a
different environment exists from what appalled Black during the Cold War. On the
other hand, vigilance against the reuse and revival of Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo
is essential to ensuring the Cold War environment does not return, and the strength of
the First Amendment is preserved as the preeminent right that Justice Black believed
it to be. However, this is not to be successfully achieved by exaggerating or conflating
the historic record.
(postulating that there were between 500 and 1,000 members of al-Qaeda near September 11,
2001), with PHILIP R. YANNELLA, AMERICAN LITERATURE IN CONTEXT AFTER 1929, at 12–13
(2011) (estimating CPUSA had 65,000 members in 1935).
1014 Sharia: The Threat to America: An Exercise in Competitive Analysis (Report of Team
‘B’ II), CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY 9 (2010), available at http://familysecuritymatters.org/doclib
/20100915_Shariah-TheThreattoAmerica.pdf.
1015 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Ethical Dimension of National Security Law, 50 S. TEX.
L. REV. 789, 799 (2009). As a caveat, the then–Deputy Judge Advocate of the Air Force, Judge
Advocate General’s Corps, supervised this author, who remains an admirer and supporter of
Major General Dunlap’s lawfare theories. For more information on the incident involving
Stimson, see Editorial, Unveiled Threats: A Bush Appointee’s Crude Gambit on Detainees’
Legal Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18. Moreover, if an attorney or law firm believed
that the comments actually reflected policy, it would likely place the prosecution in peril of
losing jurisdiction.
